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1G2 84 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 5- ‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘ They are like all kinds of trees and plants which, when set in the ground, grow, develope, and mature, and then yield their fruits and flowers. The trees do not spring into being without a becoming. It is by a process of evolution that they become what they are. Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘They are like the pots of various kinds which a potter might form when he has dug up the clay out of the earth. The pots do not spring into being without a becoming. It is by a process of evolution that they become what they are. Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, there were no bridge of metal ona mandolin’, no leather, no hollow space, no frame, no neck, no strings, no bow, and no human effort or exertion, would there be music ?’ ‘Certainly not, Sir.’ ‘But if all these things were there, would not there be a sound ?’ 1 Vinaya pattam. I don’t know what this is. The Simhalese merely repeats the words. Il, 3, 5 FORMATION OF QUALITIES. 85 ‘Of course there would.’ ‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, there were no fire-stick apparatus!, no twirling-stick!, and no cord for the twirling-stick, and no matrix}, and no burnt rag for tinder, and no human effort and exertion, could there be fire by attrition ?’ ‘ Certainly not.’ ‘But if all these conditions were present, then might not fire appear ?’ ‘Yes, certainly.’ [54] ‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Give me one more illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, there were no burning glass, and no heat of the sun, and no dried cow-dung for tinder, could there be fire ?’ ‘Certainly not.’ ‘But where these things are present there fire might be struck, might it not ?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which Arani, arani-potako, and uttarfrani. The exact differentiation of these parts of the fire-stick apparatus is uncertain. The Simhalese throws no real light on them, as it translates them respectively yafa liya, ‘under wood,’ matu Ifya, ‘upper wood,’ and uturu Ifya, also ‘upper wood.’ This method of ignition was probably quite as strange to Hinasi-kumburé as it is to us. a 4
2The Simhalese throws no real light on them, as it translates them respectively yafa liya, ‘under wood,’ matu Ifya, ‘upper wood,’ and uturu Ifya, also ‘upper wood.’ This method of ignition was probably quite as strange to Hinasi-kumburé as it is to us. a 4 86 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 6. has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It.is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Give me another illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, there were no looking-glass, and no light, and no face in front of it, would there appear an image ?’ ‘No.’ ‘But given these things,there might be a reflection?’ ‘Yes, Sir, there might.’ ‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Very good, NAgasena !’ 6. The king said: ‘Is there, Nagasena, such a thing as the soul! ?’ ‘What is this, O king, the soul (Vedagu) ?’ ‘The living principle within? which sees forms through the eye, hears sounds through the ear, experiences tastes through the tongue, smells odours through the nose, feels touch through the body, and . discerns things (conditions, “dhamm4”) through the mind—just as we, sitting here in the palace, can look out of any window out of which we wish to look, the east window or the west, or the north or the south.’ The Elder replied: ‘I will tell you about the five 1 Vedagf, see below, III, 5, 6, p. r11, not found in this meaning in the Pisakas. ‘ * Abbhantare givo, also not found in this sense in the Pi/akas. Att4, rendered just above ‘image’ or ‘reflection,’ is the word used in them for soul. Hinaf-kumburé renders this here by prana giwa, ‘breath-soul.’ See below, III, 7, 15, p. 132; and above, II, 4, p. 48; and I, 2, 6, p. 71. —_ — - Oo II, 3, 6. THE SOUL. 87 doors', great king. Listen, and give heed attentively. If the living principle within sees forms through the eye in the manner that you mention, [55] choosing its window as it likes, can it not then see forms not only through the eye, but also through each of the other five organs of sense? And in like manner can it not then as well hear sounds, and experience taste,and smell odours, and feel touch,and discern conditions through each of the other five organs of sense, besides the one you have in each case specified?’ ‘No, Sir.’ ‘Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately, the latter sense to the former organ, and so on. Now we, as we are seated here in the palace, with these windows all thrown open, and in full daylight, if we only stretch forth our heads, see all kinds of objects plainly. Can the living principle do the same when the doors of the eyes are thrown open? When the doors of the ear are thrown open, can it do so? Can it then not only hear sounds, but see sights, experience tastes, smell odours, feel touch, and discern conditions ? And so with each of its windows ?’ ‘No, Sir.’
