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1The writer who most fully anticipated the main positions of the philosophy of organ- ism is John Locke in his Essay, especially * in its later books. The lectures are divided into five parts. In the first part, the method is explained, and scheme of ideas, in terms of which the cosmology is to be framed, is stated summarily. In the second part an endeavour is made to exhibit this scheme as adequate for the interpretation of the ideas and problems which form the complex texture of civilized thought. Apart from such an investigation the summary statement of Part I is practically unintelligible. Thus Part II at once gives meaning to the verbal phrases of the scheme by their use in discussion, and shows the power of the scheme to put the various elements of our experience into a consistent relation to each other. In order to obtain a reasonably complete account of human experience considered in relation to the philosophical 1Cf. An Essay Concerning Hunan Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. VI, Sect. 11. Vv vl PREFACE problems which naturally arise, the group of philosophers and scientists belonging to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been considered, in particular Descartes, Newton, Locke, Hume, Kant. Any one of these writers is one-sided in his presentation of the groundwork of experience; but as a whole they give a general presenta- tion which dominates the development of subsequent philosophy. I started the investigation with the expec- tation of being occupied with the exposition of the diver- gencies from every member of this group. But a careful examination of their exact statements disclosed that in the main the philosophy of organism is a recurrence to pre-Kantian modes of thought. These philosophers were perplexed by the inconsistent presuppositions underlying their inherited modes of expression. In so far as they, or their successors, have endeavoured to be rigidly sys- tematic, the tendency has been to abandon just those elements in their thought upon which the philosophy of organism bases itself. An endeavour has been made to point out the exact points of agreement and of dis- agreement. In the second part, the discussions of modern thought have been confined to the most general notions of physics and biology, with a careful avoidance of all detail. Also, it must be one of the motives of a complete cosmology, to construct a system of ideas which bring the aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those con- cepts of the world which have their origin in natural science.
2Also, it must be one of the motives of a complete cosmology, to construct a system of ideas which bring the aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those con- cepts of the world which have their origin in natural science. In the third and fourth parts, the cosmological scheme is developed in terms of its own categoreal notions, and without much regard to other systems of thought. For example, in Part II there is a chapter on the ‘Extensive Continuum,’ which is largely concerned with the notions of Descartes and Newton, compared with the way in which the organic philosophy must interpret this feature of the world. But in Part IV, this question is treated from the point of view of developing the detailed method PREFACE vil in which the philosophy of organism establishes the theory of this problem. It must be thoroughly under- stood that the theme of these lectures is not a detached consideration of various traditional philosophical prob- lems which acquire urgency in certain traditional systems of thought. The lectures are intended to state a condensed scheme of cosmological ideas, to develop their meaning by confrontation with the various topics of experience, and finally to elaborate an adequate cosmol- ogy in terms of which all particular topics find them interconnections. Thus the unity of treatment is to be looked for in the gradual development of the scheme, in meaning and in relevance, and not in the successive treat- ment of particular topics. For example, the doctrines of time, of space, of perception, and of causality are recurred to again and again, as the cosmology develops. In each recurrence, these topics throw some new light on the scheme, or receive some new elucidation. At the end, in so far as the enterprise has been successful, there should be no problem of space-time, or of epistemology, or of causality, left over for discussion. The scheme should have developed all those generic notions adequate for the expression of any possible interconnection of things. Among the contemporary schools of thought, my obli- gations to the English and American Realists are obvious. In this connection, I should like especially to mention Professor T. P. Nunn, of the University of London. His anticipations, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, of some of the doctrines of recent Realism, do not appear to be sufficiently well known. I am also greatly indebted to Bergson, William James, and John Dewey. One of my preoccupations has been to rescue their type of thought from the charge of anti- intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been asso- ciated with it. Finally, though throughout the main body of the work I am in sharp disagreement with Brad- ley, the final outcome is after all not so greatly different. I am particularly indebted to his chapter on the nature vill PREFACE
