On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology — trans. C. E. Rolt
The translator’s English as printed (C. E. Rolt). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
20. The true answer whereunto will be that evil (qua evil) causes no existence or birth, but only debases and corrupts, so far as its power extends, the substance of things that have being. And if any one says that it is productive, and that by the destruction of one thing it giveth birth to somewhat else, the true answer is that it doth not so qua destructive. Qua destructive and evil it only destroys and debases ; but it taketh upon it the form of birth and essence through the action of the Good. Thus evil will be found to be a destructive force in itself, but a productive force through the action of the Good. Qua evil it neither hath being nor confers it; through the action of the Good, it hath being (yea, a good being) and confers being on good things. Or rather (since we cannot call the same thing both good and bad in the same relations, nor are the destruction and birth of the same thing the same function or faculty, whether productive or destructive, working in the same relations), Evil in itself hath neither being, goodness, productiveness, nor power of creating things which have being and goodness ; the Good, on the other hand, wherever It becomes perfectly present, creates perfect, universal and untainted manifestations of goodness ; while the things which have a lesser share therein are imperfect manifestations of goodness and mixed with other elements through lack of the Good. In fine, evil is not in any wise good, nor the maker of good; but every thing must be good only in proportion as it approacheth more or less unto the Good, since the perfect Goodness penetrating all things reacheth not only to the wholly good beings around It, but extendeth even unto the lowest things, being entirely present unto some, and in a lower measure to others, and unto others in lowest measure, according as each one is capable of participating therein.1 Some creatures participate wholly in the Good, others are lacking in It less or more, and others possess a still fainter participation therein, while to others the Good is present as but the faintest echo. For if the Good were not present only in a manner proportioned unto each, then the divinest and most honourable things would be no higher than the lowest! And how, pray, could all things have a uniform share in the Good, since not all are equally fit to share entirely therein? But in truth the exceeding greatness of the power of the Good is shown by this—that It giveth power even to the things which lack It, yea even unto that very lack itself, inasmuch as even here is to be found some kind of participation in It.2 And, if we must needs boldly speak the truth, even the things that fight against It possess through Its power their being and their capability to fight. Or rather, to speak shortly, all creatures in so far as they have being are good and come from the Good, and in so far as they are deprived of the Good, neither are good nor have they being. For in the case of other qualities, such as heat or cold, the things which have been warmed have their being even when they lose their warmth, and many of the creatures there are which have no life or mind; and in like manner God transcendeth all being and so is Super-Essential ;? and generally, in all other cases, though the quality be gone or hath never been present, the creatures yet have being and can subsist ; but that which is utterly bereft of the Good never had, nor hath, nor ever shall have, no nor can have any sort of being whatever. For instance, the depraved sinner, though bereft of the Good by his brutish desire, is in this respect unreal and desires unrealities ; but still he hath a share in the Good in so far as there is in him a distorted reflection of true Love and Communion. And anger hath a share in the Good, in so far as it is a movement which seeks to remedy apparent evils, converting them to that which appears to be fair. And even he that desires the basest life, yet in so far as he feels desire at all and feels desire for life, and intends what he thinks the best kind of life, so far participates in the Good. And if you wholly destroy the Good, there will be neither being, life, desire, nor motion, or any other thing. Hence the birth of fresh life out of destruction is not the function of evil but is the presence of Good in a lesser form, even as disease is a disorder, yet not the destruction of all order, for if this happen the disease itself will not exist.1 But the disease remains and exists. Its essence is order reduced to a minimum ; and in this it consists. For that which is utterly without the Good hath neither being nor place amongst the things that are in being ; but that which is of mixed nature owes to the Good its place among things in being, and hath this place amongst them and hath being just so far as it participates in the Good. Or rather all things in being will have their being more or less in proportion as they participate in the Good. For so far as mere Being is concerned, that which hath not being in any respect will not exist at all; that which hath being in one respect but not in another doth not exist in so far as it hath fallen away from the everlasting Being; while in so far as it hath a share of being, to that extent it exists; and thus both an element of existence and an element of non-existence in it are kept and preserved. So too with evil. That which is utterly fallen from Good can have no place either in the things which are more good or in the things which are less so. That which is good in one respect but not in another is at war with some particular good but not with the whole of the Good. It also is preserved by the admixture of the Good, and thus the Good giveth existence to the lack of Itself through some element of Itself being present there. For if the Good be entirely removed, there will not remain aught at all, either good or mixed or absolutely bad. For if evil is imperfect Goodness, the perfect absence of the Good will remove both the perfect and the imperfect Good, and evil will only exist and appear because, while it is evil in relation to one kind of good (being the contrary
20. The true answer to this will be that evil (as evil) causes no existence or birth, but only debases and corrupts, as far as its power extends, the substance of things that have being. And if anyone says that it is productive, and that by destroying one thing it gives birth to something else, the true answer is that it does not do so as destructive. As destructive and evil it only destroys and debases; but it takes on the form of birth and essence through the action of the Good. So evil will be found to be a destructive force in itself, but a productive force through the action of the Good. As evil it neither has being nor confers it; through the action of the Good it has being (indeed, a good being) and confers being on good things. Or rather (since we cannot call the same thing both good and bad in the same respects, nor are the destruction and the birth of the same thing the same function or faculty, whether productive or destructive, working in the same respects), Evil in itself has neither being, goodness, productiveness, nor the power of creating things that have being and goodness.