3When the doors of the ear are thrown open, can it do so? Can it then not only hear sounds, but see sights, experience tastes, smell odours, feel touch, and discern conditions ? And so with each of its windows ?’ ‘No, Sir.’ [56] ‘Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately. Now again, great king, if Dinna here were to go outside and stand in the gateway, would you be aware that he had done so ?’ ‘Yes, I should know it.’ ‘ And if the same Dinna were to come back again, and stand before you, would you be aware of his having done so ?’ 1 It is odd he does not say six. 88 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. III, 3, 6. ‘Yes, I should know it.’ ‘ Well, great king, would the living principle within discern, in like manner, if anything possessing flavour were laid upon the tongue, its sourness, or its saltness, or its acidity, or its pungency, or its astringency, or its sweetness? ?’ “Yes, it would know it.’ ‘But when the flavour had passed into the stomach would it still discern these things ?’ ‘Certainly not.’ ‘Then these powers are not united one to the other indiscriminately. Now suppose, O king, a man were to have a hundred vessels of honey brought and poured into one trough, and then, having had another man’s mouth closed over and tied up, were to have him cast into the trough full of honey. Would he know whether that into which he had been thrown was sweet or whether it was not?’ ‘No, Sir.’ ‘But why not ?’ ‘ Because the honey could not get into his mouth.’ ‘Then, great king, these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately 2.’ ‘I am not capable of discussing with such a reasoner. Be pleased, Sir, to explain to me how the matter stands.’ Then the Elder convinced Milinda the king with discourse drawn from the Abhidhamma, saying : ‘ It is by reason, O king, of the eye and of forms that sight arises, and those other conditions—contact, 1 This list recurs below, II, 4, 1. 3 That is: ‘ Your “ living principle within” cannot make use of whichever of its windows it pleases. And the simile of a man inside a house does not hold good of the soul.’ See the end of II, 3, 16. TI, 3, 7+ THE SOUL. 89 sensation, idea, thought, abstraction, sense of vitality, and attention ’—arise each simultaneously with its predecessor. And a similar succession of cause and effect arises when each of the other five organs of sense is brought into play. [57] Andso herein there is no such thing as soul (Vedagu) *.’ . 7. The king said: ‘Does thought-perception * arise wherever sight arises‘ ?’ ‘Yes, O king, where the one is there is the other.’ ‘ And which of the two arises first ?’ ‘ First sight, then thought.’ ‘Then does the sight issue, as it were, a command to thought, saying: “ Do you spring up there where I have?” or does thought issue command to sight, saying : ‘“ Where you spring up there will I.”’ ‘It is not so, great king. There is no intercourse between the one and the other.’
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1G2 84 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 5- ‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘ They are like all kinds of trees and plants which, when set in the ground, grow, develope, and mature, and then yield their fruits and flowers. The trees do not spring into being without a becoming. It is by a process of evolution that they become what they are. Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘They are like the pots of various kinds which a potter might form when he has dug up the clay out of the earth. The pots do not spring into being without a becoming. It is by a process of evolution that they become what they are. Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, there were no bridge of metal ona mandolin’, no leather, no hollow space, no frame, no neck, no strings, no bow, and no human effort or exertion, would there be music ?’ ‘Certainly not, Sir.’ ‘But if all these things were there, would not there be a sound ?’ 1 Vinaya pattam. I don’t know what this is. The Simhalese merely repeats the words. Il, 3, 5 FORMATION OF QUALITIES. 85 ‘Of course there would.’ ‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Give me a further illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, there were no fire-stick apparatus!, no twirling-stick!, and no cord for the twirling-stick, and no matrix}, and no burnt rag for tinder, and no human effort and exertion, could there be fire by attrition ?’ ‘ Certainly not.’ ‘But if all these conditions were present, then might not fire appear ?’ ‘Yes, certainly.’ [54] ‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Give me one more illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, there were no burning glass, and no heat of the sun, and no dried cow-dung for tinder, could there be fire ?’ ‘Certainly not.’ ‘But where these things are present there fire might be struck, might it not ?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which Arani, arani-potako, and uttarfrani. The exact differentiation of these parts of the fire-stick apparatus is uncertain. The Simhalese throws no real light on them, as it translates them respectively yafa liya, ‘under wood,’ matu Ifya, ‘upper wood,’ and uturu Ifya, also ‘upper wood.’ This method of ignition was probably quite as strange to Hinasi-kumburé as it is to us. a 4