3Finally, though throughout the main body of the work I am in sharp disagreement with Brad- ley, the final outcome is after all not so greatly different. I am particularly indebted to his chapter on the nature vill PREFACE of experience, which appears in his Essays on Truth and Reality. His insistence on ‘feeling’ is very consonant with my own conclusions. This whole metaphysical posi- tion is an implicit repudiation of the doctrine of ‘vacuous actuality.’ The fifth part is concerned with the final interpretation of the ultimate way in which the cosmological problem is to be conceived. It answers the question, What does it all come to? In this part, the approximation to Bradley is evident. Indeed, if this cosmology be deemed success- ful, it becomes natural at this point to ask whether the type of thought involved be not a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis. These lectures will be best understood by noting the following list of prevalent habits of thought, which are repudiated, in so far as concerns their influence on philosophy: (i) The distrust of speculative philosophy. (ii) The trust in language as an adequate expression of propositions. (11) The mode of philosophical thought which implies, and is implied by, the faculty-psychology. (iv) The subject-predicate form of expression. (v) The sensationalist doctrine of perception. (vi) The doctrine of vacuous actuality. (vii) The Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a theoretical construct from purely subjective experience. (viii) Arbitrary deductions in ex absurdo arguments. (ix) Belief that logical inconsistencies can indicate anything else than some antecedent errors. By reason of its ready acceptance of some, or all, of these nine myths and fallacious procedures, much nine- teenth-century philosophy excludes itself from relevance to the ordinary stubborn facts of daily life. The positive doctrine of these lectures is concerned with the becoming, the being, and the relatedness of ‘actual entities.’ An ‘actual entity’ is a res vera in the PREFACE ix Cartesian sense of that term;’ it is a Cartesian ‘sub- stance,’ and not an Aristotelian ‘primary substance.’ But Descartes retained in his metaphysical doctrine the Aris- totelian dominance of the category of ‘quality’ over that of ‘relatedness.’ In these lectures ‘relatedness’ is domi- nant over ‘quality.’ All relatedness has its foundation in the relatedness of actualities; and such relatedness is wholly concerned with the appropriation of the dead by the living—that is to say, with ‘objective immortality’ whereby what is divested of its own living immediacy becomes a real component in other living immediacies of becoming. This is the doctrine that the creative advance of the world is the becoming, the perishing, and the objec- tive immortalities of those things which jointly constitute stubborn fact.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
1The writer who most fully anticipated the main positions of the philosophy of organ- ism is John Locke in his Essay, especially * in its later books. The lectures are divided into five parts. In the first part, the method is explained, and scheme of ideas, in terms of which the cosmology is to be framed, is stated summarily. In the second part an endeavour is made to exhibit this scheme as adequate for the interpretation of the ideas and problems which form the complex texture of civilized thought. Apart from such an investigation the summary statement of Part I is practically unintelligible. Thus Part II at once gives meaning to the verbal phrases of the scheme by their use in discussion, and shows the power of the scheme to put the various elements of our experience into a consistent relation to each other. In order to obtain a reasonably complete account of human experience considered in relation to the philosophical 1Cf. An Essay Concerning Hunan Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. VI, Sect. 11. Vv vl PREFACE problems which naturally arise, the group of philosophers and scientists belonging to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been considered, in particular Descartes, Newton, Locke, Hume, Kant. Any one of these writers is one-sided in his presentation of the groundwork of experience; but as a whole they give a general presenta- tion which dominates the development of subsequent philosophy. I started the investigation with the expec- tation of being occupied with the exposition of the diver- gencies from every member of this group. But a careful examination of their exact statements disclosed that in the main the philosophy of organism is a recurrence to pre-Kantian modes of thought. These philosophers were perplexed by the inconsistent presuppositions underlying their inherited modes of expression. In so far as they, or their successors, have endeavoured to be rigidly sys- tematic, the tendency has been to abandon just those elements in their thought upon which the philosophy of organism bases itself. An endeavour has been made to point out the exact points of agreement and of dis- agreement. In the second part, the discussions of modern thought have been confined to the most general notions of physics and biology, with a careful avoidance of all detail. Also, it must be one of the motives of a complete cosmology, to construct a system of ideas which bring the aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those con- cepts of the world which have their origin in natural science.
