On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology — trans. C. E. Rolt
The translator’s English as printed (C. E. Rolt). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
’Tis but when we consider the nature of particular things, that we find one part of Nature to be natural and another part to be unnatural. For one thing may be unnatural in one case, and another thing in another case; and that which is natural in one is unnatural in another! Now the evil taint of a natural force is something unnatural. It is a lack of the thing’s natural virtues. Hence, no natural force is evil: the evil of nature lies in a thing’s inability to fulfil its natural functions.? | ‘
27. Neither inhereth evil in our bodies. For ugliness and disease are a deficiency in form and a want of order. But this is not wholly evil, being rather a lesser good. For were there a complete destruction of beauty, form, and order, the very body must disappear. And that the body is not the cause of evil in the soul is plain in that evil can be nigh at hand even without a body, as it is in the devils. Evil in spirits, souls and bodies is a weakness and lapse in the condition of their natural virtues.
28. Nor is the familiar notion true that “Evil inheres in matter qua matter.” For matter, too, hath a share in order, beauty, and form. And if matter is without these things, and in itself hath no quality or form, how can it produce anything, since in that case it hath not of itself even the power of suffering any affection? Nay, how can matter be evil? For if it hath no being whatever, it is neither good nor evil; but if it hath a kind of being, then (since all things that have being come from the Good) matter must come from the Good. And thus either the Good produces evil (i. e. evil, since it comes from the Good, is good), or else the Good Itself is produced by evil (i.e. the Good, as coming thus from evil, is evil). Or else we are driven back again to two principles. But if so, these must be derived from some further single source beyond them. And if they say that matter is necessary for the whole world to fulfil its development, how can that be evil which depends for its existence upon the Good? For evil abhors the very nature of the Good. And how can matter, if it is evil, produce and nourish Nature? For evil, qua evil, cannot produce or nourish anything, nor create or preserve it at all. And if they reply that matter causes not the evil in our souls, but that it yet draws them down towards evil, can that be true? For many of them have their gaze turned towards the Good. And how can that be, if matter doth nothing except drag them down towards evil? Hence evil in our souls is not derived from matter but from a disordered and discordant motion. And if they say that this motion is always the consequence of matter; and if the unstable medium of matter is necessary for things that are incapable of firm self-subsistence, then why is it that evil is thus necessary or that this necessary thing is evil?1
Nature, which comes from the Good. Thus the sum total of natural laws is not, as such, opposed to the ultimate unity of Nature, and therefore is not as such opposed to the Good. It is not essentially evil.
7 Cf Section 30. A
2 The argument of the whole passage is that evil is not inherent in the essential nature of things as a whole or of any particular thing. It arises in particular things (accidentally, as it were) through their failure to fulfil their true nature. But what of this accident? Is it inherent? Perhaps we might answer, “Not inherent because capable of being eliminated.”
It is only when we consider the nature of particular things that we find one part of Nature to be natural and another part unnatural. For one thing may be unnatural in one case and another thing in another; and what is natural in one is unnatural in another.1 Now the evil taint of a natural force is something unnatural: it is a lack of the thing’s natural virtues. Hence no natural force is evil; the evil of nature lies in a thing’s inability to fulfil its natural functions.2
27. Nor does evil reside in our bodies. Ugliness and disease are a deficiency of form and a lack of order. Yet this is not wholly evil; it is rather a lesser good. For if beauty, form, and order were completely destroyed, the body itself would have to disappear. And that the body is not the cause of evil in the soul is clear from the fact that evil can be present even without a body, as it is in the devils. Evil in spirits, souls, and bodies is a weakness and a lapse in the condition of their natural virtues.
28. Nor is the familiar notion true that “Evil inheres in matter as matter.” For matter, too, has a share in order, beauty, and form. And if matter is without these things, and in itself has no quality or form, how can it produce anything, since in that case it does not have of itself even the power of suffering any affection? Indeed, how can matter be evil? If it has no being whatever, it is neither good nor evil; but if it has some kind of being, then (since all things that have being come from the Good) matter must come from the Good. And so either the Good produces evil (i.e. evil, since it comes from the Good, is good), or else the Good Itself is produced by evil (i.e. the Good, as coming in this way from evil, is evil). Or else we are driven back once more to two principles. But if so, these must be derived from some further single source beyond them.
And if they say that matter is necessary for the whole world to fulfil its development, how can something be evil that depends for its existence on the Good? For evil abhors the very nature of the Good. And how can matter, if it is evil, produce and nourish Nature? For evil, as evil, cannot produce or nourish anything, nor create or preserve it at all.
And if they reply that matter does not cause the evil in our souls but nevertheless draws them down towards evil, can that be true? For many souls have their gaze turned towards the Good. And how could that be, if matter did nothing but drag them down towards evil? Hence evil in our souls is derived not from matter but from a disordered and discordant motion. And if they say that this motion is always the consequence of matter, and that the unstable medium of matter is necessary for things incapable of firm self-subsistence, then why is evil thus necessary, or why is this necessary thing evil?1
Nature, which comes from the Good. So the sum total of natural laws is not, as such, opposed to the ultimate unity of Nature, and is therefore not, as such, opposed to the Good. It is not essentially evil.
7 Cf Section 30. A
2 The argument of the whole passage is that evil is not inherent in the essential nature either of things as a whole or of any particular thing. It arises in particular things (accidentally, as it were) through their failure to fulfil their true nature. But what of this accident? Is it inherent? Perhaps we might answer, “Not inherent, because capable of being eliminated.”