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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Thus does the recluse who is devoted to effort perceive with the clearest wisdom the impermanency (of all beings and things), the suffering (that is inherent in individuality), and the absence of any soul.’ ‘ Give me an illustration.’ ‘It is like a lamp, O king, which a man might introduce into a house in darkness. When the lamp had been brought in it would dispel the darkness, 1 Samyutta Nikdya XXI, 5. 2 Paaaa. Hardy in the ‘Manual of Buddhism,’ pp. 414, 415, gives a jumble of this passage and several others. * See above, p. 51. * Vidamseti, not in Childers; but compare Theri G4tha, 74 ; Anguttara III, 103; and Gataka III, 222. 62 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. _ II, 1, 15. cause radiance to arise, and light to shine forth, and make the objects there plainly visible. Just so would wisdom in a man have such effects as were just now set forth.’ ‘Well put, Nagasena !’ 15. The king said: ‘These qualities which are so different’, Nagasena, do they bring about one and the same result ?’ ‘They do. The putting an end to evil dispositions. ~ ‘ How is that? Give me an illustration.’ ‘They are like the various parts of an army— elephants, cavalry, war chariots, and archers—who all work to one end, to wit : the conquest in battle of the opposing army.’ ‘Well put, Nagasena!’ Here ends the First Chapter. 1 That is, the five referred to above, p. 51, § 9. II, 2, 1. IDENTITY. 63 Boox II. Cuapter 2, 1. [40] The king said: ‘ He who is born, Nagasena, does he remain the same or become another ?’ ‘ Neither the same nor another.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘Now what do you think, O king? You were once a baby, a tender thing, and small in size, lying flat on your back. Was that the same as you who are now grown up?’ ‘No. That child was one, I am another.’ ‘If you are not that child, it will follow that you have had neither mother nor father, no! nor teacher. You cannot have been taught either learning, or behaviour, or wisdom. What, great king! is the mother of the embryo in the first stage different from the mother of the embryo in the second stage, or the third, or the fourth! ? Is the mother of the baby a different person from the mother of the grown-up man? Is the person who goes to school one, and the same when he has finished his schooling another ? Is it one who commits a crime, another who is punished by having his hands or feet cut off??’ ‘Certainly not. But what would you, Sir, say to that ?’ The Elder replied: ‘I should say that I am the same person, now I am grown up, as I was when I was a tender tiny baby, flat on my back. For all these states are included in one by means of this body.’ ‘Give me an illustration,’ * On these four stages see Gataka IV, 496, and Samyutta X, 1, 3. * Hardy makes sad nonsense of all this, 64 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, r. ‘Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through ?’ ‘Yes, it might do so.’
2* Hardy makes sad nonsense of all this, 64 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, r. ‘Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through ?’ ‘Yes, it might do so.’ ‘Now, is it the same flame that burns in the first watch of the night, Sir, and in the second?’ ‘No.’ ‘Or the same that burns in the second watch and in the third ?’ ‘No.’ ‘Then is there one lamp in the first watch, and another in the second, and another in the third ?’ ‘No. The light comes from the same lamp all the night through.’ ‘Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness ',’ ‘ Give me a further illustration.’ 1 Hardy (p. 429) renders this as follows: ‘In the same way, great king, one being is conceived, another is born, another dies ; when comprehended by the mind, it is like a thing that has no before, and no after; no preceding, no succeeding existence. Thus the being who is born does not continue the same, nor does he become another; the last winyana, or consciousness, is thus united with the rest.’ (!) He confesses himself in doubt as to the last few words, but is quite unconscious of having completely misinterpreted the whole paragraph. The meaning is really quite plain in both the Pali and the Simhalese. A man, at any one moment, is precisely all that he is then conscious of. The phase of his self-consciousness, the totality of that of which he is conscious, is always changing; and is so different at death from what it was at birth that, in a certain sense, he is not the same at the one time as he was at the other. But there is a continuity in the whole series ;—a continuity dependent II, 2, 2. ASSURANCE OF SALVATION. 65 ‘It is like milk, [41] which when once taken from the cow, turns, after a lapse of time, first to curds, and then from curds to butter, and then from butter to ghee. Now would it be right to say that the milk was the same thing as the curds, or the butter, or the ghee?’ ‘Certainly not; but they are produced out of it.’ ‘Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness.’ ‘Well put, Nagasena !’ 21, The king said: ‘Is a man, Nagasena, who will not be reborn, aware of the fact ?’ ‘Yes, O king.’ ‘And how does he know it ?’ ‘ By the cessation of all that is cause, proximate or remote ?, of rebirth.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘ Suppose a farmer, great king, had ploughed and sown and filled his granary; and then for a period should neither plough nor sow, but live on the
