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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1There is no intercourse between the one and the other.’ ‘ Then how is it, Sir, that thought arises wherever sight does ?’ ‘Because of there being a sloping down, and because of there being a door, and because of there being a habit °, and because of there being an association.’ ‘How is that? Give me an illustration of mind arising where sight arises because of there being a sloping down.’ ‘Now what do you think, great king? When it rains *, where will the water go to ?’ 1 The last four are Aetan4, ekaggaté, givitindriyam, and manasik4ro; and in the Simhalese are simply repeated in their Simhalese form. ® This conclusion is all wrong in Hardy, pp. 457, 458. 5 Mano-vi#aanam. * Kakkhu-viatanam. 5 Kinnatt4, which Hinafi-kumburé renders purudu bewin. * Deve vassante: ‘when the god rains.’ go THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 7. ‘It will follow the slope of the ground.’ ‘And if it were to rain again, where would the water go to ?’ ‘It would go the same way as the first water had gone.’ ‘What then? Does the first water issue, as it were, command to the second, saying : “Do you go where I have?” Or does the second issue command to the first, saying: “ Whithersoever you go, thither will 1” ?’ ‘Itis not so, Sir. There is no intercourse between the two. Each goes its way because of the slope of the ground.’ ‘Just so, great king, [58] is it by reason of the natural slope that where sight has arisen there also does thought arise. And neither does the sightperception issue command to the mind-perception, saying: “ Where I have arisen, there do thou also spring up;” nor does the mind-perception inform the sight-perception, saying: ‘Where thou hast arisen, there will I also spring up.” There is no conversation, as it were, between them. All that happens, happens through natural slope.’ ‘ Now give me an illustration of there being a door.’ ‘What do you think, greatking? Suppose a king had a frontier city, and it was strongly defended with towers and bulwarks, and had only one gateway. Ifa man wanted to leave the city, how would he go out ?’ ‘ By the gate, certainly.’ ‘ And if another man wanted to leave it, how would he go out ?’ ‘The same way as the first.’ ‘What then? Would the first man tell the second: TI, 3, 7. SENSATION AND IDEAS. gI “ Mind you go out the same way asI do”? Or would the second tell the first: “The way you go out, I shall go out too”?’ ‘Certainly not, Sir. There would be no communication between them. They would go that way because that was the gate.’ ‘Just so, great king, with thought and sight.’ ‘Now give me an illustration of thought arising where sight is because of habit.’ ‘What do you think, great king? If one cart went ahead, which way would a second cart go ?’ ‘The same as the first.’ . ‘ But would the first tell the second to go where it went, [59] or the second tell the first that it would go where it (the first) had gone ?’
2If one cart went ahead, which way would a second cart go ?’ ‘The same as the first.’ . ‘ But would the first tell the second to go where it went, [59] or the second tell the first that it would go where it (the first) had gone ?’ ‘No, Sir. There would be no communication between the two. The second would follow the first out of habit.’ ‘Just so, great king, with sight and thought.’ ‘Now give me an illustration of how thought arises, where sight has arisen, through association.’ ‘In the art of calculating by using the joints of the fingers as signs or marks’, in the art of arithmetic pure and simple?, in the art of estimating the probable * Mudd4&. Hinasi-kumburé is here a little fuller than Buddhaghosa at vol. i, p. 95 of the Sumangala. He says: yam se engili purukhi alw& gena sa##4 ko/a kiyana hasta mudra sAstraya, ‘the finger-ring art, so called from seizing on the joints of the fingers, and using them as signs.’ * Ganan&. Hinafi-kumburé says: askhidra wu ganam sAstraya, ‘the art of unbroken counting,’ which is precisely Buddhaghosa’s explanation (confirming the reading we have there adopted), and probably means arithmetic without the aids involved in the last phrase. We have here in that case an interesting peep into the 92 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 8. yield of growing crops’, and in the art of writing, O king, the beginner is clumsy. But after a certain time with attention and practice he becomes expert. Just so is it that, where sight has arisen, thought too by association springs up.’ And in response to similar questions, the Elder declared that in the same way thought sprang up wherever there was hearing, or taste, or smell, or touch: that in each case it was subsequent to the other, but arose without communication from [60] the natural causes above set out. 8. The king said: ‘Where thought (mental perception *) is, Nagasena, is there always sensation ?’ ‘ Yes, where thought arises there is contact, and there is sensation, and there is idea, and there is conceived intention, and there is reflection, and there is investigation 5’ 9. ‘ Reverend Sir, what is the distinguishing characteristic of contact (Phassa) ?’ ‘Touch *, O king.’ ‘But give me an illustration.’ ‘It is as when two rams are butting together, O progress of arithmetical knowledge. When our author wrote, the old way of counting on the fingers was still in vogue, but the modern system was coming into general use. 1 Sankhé, literally ‘calculation,’ but which Hardy amplifies into Kshetraya wriksha vilokaya kofa phala pramanaya kiyannawf samkhya sAstraya. * Mano-vi##ana as all through the last section. The reader must not forget that mano is here strictly an organ of sense, on an exact level with eye, ear, tongue, &c. 5 Xetané, vitakko, and vikdro. See fuller further on, §§ 11, 13, 14. * Phusana. So also Buddhaghosa at p. 63 of the Sumangala. ‘ TI, 3, 10. SENSATION AND IDEA. 93