2Also, it must be one of the motives of a complete cosmology, to construct a system of ideas which bring the aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those con- cepts of the world which have their origin in natural science. In the third and fourth parts, the cosmological scheme is developed in terms of its own categoreal notions, and without much regard to other systems of thought. For example, in Part II there is a chapter on the ‘Extensive Continuum,’ which is largely concerned with the notions of Descartes and Newton, compared with the way in which the organic philosophy must interpret this feature of the world. But in Part IV, this question is treated from the point of view of developing the detailed method PREFACE vil in which the philosophy of organism establishes the theory of this problem. It must be thoroughly under- stood that the theme of these lectures is not a detached consideration of various traditional philosophical prob- lems which acquire urgency in certain traditional systems of thought. The lectures are intended to state a condensed scheme of cosmological ideas, to develop their meaning by confrontation with the various topics of experience, and finally to elaborate an adequate cosmol- ogy in terms of which all particular topics find them interconnections. Thus the unity of treatment is to be looked for in the gradual development of the scheme, in meaning and in relevance, and not in the successive treat- ment of particular topics. For example, the doctrines of time, of space, of perception, and of causality are recurred to again and again, as the cosmology develops. In each recurrence, these topics throw some new light on the scheme, or receive some new elucidation. At the end, in so far as the enterprise has been successful, there should be no problem of space-time, or of epistemology, or of causality, left over for discussion. The scheme should have developed all those generic notions adequate for the expression of any possible interconnection of things. Among the contemporary schools of thought, my obli- gations to the English and American Realists are obvious. In this connection, I should like especially to mention Professor T. P. Nunn, of the University of London. His anticipations, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, of some of the doctrines of recent Realism, do not appear to be sufficiently well known. I am also greatly indebted to Bergson, William James, and John Dewey. One of my preoccupations has been to rescue their type of thought from the charge of anti- intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been asso- ciated with it. Finally, though throughout the main body of the work I am in sharp disagreement with Brad- ley, the final outcome is after all not so greatly different. I am particularly indebted to his chapter on the nature vill PREFACE
3Finally, though throughout the main body of the work I am in sharp disagreement with Brad- ley, the final outcome is after all not so greatly different. I am particularly indebted to his chapter on the nature vill PREFACE of experience, which appears in his Essays on Truth and Reality. His insistence on ‘feeling’ is very consonant with my own conclusions. This whole metaphysical posi- tion is an implicit repudiation of the doctrine of ‘vacuous actuality.’ The fifth part is concerned with the final interpretation of the ultimate way in which the cosmological problem is to be conceived. It answers the question, What does it all come to? In this part, the approximation to Bradley is evident. Indeed, if this cosmology be deemed success- ful, it becomes natural at this point to ask whether the type of thought involved be not a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis. These lectures will be best understood by noting the following list of prevalent habits of thought, which are repudiated, in so far as concerns their influence on philosophy: (i) The distrust of speculative philosophy. (ii) The trust in language as an adequate expression of propositions. (11) The mode of philosophical thought which implies, and is implied by, the faculty-psychology. (iv) The subject-predicate form of expression. (v) The sensationalist doctrine of perception. (vi) The doctrine of vacuous actuality. (vii) The Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a theoretical construct from purely subjective experience. (viii) Arbitrary deductions in ex absurdo arguments. (ix) Belief that logical inconsistencies can indicate anything else than some antecedent errors. By reason of its ready acceptance of some, or all, of these nine myths and fallacious procedures, much nine- teenth-century philosophy excludes itself from relevance to the ordinary stubborn facts of daily life. The positive doctrine of these lectures is concerned with the becoming, the being, and the relatedness of ‘actual entities.’ An ‘actual entity’ is a res vera in the PREFACE ix Cartesian sense of that term;’ it is a Cartesian ‘sub- stance,’ and not an Aristotelian ‘primary substance.’ But Descartes retained in his metaphysical doctrine the Aris- totelian dominance of the category of ‘quality’ over that of ‘relatedness.’ In these lectures ‘relatedness’ is domi- nant over ‘quality.’ All relatedness has its foundation in the relatedness of actualities; and such relatedness is wholly concerned with the appropriation of the dead by the living—that is to say, with ‘objective immortality’ whereby what is divested of its own living immediacy becomes a real component in other living immediacies of becoming. This is the doctrine that the creative advance of the world is the becoming, the perishing, and the objec- tive immortalities of those things which jointly constitute stubborn fact.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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