3on the whole body. And this fits the simile, in which the lamp is the body, and the flame the changing self-consciousness ; whereas it is impossible to make the simile fit the conclusion as rendered by Hardy. On the phrase apubbam akariyam see Dr. Morris’s note at p. ror of the Pali Text Society’s Journal, 1887, and the passages he there quotes. ' Omitted in Hardy. The correlative question is discussed below, III, 5, 8, p. 112. 8 That is to say, Tawha and Up4dana. [35] F 66 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 3. stored-up grain, or dispose of it in barter, or deal with it as he had need. Would the farmer be aware, great king, that his granary was not getting filled ?’ ‘Yes, he ought to know it.’ ‘But how ?’ ‘He would know that the cause, proximate and remote, of the filling of the granary had ceased.’ ‘Just so with the man you spoke of. By the cessation of all that leads to rebirth, he would be conscious of having escaped his liability to it.’ ‘Well explained, N4gasena!’ 31. The king said: ‘He who has intelligence, NA4gasena, has he also wisdom ? ?’ ‘Yes, great king.’ [42] ‘What ; are they both the same?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Then would he, with his intelligence — which, you say, is the same as wisdom—be still in bewilderment or not ?’ ‘In regard to some things, yes; in regard to others, no.’ ‘What would he be in bewilderment about ?’ ‘He would still be in bewilderment as to those parts of learning he had not learnt, as to those countries he had not seen, and as to those names or terms he had not heard.’ ‘And wherein would he not be in bewilderment ?’ ‘As regards that which has been accomplished by insight—(the perception, that is,) of the imper- ? Summarised in Hardy’s ‘ Manual,’ p. 414. 3 Nana and pafaa. II, 2, 3. INTELLIGENCE AND WISDOM. 67 manence of all beings, of the suffering inherent in individuality, and of the non-existence of any soul ?.’ ‘ Then what would have become of his delusions on those points.’ ‘When intelligence has once arisen, that moment delusion has died away.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘It is like the lamp, which when a man has brought into a darkened room, then the darkness would vanish away, and light would appear.’ ‘And what, Nagasena, on the other hand, has then become of his wisdom ?’ ‘When the reasoning wisdom has effected that which it has to do, then the reasoning ceases to go on. But that which has been acquired by means of it remains—the knowledge, to wit, of the impermanence of every being, of the suffering inherent in individuality, and of the absence of any soul.’ ‘Give me an illustration, reverend Sir, of what you have last said.’ ‘It is as when a man wants, during the night, to send a letter, and after having his clerk called, has a lamp lit, and gets the letter written. Then, when that has been done, he extinguishes the lamp. But though the lamp had been put out the writing would still be there. Thus does reasoning cease, and knowledge remain.’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Thus does the recluse who is devoted to effort perceive with the clearest wisdom the impermanency (of all beings and things), the suffering (that is inherent in individuality), and the absence of any soul.’ ‘ Give me an illustration.’ ‘It is like a lamp, O king, which a man might introduce into a house in darkness. When the lamp had been brought in it would dispel the darkness, 1 Samyutta Nikdya XXI, 5. 2 Paaaa. Hardy in the ‘Manual of Buddhism,’ pp. 414, 415, gives a jumble of this passage and several others. * See above, p. 51. * Vidamseti, not in Childers; but compare Theri G4tha, 74 ; Anguttara III, 103; and Gataka III, 222. 62 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. _ II, 1, 15. cause radiance to arise, and light to shine forth, and make the objects there plainly visible. Just so would wisdom in a man have such effects as were just now set forth.’ ‘Well put, Nagasena !’ 15. The king said: ‘These qualities which are so different’, Nagasena, do they bring about one and the same result ?’ ‘They do. The putting an end to evil dispositions. ~ ‘ How is that? Give me an illustration.’ ‘They are like the various parts of an army— elephants, cavalry, war chariots, and archers—who all work to one end, to wit : the conquest in battle of the opposing army.’ ‘Well put, Nagasena!’ Here ends the First Chapter. 1 That is, the five referred to above, p. 51, § 9. II, 2, 1. IDENTITY. 63 Boox II. Cuapter 2, 1. [40] The king said: ‘ He who is born, Nagasena, does he remain the same or become another ?’ ‘ Neither the same nor another.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘Now what do you think, O king? You were once a baby, a tender thing, and small in size, lying flat on your back. Was that the same as you who are now grown up?’ ‘No. That child was one, I am another.’ ‘If you are not that child, it will follow that you have had neither mother nor father, no! nor teacher. You cannot have been taught either learning, or behaviour, or wisdom. What, great king! is the mother of the embryo in the first stage different from the mother of the embryo in the second stage, or the third, or the fourth! ? Is the mother of the baby a different person from the mother of the grown-up man? Is the person who goes to school one, and the same when he has finished his schooling another ? Is it one who commits a crime, another who is punished by having his hands or feet cut off??’ ‘Certainly not. But what would you, Sir, say to that ?’ The Elder replied: ‘I should say that I am the same person, now I am grown up, as I was when I was a tender tiny baby, flat on my back. For all these states are included in one by means of this body.’ ‘Give me an illustration,’ * On these four stages see Gataka IV, 496, and Samyutta X, 1, 3. * Hardy makes sad nonsense of all this, 64 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, r. ‘Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through ?’ ‘Yes, it might do so.’
