Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1If he ascertains (beforehand) that those whose opinion is in accordance with the Dhamma are in the majority, the vote is to be taken undisguisedly, openly. Thus, O Bhikkhus, is the open method of taking the votes. ‘These, O Bhikkhus, are the three methods of taking the votes!’ 27. ‘By how many kinds of settlement is a legal question arising out of censure settled? A legal question arising out of censure can be settled by four kinds of settlement—by the Proceeding in Presence—by the Proceeding for those who are consciously innocent—by the Proceeding for those who are no longer out of their mind—by the Proceeding for those who are obstinate. ‘If one should ask, “Can it be that a legal question arising out of censure, without recourse being had to two modes of settlement—to wit, the Proceeding for those who are no longer out of their mind, and the ' This naive chapter would seem to show that the pia fraus was not unknown to the Buddhist monks at the time when the Kullavagga was composed. Buddhaghosa’s note (given at p. 315 of H. O.’s edition of the text) specifies the different occasions when each of the three methods should be used. 58 KULLAVAGGA. IV, 14, 24. Proceeding for those who are obstinate—may be settled by the two other modes of settlement—to wit, the Proceeding in Presence, and the Proceeding for those who are consciously innocent ?” he should be told, “ Yes, it can.” (If he should say), “ How may that be ?” the answer should be as follows: ‘In case the Bhikkhus bring a groundless charge against a Bhikkhu of a breach of morality. In respect thereof, O Bhikkhus, to that Bhikkhu whose memory in regard to the matter is quite clear, the Proceeding for the consciously innocent is to be accorded. ‘And thus, O Bhikkhus, is to be granted (&c., as in chapter 4, § 10, down to the end, with the necessary alterations for a general rule instead of a particular case). ‘This, O Bhikkhus, is called a legal question that has been settled. And how settled? By the Proceeding in Presence, and by the Proceeding for the consciously innocent. And what therein belongs to the Proceeding in Presence? The presence of the Samgha, and the presence of the Dhamma, and the presence of the Vinaya, and the presence of the particular person. And therein what is the presence of the Samgha (&c., as in § 16, down to the end)? And what therein belongs to the’ Proceeding for the consciously innocent? The carrying out of, the accomplishment of, the proceeding by, the undertaking of, the acceptance of, the pacification of the Proceeding for the consciously innocent’. That is what belongs herein to the Proceeding for the consciously innocent.’ 1 This clause corresponds to the one above, in § 24, and below, in § 29. IV, 14, 29. THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. 59 28. [This section bears exactly the same relation to chapter 5 as the last section does to chapter 4, the form of the two sections being exactly the same throughout. ]
2IV, 14, 29. THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. 59 28. [This section bears exactly the same relation to chapter 5 as the last section does to chapter 4, the form of the two sections being exactly the same throughout. ] 291. ‘If one should ask, “ Can it be that a legal question arising out of censure, without recourse being had to two modes of settlement—to wit, the Proceeding for those who are consciously innocent, and the Proceeding for those who are no longer out of their mind—may be settled by the two other modes of settlement—to wit, the Proceeding in Presence, and the Proceeding for those who are obstinate ?” he should be told, “ Yes, it can.” If he should say, “How may that be?” the answer should be as follows : ‘In case a Bhikkhu warn another Bhikkhu in the midst of the Samgha of a grievous offence, and call upon him to recollect (whether he have committed it or not), saying, “ Has the venerable one been guilty of such and such a grievous offence—a P4ragika offence, or an offence equivalent to a P4rdgika offence?” And he replies thus, “I do not, Sir, call to mind that I have been guilty of such and such a grievous offence—a P4rdgika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Paragika offence.” To him thus denying the other insists, saying, “Come now, Sir, ascertain for certain whether you are conscious of having been guilty of such and such a grievous 1 This section again bears exactly the same relation to chapter 11 as the previous ones have done to chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The outline of the form is the same, but as in the introductory part (containing the description of the offence) the present section is much fuller than the chapter to which it refers, we prefer to give that part of this section in full. 60 KULLAVAGGA. IV, 14, 29.
