Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1[47] Or it is like the fire which a man, in the cold season, might kindle, and when he had warmed himself, leave still burning, and go away. Then if that fire were to set ? Repeated below, III, 5, 7, p. 112. Il, 2, 6. KARMA. 73 . another man’s field on fire, and the owner of the field were to seize him, and bring him before the king, and charge him with the injury, and he were to say: “ Your Majesty! It was not I who set this man’s field on fire. The fire I left burning was a different one from that which burnt his field. I am not guilty.” Now would the man, O king, be guilty?’ ‘Certainly, Sir.’ ‘But why?’ ‘ Because, in spite of whatever he might say, he would be guilty in respect of the subsequent fire that resulted from the previous one.’ ‘Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are done by this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its Karma). ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, a man were to take a lamp and go up into the top storey of his house, and there eat his meal. And the lamp blazing up were to set the thatch on fire, and from that the house should catch fire, and that house having caught fire the whole village should be burnt. And they should seize him and ask: “ What, you fellow, did you set our village on fire for?” And he should reply: “I’ve not set your village on fire! The flame of the lamp, by the light of which I was eating, was one thing; the fire which burnt your village was another thing.” Now if they, thus disputing, should go to law before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?’ ‘In the villagers’ favour,’ ‘But why ?’ 74 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 6. ‘Because, Sir, in spite of whatever the man might say, the one fire was produced from the other.’ ‘Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, a man were to choose a young girl in marriage, and give a price! for her and go away. [48] And she in due course should grow up to full age, and then another man were to pay a price for her and marry her. And when the first one had come back he should say: “ Why, you fellow, have you carried off my wife?” And the other were to reply: “It’s not your wife I have carried off! The little girl, the mere child, whom you chose in marriage and paid a price for is one; the girl grown up to full age whom I chose in marriage and paid a price for, is another.” Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case ?’ ‘In favour of the first.’ ‘But why?’ ‘Because, in spite of whatever the second might say, the grown-up girl would have been derived from the other girl.’
2‘Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form 1 Sunkam datva. Literally ‘paying a tax.’ So early were early marriages! Compare Theri Gath, 402. Hinafi-kumburé, p- 58, has woe/up dif, ‘having provided her with means of subsistence.’ But, of course, the Sunka must have been a price paid to the parents. II, 2, 7+ KARMA. 75 which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘Suppose a man, O king, were to buy of a herdsman a vessel of milk, and go away leaving it in his charge, saying : “I will come for it to-morrow;” and the next day it were to become curds. And when the man should come and ask for it, then suppose the other were to offer him the curds, and he should say: “It was not curds 1 bought of you; give me my vessel of milk.” And the other were to reply: “Without any fault of mine? your milk has turned to curds.” Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case ?’ ‘In favour of the herdsman.’ ‘But why?’ ‘Because, in spite of whatever the other might say, the curds were derived from the milk.’ ‘ Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form that finds its end in death, and another that is reborn. But that other is the result of the first, and is therefore not thereby released from its evil deeds (its bad Karma).’ ‘Very good, Nagasena !’ 7°. The king said: ‘ Will you, Nagasena, be reborn ?’ 1 Agdnato: there is an ambiguity here, as the word may mean ‘to me not knowing it,’ or ‘to you not knowing it.’ Hinafikumburé takes the latter interpretation, and renders: ‘O come! Do you not know that your milk has become curds?’ (Embala, tage kiri maw bawa no dannehi deeyi.) ? Not in Hardy. 76 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 8. ‘ Nay, great king, what is the use of asking that question again ? Have I not already told you that if, when I die, [49] I die with craving in my heart, I shall; but if not, not? ?’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, a man were to render service to the king ?: and the king, pleased with him, were to bestow an office upon him. And then that he, while living through that appointment, in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, should publicly declare that the king had repaid him naught. Now would that man, O king, be acting rightly ?’ ‘Most certainly not.’ ‘Just so, great king, what is the use of asking that question again? Have I not already told you that if, when I die, I die with craving in my heart, I shall; and if not, not ?’ ‘You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.’ 8. The king said: ‘ You were talking just now of name-and-form. What does “name” mean in that expression, and what “form” ?’ ‘ Whatever is gross therein, that is “form”: whatever is subtle, mental, that is “ name.”’ ‘Why is it, N&gasena, that name is not reborn separately, or form separately ?’
