On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology — trans. C. E. Rolt
The translator’s English as printed (C. E. Rolt). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
For this world is by its very nature finite. And hence, if the evil in it is (as Dionysius rightly says) but partial, it must also be remembered (as he for a moment forgets) that its very existence is but partial. And, therefore, though evil is ultimately non-existent, yet the bad qualities of things may, so far as this present world is concerned, have as much reality, or at least as much actuality, as their good qualities. And when we say that evil is ultimately non-existent we merely mean that evil ought to have no actuality here, not that it has none. Dionysius calls evil a “lapse and failure of the creature’s proper virtues.” But a lapse or failure has in it something positive, as he in the same breath both admits by using the word and also tries to explain away. It is as positive as the virtues from which it lapses. The absence of light from the centre of a wooden block is nothing, for the light has no proper place there, but the absence of light from the air, where light should be, is darkness and is a visible shadow. St. Augustine has crystallized this truth in his famous epigram, quoted above in part, which runs in full as follows: “Sin is naught, and men are naught when they sin.” The void left by the want of a good thing has a content consisting in the want. Probably had Dionysius seen more of the world’s misery and sin he would have had a stronger sense of this fact. And in that case he would have given more prominence than he gives, in his extant writings at least, to the Cross of Christ.
Two things should, however, be borne in mind. In the first place he is writing for intellectual Christians in whom he can take for granted both an understanding of metaphysics and a horror of sin. To such readers the non-existence of evil could not
For this world is by its very nature finite. And so, if the evil in it is (as Dionysius rightly says) only partial, it must also be remembered (as he forgets for a moment) that its very existence is only partial. Therefore, although evil is ultimately non-existent, the bad qualities of things may, as far as this present world is concerned, have as much reality—or at least as much actuality—as their good qualities. And when we say that evil is ultimately non-existent, we mean only that evil ought to have no actuality here, not that it has none.
Dionysius calls evil a “lapse and failure of the creature’s proper virtues.” But a lapse or failure has something positive in it, as he in the same breath both admits, by using the word, and tries to explain away. It is as positive as the virtues from which it lapses. The absence of light from the centre of a wooden block is nothing, since light has no proper place there; but the absence of light from the air, where light should be, is darkness, and is a visible shadow. St. Augustine has crystallized this truth in his famous epigram, quoted above in part, which in full runs: “Sin is naught, and men are naught when they sin.” The void left by the lack of a good thing has a content, which consists in the lack. Had Dionysius seen more of the world’s misery and sin, he would probably have had a stronger sense of this fact. And in that case he would have given more prominence than he does—in his surviving writings, at least—to the Cross of Christ.
Two things, however, should be borne in mind. In the first place, he is writing for intellectual Christians in whom he can take for granted both an understanding of metaphysics and a horror of sin. To such readers the non-existence of evil could not