3The outline of the form is the same, but as in the introductory part (containing the description of the offence) the present section is much fuller than the chapter to which it refers, we prefer to give that part of this section in full. 60 KULLAVAGGA. IV, 14, 29. offence—a P4ragika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Paragika offence.” And he replies thus: “I do not, Sir, call to mind that I have been guilty of such and such a grievous offence—a P4rdgika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Paragika offence. But I do, Sir, recollect that I was guilty of such and such a trifling offence.” To him thus denying the other insists [as before]. And he replies thus: “ Seeing that I am willing, Sir, though you did not ask me, to confess myself guilty of that trifling offence, why should I not confess, when asked, such and such a grievous offence—a P4ragika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Paragika offence?” And the other rejoins, “But you do not confess, Sir, even that trifling offence without being asked. How should you confess, if you were not asked, the commission of such and such a grievous offence—a Pardgika offence, or one equivalent to a P4ragika offence ? Come now, Sir, ascertain for certain whether you are conscious of having been guilty of such and such a grievous offence—a Pardgika offence, or one equivalent to a Paragika offence?” And he replies, “Yes, I am conscious, Sir, of having committed such and such an offence—a Pardgika offence, or one equivalent to a Paragika offence. In sport did I say, in fun did I say that I was not conscious thereof.” ‘Then, O Bhikkhus, the Proceeding for those who are obstinate should be carried out against that Bhikkhu. . ‘And thus should it be carried out (&c., as chapter 11, § 2, down to the end, reading “such and such a Bhikkhu” for “ Upavala,” and “ grievous offence” for “ offence ”). IV, 14,30. THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. 61 ‘This, O Bhikkhus, is called a legal question that has been settled. And how has it been settled? By the Proceeding in Presence, and by the Proceeding for those who are obstinate. And what therein belongs to the Proceeding in Presence ? The Presence of the Samgha (&c., as in § 16). And what therein belongs to the Proceeding for those who are obstinate? The carrying out of, the accomplishment of, the proceeding by, the undertaking of, the acceptance of, the pacification of the official act (the Kamma) by the Proceeding for those who are obstinate. That is what belongs therein to the Proceeding for those who are obstinate. ‘When a legal question, O Bhikkhus, has been thus settled, if a disputant re-open the question, such re-opening is a Pafittiya. If one who has conveyed his consent complain of the decision, such complaint is a Pa&ittiya.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1If he ascertains (beforehand) that those whose opinion is in accordance with the Dhamma are in the majority, the vote is to be taken undisguisedly, openly. Thus, O Bhikkhus, is the open method of taking the votes. ‘These, O Bhikkhus, are the three methods of taking the votes!’ 27. ‘By how many kinds of settlement is a legal question arising out of censure settled? A legal question arising out of censure can be settled by four kinds of settlement—by the Proceeding in Presence—by the Proceeding for those who are consciously innocent—by the Proceeding for those who are no longer out of their mind—by the Proceeding for those who are obstinate. ‘If one should ask, “Can it be that a legal question arising out of censure, without recourse being had to two modes of settlement—to wit, the Proceeding for those who are no longer out of their mind, and the ' This naive chapter would seem to show that the pia fraus was not unknown to the Buddhist monks at the time when the Kullavagga was composed. Buddhaghosa’s note (given at p. 315 of H. O.’s edition of the text) specifies the different occasions when each of the three methods should be used. 58 KULLAVAGGA. IV, 14, 24. Proceeding for those who are obstinate—may be settled by the two other modes of settlement—to wit, the Proceeding in Presence, and the Proceeding for those who are consciously innocent ?” he should be told, “ Yes, it can.” (If he should say), “ How may that be ?” the answer should be as follows: ‘In case the Bhikkhus bring a groundless charge against a Bhikkhu of a breach of morality. In respect thereof, O Bhikkhus, to that Bhikkhu whose memory in regard to the matter is quite clear, the Proceeding for the consciously innocent is to be accorded. ‘And thus, O Bhikkhus, is to be granted (&c., as in chapter 4, § 10, down to the end, with the necessary alterations for a general rule instead of a particular case). ‘This, O Bhikkhus, is called a legal question that has been settled. And how settled? By the Proceeding in Presence, and by the Proceeding for the consciously innocent. And what therein belongs to the Proceeding in Presence? The presence of the Samgha, and the presence of the Dhamma, and the presence of the Vinaya, and the presence of the particular person. And therein what is the presence of the Samgha (&c., as in § 16, down to the end)? And what therein belongs to the’ Proceeding for the consciously innocent? The carrying out of, the accomplishment of, the proceeding by, the undertaking of, the acceptance of, the pacification of the Proceeding for the consciously innocent’. That is what belongs herein to the Proceeding for the consciously innocent.’ 1 This clause corresponds to the one above, in § 24, and below, in § 29. IV, 14, 29. THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. 59 28. [This section bears exactly the same relation to chapter 5 as the last section does to chapter 4, the form of the two sections being exactly the same throughout. ]