3The king said: ‘ You were talking just now of name-and-form. What does “name” mean in that expression, and what “form” ?’ ‘ Whatever is gross therein, that is “form”: whatever is subtle, mental, that is “ name.”’ ‘Why is it, N&gasena, that name is not reborn separately, or form separately ?’ ‘These conditions, great king, are connected one with the other; and spring into being together.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘As a hen, great king, would not get a yoke or 1 See above, Chapter 1, § 6, p. go. 2 This simile, with a different conclusion, recurs below, II, 3, 10 (P. 93). II, 2, 9. TIME. 77 an egg-shell separately, but both would arise in one, they two being intimately dependent one on the other; just so, if there were no name there would be no form. What is meant by name in that expression being intimately dependent on what is meant by form, they spring up together. And this is, through time immemorial, their nature,’ ‘You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.’ 9. The king said: ‘ You speak, Nagasena, of time immemorial. What does this word “time” mean ?’ ‘ Past time, O king, and present, and future.’ ‘But what ? is there such a thing as time ?’ ‘There is time which exists, and time which does not.’ ‘Which then exists, and which not ?’ [50] ‘There are Confections (constituent potentialities of being)?, O king, which are past in the sense of having passed away, and ceased to be, or of having been dissolved, or altogether changed. To them time is not. But there are conditions of heart which are now producing their effect, or still have in them the inherent possibility of producing 1Evam etam digham addhanam sambhavitam: which Hardy, p. 141, renders: ‘They accompany each other (as to the species, but not as to the individual) during infinitude.’ But even the Simhalese text cannot be made to mean this. * Samkh4r4. See the full list in my ‘ Buddhism,’ pp. 91, 92 (a list, indeed, not found as yet in the Pifakas, and probably later, but yet founded on the older divisions, and explanatory of them). They are all those divisions into which existence (or the process of becoming and ceasing to be as Buddhism looks at it) should be divided, and are practically so many sorts of action (Karma). For the older divisions see the note at the passages quoted in ‘ Vinaya Texts,’ I, 76. 78 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 9. effect, or which will otherwise lead to reindividualisation. To them time is. Where there are beings who, when dead, will be reborn, there time is. Where there are beings who, when dead, will not be reborn, there time is not; and where there are beings who are altogether set free (who, having attained Nirv4za in their present life, have come to the end of that life), there time is not—because of their having been quite set free!’ ‘You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.’ Here ends the Second Chapter.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1[47] Or it is like the fire which a man, in the cold season, might kindle, and when he had warmed himself, leave still burning, and go away. Then if that fire were to set ? Repeated below, III, 5, 7, p. 112. Il, 2, 6. KARMA. 73 . another man’s field on fire, and the owner of the field were to seize him, and bring him before the king, and charge him with the injury, and he were to say: “ Your Majesty! It was not I who set this man’s field on fire. The fire I left burning was a different one from that which burnt his field. I am not guilty.” Now would the man, O king, be guilty?’ ‘Certainly, Sir.’ ‘But why?’ ‘ Because, in spite of whatever he might say, he would be guilty in respect of the subsequent fire that resulted from the previous one.’ ‘Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are done by this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its Karma). ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, a man were to take a lamp and go up into the top storey of his house, and there eat his meal. And the lamp blazing up were to set the thatch on fire, and from that the house should catch fire, and that house having caught fire the whole village should be burnt. And they should seize him and ask: “ What, you fellow, did you set our village on fire for?” And he should reply: “I’ve not set your village on fire! The flame of the lamp, by the light of which I was eating, was one thing; the fire which burnt your village was another thing.” Now if they, thus disputing, should go to law before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?’ ‘In the villagers’ favour,’ ‘But why ?’ 74 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 6. ‘Because, Sir, in spite of whatever the man might say, the one fire was produced from the other.’ ‘Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, a man were to choose a young girl in marriage, and give a price! for her and go away. [48] And she in due course should grow up to full age, and then another man were to pay a price for her and marry her. And when the first one had come back he should say: “ Why, you fellow, have you carried off my wife?” And the other were to reply: “It’s not your wife I have carried off! The little girl, the mere child, whom you chose in marriage and paid a price for is one; the girl grown up to full age whom I chose in marriage and paid a price for, is another.” Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case ?’ ‘In favour of the first.’ ‘But why?’ ‘Because, in spite of whatever the second might say, the grown-up girl would have been derived from the other girl.’
