On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology — trans. C. E. Rolt
The translator’s English as printed (C. E. Rolt). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
The teaching of Dionysius on the Trinity is, so far as it goes, substantially the same as that of St. Augustine or St. Thomas Aquinas; only it is expressed in more exact, if at first sight somewhat fantastic, terms. St. Augustine,1 for instance, teaches that the inner Differentiations of the Trinity belong solely to the realm of eternal Manifestation when he says that They exist secundum Relativum and not secundum Substantiam. Also he teaches the Supra-Personality of the Trinity when he says that neither the undivided Trinity nor any of Its Three Persons is a particular individuality”; and St. Thomas teaches the same thing when he says that the Human Soul of Jesus does not comprehend or contain the Word since the Human Soul is finite (i.e. a particular individuality) while the Word is Infinite.
1 [Augustine says indeed that the Father and the Son exist, non secundum substantiam, sed secundum relativum (De Trin. v. 6). But Augustine’s argument is, that while no attribute of God is accidental, yet all attributes are not said with reference to His substance. Certain attributes of God are neither accidental nor substantial, but relative. This applies to Divine Fatherhood and Sonship. For the Father is what He is in relation to the Son, and similarly the Son to the Father. But these are relations of “Beings,” and are relations which are “eternal and unchangeable.” Augustine does not affirm a supra-personal reality of God behind the Trinity of manifestation. For Augustine the Father and the Son are ultimate realities. “But if the Father, in that He is called the Father, were so called in relation to Himself, not to the Son; and the Son, in that He is called the Son, were so called in relation to Himself, not to the Father; then both the one would be called Father, and the other Son, according to substance, But because the Father is not called the Father except in that He has a Son, and the Son is not called Son except in that He has a Father, these things are not said according to substance; because each of them is not so called in relation to Himself, but the terms are used reciprocally and in relation each to the other; nor yet according to accident, because both the being called the Father, and the being called the Son, is eternal and unchangeable to them. Wherefore, although to be the Father and to be the Son is different, yet their substance is not different ; because they are so called, not according to substance, but according to relation, which relation, however, is not accident, because it is not changeable.” —Aug., De Trin. v. 6.—ED.]
The teaching of Dionysius on the Trinity is, as far as it goes, substantially the same as that of St. Augustine or St. Thomas Aquinas; it is only expressed in more exact, if at first sight somewhat fantastic, terms. St. Augustine,1 for instance, teaches that the inner Differentiations of the Trinity belong solely to the realm of eternal Manifestation when he says that They exist according to Relation (secundum Relativum) and not according to Substance (secundum Substantiam). He also teaches the Supra-Personality of the Trinity when he says that neither the undivided Trinity nor any of Its Three Persons is a particular individuality; and St. Thomas teaches the same thing when he says that the Human Soul of Jesus does not comprehend or contain the Word, since the Human Soul is finite (i.e. a particular individuality) while the Word is Infinite.
1 [Augustine does indeed say that the Father and the Son exist not according to substance, but according to relation (On the Trinity (De Trinitate) v. 6). But Augustine's argument is that, while no attribute of God is accidental, not all attributes are predicated with reference to His substance. Certain attributes of God are neither accidental nor substantial, but relative. This applies to the Divine Fatherhood and Sonship. For the Father is what He is in relation to the Son, and likewise the Son in relation to the Father. But these are relations of “Beings,” and they are relations which are “eternal and unchangeable.” Augustine does not affirm a supra-personal reality of God behind the Trinity of manifestation. For Augustine the Father and the Son are ultimate realities.
“But if the Father, in that He is called the Father, were so called in relation to Himself and not to the Son, and the Son, in that He is called the Son, were so called in relation to Himself and not to the Father, then the one would be called Father and the other Son according to substance. But because the Father is not called the Father except in that He has a Son, and the Son is not called Son except in that He has a Father, these things are not said according to substance; for neither of them is so called in relation to Himself, but the terms are used reciprocally and in relation each to the other. Nor are they said according to accident, because both being called the Father and being called the Son are eternal and unchangeable for them. Therefore, although to be the Father and to be the Son are different, their substance is not different; because they are so called not according to substance but according to relation, and this relation is not accident, because it is not changeable.” —Aug., On the Trinity v. 6.—ED.]