2* Hardy makes sad nonsense of all this, 64 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, r. ‘Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through ?’ ‘Yes, it might do so.’ ‘Now, is it the same flame that burns in the first watch of the night, Sir, and in the second?’ ‘No.’ ‘Or the same that burns in the second watch and in the third ?’ ‘No.’ ‘Then is there one lamp in the first watch, and another in the second, and another in the third ?’ ‘No. The light comes from the same lamp all the night through.’ ‘Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness ',’ ‘ Give me a further illustration.’ 1 Hardy (p. 429) renders this as follows: ‘In the same way, great king, one being is conceived, another is born, another dies ; when comprehended by the mind, it is like a thing that has no before, and no after; no preceding, no succeeding existence. Thus the being who is born does not continue the same, nor does he become another; the last winyana, or consciousness, is thus united with the rest.’ (!) He confesses himself in doubt as to the last few words, but is quite unconscious of having completely misinterpreted the whole paragraph. The meaning is really quite plain in both the Pali and the Simhalese. A man, at any one moment, is precisely all that he is then conscious of. The phase of his self-consciousness, the totality of that of which he is conscious, is always changing; and is so different at death from what it was at birth that, in a certain sense, he is not the same at the one time as he was at the other. But there is a continuity in the whole series ;—a continuity dependent II, 2, 2. ASSURANCE OF SALVATION. 65 ‘It is like milk, [41] which when once taken from the cow, turns, after a lapse of time, first to curds, and then from curds to butter, and then from butter to ghee. Now would it be right to say that the milk was the same thing as the curds, or the butter, or the ghee?’ ‘Certainly not; but they are produced out of it.’ ‘Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness.’ ‘Well put, Nagasena !’ 21, The king said: ‘Is a man, Nagasena, who will not be reborn, aware of the fact ?’ ‘Yes, O king.’ ‘And how does he know it ?’ ‘ By the cessation of all that is cause, proximate or remote ?, of rebirth.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘ Suppose a farmer, great king, had ploughed and sown and filled his granary; and then for a period should neither plough nor sow, but live on the
3on the whole body. And this fits the simile, in which the lamp is the body, and the flame the changing self-consciousness ; whereas it is impossible to make the simile fit the conclusion as rendered by Hardy. On the phrase apubbam akariyam see Dr. Morris’s note at p. ror of the Pali Text Society’s Journal, 1887, and the passages he there quotes. ' Omitted in Hardy. The correlative question is discussed below, III, 5, 8, p. 112. 8 That is to say, Tawha and Up4dana. [35] F 66 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 3. stored-up grain, or dispose of it in barter, or deal with it as he had need. Would the farmer be aware, great king, that his granary was not getting filled ?’ ‘Yes, he ought to know it.’ ‘But how ?’ ‘He would know that the cause, proximate and remote, of the filling of the granary had ceased.’ ‘Just so with the man you spoke of. By the cessation of all that leads to rebirth, he would be conscious of having escaped his liability to it.’ ‘Well explained, N4gasena!’ 31. The king said: ‘He who has intelligence, NA4gasena, has he also wisdom ? ?’ ‘Yes, great king.’ [42] ‘What ; are they both the same?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Then would he, with his intelligence — which, you say, is the same as wisdom—be still in bewilderment or not ?’ ‘In regard to some things, yes; in regard to others, no.’ ‘What would he be in bewilderment about ?’ ‘He would still be in bewilderment as to those parts of learning he had not learnt, as to those countries he had not seen, and as to those names or terms he had not heard.’ ‘And wherein would he not be in bewilderment ?’ ‘As regards that which has been accomplished by insight—(the perception, that is,) of the imper- ? Summarised in Hardy’s ‘ Manual,’ p. 414. 3 Nana and pafaa. II, 2, 3. INTELLIGENCE AND WISDOM. 67 manence of all beings, of the suffering inherent in individuality, and of the non-existence of any soul ?.’ ‘ Then what would have become of his delusions on those points.’ ‘When intelligence has once arisen, that moment delusion has died away.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘It is like the lamp, which when a man has brought into a darkened room, then the darkness would vanish away, and light would appear.’ ‘And what, Nagasena, on the other hand, has then become of his wisdom ?’ ‘When the reasoning wisdom has effected that which it has to do, then the reasoning ceases to go on. But that which has been acquired by means of it remains—the knowledge, to wit, of the impermanence of every being, of the suffering inherent in individuality, and of the absence of any soul.’ ‘Give me an illustration, reverend Sir, of what you have last said.’ ‘It is as when a man wants, during the night, to send a letter, and after having his clerk called, has a lamp lit, and gets the letter written. Then, when that has been done, he extinguishes the lamp. But though the lamp had been put out the writing would still be there. Thus does reasoning cease, and knowledge remain.’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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