3The reader must not forget that mano is here strictly an organ of sense, on an exact level with eye, ear, tongue, &c. 5 Xetané, vitakko, and vikdro. See fuller further on, §§ 11, 13, 14. * Phusana. So also Buddhaghosa at p. 63 of the Sumangala. ‘ TI, 3, 10. SENSATION AND IDEA. 93 king. The eye should be regarded as one of those two, the form (object) as the other, and the contact as the union of the two.’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘It is as when two cymbals? are clashed together. The one is as the eye, the other as the object, and the junction of the two is like contact.’ ‘Very good, Nagasena!’ 10. ‘ Reverend Sir, what is the characteristic mark of sensation (Vedan4) ?’ ‘The being experienced, great king, and enjoyed #.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘It is like the case of the man * on whom the king, pleased with a service he has rendered him, should bestow an office. He while living, through that appointment, in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, would think : “ Formerly I did the king a service. For that the king, pleased with me, gave me this office. It is on that account that I now experience such sensations.’—And it is like the case of the man [61] who having done good deeds is re-born, on the dissolution of the body after death, into some happy conditions of bliss in heaven. He, while living there in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, would think : “Formerly I must have done good deeds. It is on that account that I now experience such sensations.” Thus is it, great king, that the being experienced and enjoyed is the characteristic mark of sensation.’ ‘Very good, Nagasena!’ 1 Sammé4, compare Theri Gatha, 893, grt. * Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., only gives the first of these. § See for a similar illustration above, II, 2, 7, p. 76. 94 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 11. 11. ‘What is the distinguishing characteristic, NAgasena, of idea (Sa#74) ?’ ‘Recognition, O king» And what does he recognise ?—blueness and yellowness and redness and whiteness and brownness.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘It is like the king’s treasurer, O king, who when he sees, on entering the treasure, objects the property of the king of all those colours, recognises (that they have such). Thus it is, great king, that recognition is the mark of idea.’ ‘Very good, NAgasena !’ ‘What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nagasena, of the conceived purpose (Ketan4) ?’ ‘The being conceived, O king, and the being prepared ®.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1There is no intercourse between the one and the other.’ ‘ Then how is it, Sir, that thought arises wherever sight does ?’ ‘Because of there being a sloping down, and because of there being a door, and because of there being a habit °, and because of there being an association.’ ‘How is that? Give me an illustration of mind arising where sight arises because of there being a sloping down.’ ‘Now what do you think, great king? When it rains *, where will the water go to ?’ 1 The last four are Aetan4, ekaggaté, givitindriyam, and manasik4ro; and in the Simhalese are simply repeated in their Simhalese form. ® This conclusion is all wrong in Hardy, pp. 457, 458. 5 Mano-vi#aanam. * Kakkhu-viatanam. 5 Kinnatt4, which Hinafi-kumburé renders purudu bewin. * Deve vassante: ‘when the god rains.’ go THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 7. ‘It will follow the slope of the ground.’ ‘And if it were to rain again, where would the water go to ?’ ‘It would go the same way as the first water had gone.’ ‘What then? Does the first water issue, as it were, command to the second, saying : “Do you go where I have?” Or does the second issue command to the first, saying: “ Whithersoever you go, thither will 1” ?’ ‘Itis not so, Sir. There is no intercourse between the two. Each goes its way because of the slope of the ground.’ ‘Just so, great king, [58] is it by reason of the natural slope that where sight has arisen there also does thought arise. And neither does the sightperception issue command to the mind-perception, saying: “ Where I have arisen, there do thou also spring up;” nor does the mind-perception inform the sight-perception, saying: ‘Where thou hast arisen, there will I also spring up.” There is no conversation, as it were, between them. All that happens, happens through natural slope.’ ‘ Now give me an illustration of there being a door.’ ‘What do you think, greatking? Suppose a king had a frontier city, and it was strongly defended with towers and bulwarks, and had only one gateway. Ifa man wanted to leave the city, how would he go out ?’ ‘ By the gate, certainly.’ ‘ And if another man wanted to leave it, how would he go out ?’ ‘The same way as the first.’ ‘What then? Would the first man tell the second: TI, 3, 7. SENSATION AND IDEAS. gI “ Mind you go out the same way asI do”? Or would the second tell the first: “The way you go out, I shall go out too”?’ ‘Certainly not, Sir. There would be no communication between them. They would go that way because that was the gate.’ ‘Just so, great king, with thought and sight.’ ‘Now give me an illustration of thought arising where sight is because of habit.’ ‘What do you think, great king? If one cart went ahead, which way would a second cart go ?’ ‘The same as the first.’ . ‘ But would the first tell the second to go where it went, [59] or the second tell the first that it would go where it (the first) had gone ?’