2IV, 14, 29. THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. 59 28. [This section bears exactly the same relation to chapter 5 as the last section does to chapter 4, the form of the two sections being exactly the same throughout. ] 291. ‘If one should ask, “ Can it be that a legal question arising out of censure, without recourse being had to two modes of settlement—to wit, the Proceeding for those who are consciously innocent, and the Proceeding for those who are no longer out of their mind—may be settled by the two other modes of settlement—to wit, the Proceeding in Presence, and the Proceeding for those who are obstinate ?” he should be told, “ Yes, it can.” If he should say, “How may that be?” the answer should be as follows : ‘In case a Bhikkhu warn another Bhikkhu in the midst of the Samgha of a grievous offence, and call upon him to recollect (whether he have committed it or not), saying, “ Has the venerable one been guilty of such and such a grievous offence—a P4ragika offence, or an offence equivalent to a P4rdgika offence?” And he replies thus, “I do not, Sir, call to mind that I have been guilty of such and such a grievous offence—a P4rdgika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Paragika offence.” To him thus denying the other insists, saying, “Come now, Sir, ascertain for certain whether you are conscious of having been guilty of such and such a grievous 1 This section again bears exactly the same relation to chapter 11 as the previous ones have done to chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The outline of the form is the same, but as in the introductory part (containing the description of the offence) the present section is much fuller than the chapter to which it refers, we prefer to give that part of this section in full. 60 KULLAVAGGA. IV, 14, 29.
3The outline of the form is the same, but as in the introductory part (containing the description of the offence) the present section is much fuller than the chapter to which it refers, we prefer to give that part of this section in full. 60 KULLAVAGGA. IV, 14, 29. offence—a P4ragika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Paragika offence.” And he replies thus: “I do not, Sir, call to mind that I have been guilty of such and such a grievous offence—a P4rdgika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Paragika offence. But I do, Sir, recollect that I was guilty of such and such a trifling offence.” To him thus denying the other insists [as before]. And he replies thus: “ Seeing that I am willing, Sir, though you did not ask me, to confess myself guilty of that trifling offence, why should I not confess, when asked, such and such a grievous offence—a P4ragika offence, or an offence equivalent to a Paragika offence?” And the other rejoins, “But you do not confess, Sir, even that trifling offence without being asked. How should you confess, if you were not asked, the commission of such and such a grievous offence—a Pardgika offence, or one equivalent to a P4ragika offence ? Come now, Sir, ascertain for certain whether you are conscious of having been guilty of such and such a grievous offence—a Pardgika offence, or one equivalent to a Paragika offence?” And he replies, “Yes, I am conscious, Sir, of having committed such and such an offence—a Pardgika offence, or one equivalent to a Paragika offence. In sport did I say, in fun did I say that I was not conscious thereof.” ‘Then, O Bhikkhus, the Proceeding for those who are obstinate should be carried out against that Bhikkhu. . ‘And thus should it be carried out (&c., as chapter 11, § 2, down to the end, reading “such and such a Bhikkhu” for “ Upavala,” and “ grievous offence” for “ offence ”). IV, 14,30. THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. 61 ‘This, O Bhikkhus, is called a legal question that has been settled. And how has it been settled? By the Proceeding in Presence, and by the Proceeding for those who are obstinate. And what therein belongs to the Proceeding in Presence ? The Presence of the Samgha (&c., as in § 16). And what therein belongs to the Proceeding for those who are obstinate? The carrying out of, the accomplishment of, the proceeding by, the undertaking of, the acceptance of, the pacification of the official act (the Kamma) by the Proceeding for those who are obstinate. That is what belongs therein to the Proceeding for those who are obstinate. ‘When a legal question, O Bhikkhus, has been thus settled, if a disputant re-open the question, such re-opening is a Pafittiya. If one who has conveyed his consent complain of the decision, such complaint is a Pa&ittiya.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
No commentary for this page.