The Good, on the other hand, wherever It becomes perfectly present, creates perfect, universal and untainted manifestations of goodness; while the things that have a lesser share in It are imperfect manifestations of goodness, mixed with other elements through lack of the Good. In short, evil is in no way good, nor the maker of good; but each thing is good only in proportion as it comes more or less close to the Good. For the perfect Goodness, penetrating all things, reaches not only to the wholly good beings around It but extends even to the lowest things, being entirely present to some, present in a lower measure to others, and to others in the lowest measure, according to each one’s capacity to participate in It.1 Some creatures participate wholly in the Good, others lack It to a greater or lesser degree, others possess a still fainter participation in It, while to others the Good is present only as the faintest echo. For if the Good were not present in a manner proportioned to each, then the most divine and honourable things would be no higher than the lowest! And how, indeed, could all things have an equal share in the Good, since not all are equally fit to share in It entirely? But in truth the surpassing greatness of the power of the Good is shown by this: that It gives power even to the things that lack It, and even to that very lack itself, since even there some kind of participation in It is to be found.2
And if we must speak the truth boldly, even the things that fight against It possess, through Its power, their being and their capacity to fight. Or rather, to put it briefly, all creatures, in so far as they have being, are good and come from the Good; and in so far as they are deprived of the Good, they are neither good nor have they being. For in the case of other qualities, such as heat or cold, things that have been warmed still have their being when they lose their warmth, and there are many creatures that have no life or mind; and likewise God transcends all being and so is Super-Essential;2 and in general, in all other cases, even though the quality has gone or has never been present, the creatures still have being and can subsist. But that which is utterly bereft of the Good never had, nor has, nor ever will have, nor can have, any sort of being whatever.
For instance, the depraved sinner, though bereft of the Good by his brutish desire, is in this respect unreal and desires unrealities; yet he still has a share in the Good in so far as there is in him a distorted reflection of true Love and Communion. And anger has a share in the Good, in so far as it is a movement that seeks to remedy apparent evils, converting them to what appears to be fair. And even one who desires the basest life, in so far as he feels desire at all, and desire for life, and intends what he thinks the best kind of life, to that extent participates in the Good. And if you wholly destroy the Good, there will be neither being, life, desire, nor motion, nor anything else. So the birth of fresh life out of destruction is not the work of evil but the presence of Good in a lesser form, just as disease is a disorder, yet not the destruction of all order; for if that happened, the disease itself would not exist.1 But the disease remains and exists. Its essence is order reduced to a minimum, and in this it consists.
For that which is utterly without the Good has neither being nor place among the things that are in being; but that which is of mixed nature owes its place among things in being to the Good, and has this place among them, and has being, just so far as it participates in the Good. Or rather, all things in being will have their being more or less in proportion as they participate in the Good. For as far as mere Being is concerned, that which has no being in any respect will not exist at all; that which has being in one respect but not in another does not exist in so far as it has fallen away from the everlasting Being, while in so far as it has a share of being, to that extent it exists; and so both an element of existence and an element of non-existence in it are kept and preserved.
So too with evil. That which has utterly fallen from Good can have no place either among things that are more good or among things that are less so. That which is good in one respect but not in another is at war with some particular good, but not with the whole of the Good. It too is preserved by the admixture of the Good, and so the Good gives existence to the lack of Itself through some element of Itself being present there. For if the Good is entirely removed, nothing at all will remain, whether good, mixed, or absolutely bad. For if evil is imperfect Goodness, the perfect absence of the Good will remove both the perfect and the imperfect Good, and evil will exist and appear only because, while it is evil in relation to one kind of good (being the contrary