2If one cart went ahead, which way would a second cart go ?’ ‘The same as the first.’ . ‘ But would the first tell the second to go where it went, [59] or the second tell the first that it would go where it (the first) had gone ?’ ‘No, Sir. There would be no communication between the two. The second would follow the first out of habit.’ ‘Just so, great king, with sight and thought.’ ‘Now give me an illustration of how thought arises, where sight has arisen, through association.’ ‘In the art of calculating by using the joints of the fingers as signs or marks’, in the art of arithmetic pure and simple?, in the art of estimating the probable * Mudd4&. Hinasi-kumburé is here a little fuller than Buddhaghosa at vol. i, p. 95 of the Sumangala. He says: yam se engili purukhi alw& gena sa##4 ko/a kiyana hasta mudra sAstraya, ‘the finger-ring art, so called from seizing on the joints of the fingers, and using them as signs.’ * Ganan&. Hinafi-kumburé says: askhidra wu ganam sAstraya, ‘the art of unbroken counting,’ which is precisely Buddhaghosa’s explanation (confirming the reading we have there adopted), and probably means arithmetic without the aids involved in the last phrase. We have here in that case an interesting peep into the 92 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 8. yield of growing crops’, and in the art of writing, O king, the beginner is clumsy. But after a certain time with attention and practice he becomes expert. Just so is it that, where sight has arisen, thought too by association springs up.’ And in response to similar questions, the Elder declared that in the same way thought sprang up wherever there was hearing, or taste, or smell, or touch: that in each case it was subsequent to the other, but arose without communication from [60] the natural causes above set out. 8. The king said: ‘Where thought (mental perception *) is, Nagasena, is there always sensation ?’ ‘ Yes, where thought arises there is contact, and there is sensation, and there is idea, and there is conceived intention, and there is reflection, and there is investigation 5’ 9. ‘ Reverend Sir, what is the distinguishing characteristic of contact (Phassa) ?’ ‘Touch *, O king.’ ‘But give me an illustration.’ ‘It is as when two rams are butting together, O progress of arithmetical knowledge. When our author wrote, the old way of counting on the fingers was still in vogue, but the modern system was coming into general use. 1 Sankhé, literally ‘calculation,’ but which Hardy amplifies into Kshetraya wriksha vilokaya kofa phala pramanaya kiyannawf samkhya sAstraya. * Mano-vi##ana as all through the last section. The reader must not forget that mano is here strictly an organ of sense, on an exact level with eye, ear, tongue, &c. 5 Xetané, vitakko, and vikdro. See fuller further on, §§ 11, 13, 14. * Phusana. So also Buddhaghosa at p. 63 of the Sumangala. ‘ TI, 3, 10. SENSATION AND IDEA. 93
3The reader must not forget that mano is here strictly an organ of sense, on an exact level with eye, ear, tongue, &c. 5 Xetané, vitakko, and vikdro. See fuller further on, §§ 11, 13, 14. * Phusana. So also Buddhaghosa at p. 63 of the Sumangala. ‘ TI, 3, 10. SENSATION AND IDEA. 93 king. The eye should be regarded as one of those two, the form (object) as the other, and the contact as the union of the two.’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘It is as when two cymbals? are clashed together. The one is as the eye, the other as the object, and the junction of the two is like contact.’ ‘Very good, Nagasena!’ 10. ‘ Reverend Sir, what is the characteristic mark of sensation (Vedan4) ?’ ‘The being experienced, great king, and enjoyed #.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘It is like the case of the man * on whom the king, pleased with a service he has rendered him, should bestow an office. He while living, through that appointment, in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, would think : “ Formerly I did the king a service. For that the king, pleased with me, gave me this office. It is on that account that I now experience such sensations.’—And it is like the case of the man [61] who having done good deeds is re-born, on the dissolution of the body after death, into some happy conditions of bliss in heaven. He, while living there in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, would think : “Formerly I must have done good deeds. It is on that account that I now experience such sensations.” Thus is it, great king, that the being experienced and enjoyed is the characteristic mark of sensation.’ ‘Very good, Nagasena!’ 1 Sammé4, compare Theri Gatha, 893, grt. * Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., only gives the first of these. § See for a similar illustration above, II, 2, 7, p. 76. 94 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 11. 11. ‘What is the distinguishing characteristic, NAgasena, of idea (Sa#74) ?’ ‘Recognition, O king» And what does he recognise ?—blueness and yellowness and redness and whiteness and brownness.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘It is like the king’s treasurer, O king, who when he sees, on entering the treasure, objects the property of the king of all those colours, recognises (that they have such). Thus it is, great king, that recognition is the mark of idea.’ ‘Very good, NAgasena !’ ‘What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nagasena, of the conceived purpose (Ketan4) ?’ ‘The being conceived, O king, and the being prepared ®.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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