2‘Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form 1 Sunkam datva. Literally ‘paying a tax.’ So early were early marriages! Compare Theri Gath, 402. Hinafi-kumburé, p- 58, has woe/up dif, ‘having provided her with means of subsistence.’ But, of course, the Sunka must have been a price paid to the parents. II, 2, 7+ KARMA. 75 which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘Suppose a man, O king, were to buy of a herdsman a vessel of milk, and go away leaving it in his charge, saying : “I will come for it to-morrow;” and the next day it were to become curds. And when the man should come and ask for it, then suppose the other were to offer him the curds, and he should say: “It was not curds 1 bought of you; give me my vessel of milk.” And the other were to reply: “Without any fault of mine? your milk has turned to curds.” Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case ?’ ‘In favour of the herdsman.’ ‘But why?’ ‘Because, in spite of whatever the other might say, the curds were derived from the milk.’ ‘ Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form that finds its end in death, and another that is reborn. But that other is the result of the first, and is therefore not thereby released from its evil deeds (its bad Karma).’ ‘Very good, Nagasena !’ 7°. The king said: ‘ Will you, Nagasena, be reborn ?’ 1 Agdnato: there is an ambiguity here, as the word may mean ‘to me not knowing it,’ or ‘to you not knowing it.’ Hinafikumburé takes the latter interpretation, and renders: ‘O come! Do you not know that your milk has become curds?’ (Embala, tage kiri maw bawa no dannehi deeyi.) ? Not in Hardy. 76 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 8. ‘ Nay, great king, what is the use of asking that question again ? Have I not already told you that if, when I die, [49] I die with craving in my heart, I shall; but if not, not? ?’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, a man were to render service to the king ?: and the king, pleased with him, were to bestow an office upon him. And then that he, while living through that appointment, in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, should publicly declare that the king had repaid him naught. Now would that man, O king, be acting rightly ?’ ‘Most certainly not.’ ‘Just so, great king, what is the use of asking that question again? Have I not already told you that if, when I die, I die with craving in my heart, I shall; and if not, not ?’ ‘You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.’ 8. The king said: ‘ You were talking just now of name-and-form. What does “name” mean in that expression, and what “form” ?’ ‘ Whatever is gross therein, that is “form”: whatever is subtle, mental, that is “ name.”’ ‘Why is it, N&gasena, that name is not reborn separately, or form separately ?’
3The king said: ‘ You were talking just now of name-and-form. What does “name” mean in that expression, and what “form” ?’ ‘ Whatever is gross therein, that is “form”: whatever is subtle, mental, that is “ name.”’ ‘Why is it, N&gasena, that name is not reborn separately, or form separately ?’ ‘These conditions, great king, are connected one with the other; and spring into being together.’ ‘Give me an illustration.’ ‘As a hen, great king, would not get a yoke or 1 See above, Chapter 1, § 6, p. go. 2 This simile, with a different conclusion, recurs below, II, 3, 10 (P. 93). II, 2, 9. TIME. 77 an egg-shell separately, but both would arise in one, they two being intimately dependent one on the other; just so, if there were no name there would be no form. What is meant by name in that expression being intimately dependent on what is meant by form, they spring up together. And this is, through time immemorial, their nature,’ ‘You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.’ 9. The king said: ‘ You speak, Nagasena, of time immemorial. What does this word “time” mean ?’ ‘ Past time, O king, and present, and future.’ ‘But what ? is there such a thing as time ?’ ‘There is time which exists, and time which does not.’ ‘Which then exists, and which not ?’ [50] ‘There are Confections (constituent potentialities of being)?, O king, which are past in the sense of having passed away, and ceased to be, or of having been dissolved, or altogether changed. To them time is not. But there are conditions of heart which are now producing their effect, or still have in them the inherent possibility of producing 1Evam etam digham addhanam sambhavitam: which Hardy, p. 141, renders: ‘They accompany each other (as to the species, but not as to the individual) during infinitude.’ But even the Simhalese text cannot be made to mean this. * Samkh4r4. See the full list in my ‘ Buddhism,’ pp. 91, 92 (a list, indeed, not found as yet in the Pifakas, and probably later, but yet founded on the older divisions, and explanatory of them). They are all those divisions into which existence (or the process of becoming and ceasing to be as Buddhism looks at it) should be divided, and are practically so many sorts of action (Karma). For the older divisions see the note at the passages quoted in ‘ Vinaya Texts,’ I, 76. 78 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 2, 9. effect, or which will otherwise lead to reindividualisation. To them time is. Where there are beings who, when dead, will be reborn, there time is. Where there are beings who, when dead, will not be reborn, there time is not; and where there are beings who are altogether set free (who, having attained Nirv4za in their present life, have come to the end of that life), there time is not—because of their having been quite set free!’ ‘You are ready, Nagasena, in reply.’ Here ends the Second Chapter.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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