2The Simhalese throws no real light on them, as it translates them respectively yafa liya, ‘under wood,’ matu Ifya, ‘upper wood,’ and uturu Ifya, also ‘upper wood.’ This method of ignition was probably quite as strange to Hinasi-kumburé as it is to us. a 4 86 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. II, 3, 6. has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It.is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Give me another illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, there were no looking-glass, and no light, and no face in front of it, would there appear an image ?’ ‘No.’ ‘But given these things,there might be a reflection?’ ‘Yes, Sir, there might.’ ‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’ ‘Very good, NAgasena !’ 6. The king said: ‘Is there, Nagasena, such a thing as the soul! ?’ ‘What is this, O king, the soul (Vedagu) ?’ ‘The living principle within? which sees forms through the eye, hears sounds through the ear, experiences tastes through the tongue, smells odours through the nose, feels touch through the body, and . discerns things (conditions, “dhamm4”) through the mind—just as we, sitting here in the palace, can look out of any window out of which we wish to look, the east window or the west, or the north or the south.’ The Elder replied: ‘I will tell you about the five 1 Vedagf, see below, III, 5, 6, p. r11, not found in this meaning in the Pisakas. ‘ * Abbhantare givo, also not found in this sense in the Pi/akas. Att4, rendered just above ‘image’ or ‘reflection,’ is the word used in them for soul. Hinaf-kumburé renders this here by prana giwa, ‘breath-soul.’ See below, III, 7, 15, p. 132; and above, II, 4, p. 48; and I, 2, 6, p. 71. —_ — - Oo II, 3, 6. THE SOUL. 87 doors', great king. Listen, and give heed attentively. If the living principle within sees forms through the eye in the manner that you mention, [55] choosing its window as it likes, can it not then see forms not only through the eye, but also through each of the other five organs of sense? And in like manner can it not then as well hear sounds, and experience taste,and smell odours, and feel touch,and discern conditions through each of the other five organs of sense, besides the one you have in each case specified?’ ‘No, Sir.’ ‘Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately, the latter sense to the former organ, and so on. Now we, as we are seated here in the palace, with these windows all thrown open, and in full daylight, if we only stretch forth our heads, see all kinds of objects plainly. Can the living principle do the same when the doors of the eyes are thrown open? When the doors of the ear are thrown open, can it do so? Can it then not only hear sounds, but see sights, experience tastes, smell odours, feel touch, and discern conditions ? And so with each of its windows ?’ ‘No, Sir.’
3When the doors of the ear are thrown open, can it do so? Can it then not only hear sounds, but see sights, experience tastes, smell odours, feel touch, and discern conditions ? And so with each of its windows ?’ ‘No, Sir.’ [56] ‘Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately. Now again, great king, if Dinna here were to go outside and stand in the gateway, would you be aware that he had done so ?’ ‘Yes, I should know it.’ ‘ And if the same Dinna were to come back again, and stand before you, would you be aware of his having done so ?’ 1 It is odd he does not say six. 88 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. III, 3, 6. ‘Yes, I should know it.’ ‘ Well, great king, would the living principle within discern, in like manner, if anything possessing flavour were laid upon the tongue, its sourness, or its saltness, or its acidity, or its pungency, or its astringency, or its sweetness? ?’ “Yes, it would know it.’ ‘But when the flavour had passed into the stomach would it still discern these things ?’ ‘Certainly not.’ ‘Then these powers are not united one to the other indiscriminately. Now suppose, O king, a man were to have a hundred vessels of honey brought and poured into one trough, and then, having had another man’s mouth closed over and tied up, were to have him cast into the trough full of honey. Would he know whether that into which he had been thrown was sweet or whether it was not?’ ‘No, Sir.’ ‘But why not ?’ ‘ Because the honey could not get into his mouth.’ ‘Then, great king, these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately 2.’ ‘I am not capable of discussing with such a reasoner. Be pleased, Sir, to explain to me how the matter stands.’ Then the Elder convinced Milinda the king with discourse drawn from the Abhidhamma, saying : ‘ It is by reason, O king, of the eye and of forms that sight arises, and those other conditions—contact, 1 This list recurs below, II, 4, 1. 3 That is: ‘ Your “ living principle within” cannot make use of whichever of its windows it pleases. And the simile of a man inside a house does not hold good of the soul.’ See the end of II, 3, 16. TI, 3, 7+ THE SOUL. 89 sensation, idea, thought, abstraction, sense of vitality, and attention ’—arise each simultaneously with its predecessor. And a similar succession of cause and effect arises when each of the other five organs of sense is brought into play. [57] Andso herein there is no such thing as soul (Vedagu) *.’ . 7. The king said: ‘Does thought-perception * arise wherever sight arises‘ ?’ ‘Yes, O king, where the one is there is the other.’ ‘ And which of the two arises first ?’ ‘ First sight, then thought.’ ‘Then does the sight issue, as it were, a command to thought, saying: “ Do you spring up there where I have?” or does thought issue command to sight, saying : ‘“ Where you spring up there will I.”’ ‘It is not so, great king. There is no intercourse between the one and the other.’
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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