Process and Reality — the Gifford Lectures, 1929

it is only some actual entities which will have the standpoints so as to include in their actual world, the actual entities which constitute the logical subjects of the proposition. Thus every proposition defines the judging subjects for which it is a proposition. Every proposition presupposes some definite settled actual entities in the actual world of its judging subject; and thus its possible judging subjects must have these actual entities in the actual world of each of them. All judgment requires knowledge of the presupposed actual entities. Thus in addition to the requisite composition of the actual world presupposed by a proposition, there must be the requisite knowledge of that world presupposed by a judgment, whether the judgment be correct or incorrect. For actual entities, whose actual worlds have not the requisite composition, the proposition is non-existent; for actual entities, without the requisite knowledge, the judgment is impossible. It is quite true that a more abstract proposition can be modelled on the lines of the original proposition, so as to avoid the presupposition of some or all of these settled actual entities which are the logical subjects in the original proposition. This new proposition will have meaning for a wider group of possible subjects than the original proposition. Some propositions seem to us to have meaning for all possible judging subjects. This may be the case; but I do not dare to affirm that our metaphysical capacities are sufficiently developed to warrant any certainty on this question. Perhaps we are always presupposing some wide society beyond which our imaginations cannot leap. But the vagueness of verbal statements is such that the same form of words is taken to represent a whole set of allied propositions of various grades of abstractness.

A judgment weakens or strengthens the decision whereby the judged proposition, as a constituent in the lure, is admitted as an efficient element in the concrescence, with the reinforcement of knowledge. A judgment is the critique of a lure for feeling.

p. 295

SECTION III

It now remains to consider the sense in which the actual world, in some systematic aspect, enters into each proposition. This investigation is wholly concerned with the notion of the logical subjects of the proposition. These logical subjects are, in the old sense of the term, ‘particulars.’ They are not concepts in comparison with other concepts; they are particular facts in a potential pattern.

But particulars must be indicated; because the proposition concerns just those particulars and no others. Thus the indication belongs to the proposition; namely, ‘Those particulars as thus indicated in such-and-such a predicative pattern’ constitutes the proposition. Apart from the indication there is no proposition because there are no determinate particulars. Thus we have to study the theory of indication.

Some definitions are required:

A ‘relation’ between occasions is an eternal object illustrated in the complex of mutual prehensions by virtue of which those occasions constitute a nexus.

A relation is called a ‘dual relation’ when the nexus in which it is realized consists of two, and only two, actual occasions. It is a ‘triple relation’ when there are three occasions, and so on.

There will, in general, be an indefinite number of eternal objects thus illustrated in the mutual prehensions of the occasions of any one nexus; that is to say, there are an indefinite number of relations realized between the occasions of any particular nexus.

A ‘general principle’ is an eternal object which is only illustrated through its ‘instances,’ which are also eternal objects. Thus the realization of an instance is also the realization of the general principle of which that eternal object is an instance. But the converse is not true; namely, the realization of the general principle does not involve the realization of any particular instance, thoughp. 296 it does necessitate the realization of some instance. Thus the instances each involve the general principle, but the general principle only involves at least one instance. In general, the instances of a general principle are mutually exclusive, so that the realization of one instance involves the exclusion of the other instances. For example, colour is a general principle and colours are the instances. So if all sensible bodies exhibit the general principle, which is colour, each body exhibits some definite colour. Also each body exhibiting a definite colour is thereby ‘coloured.’

A nexus exhibits an ‘indicative system’ of dual relations among its members, when (i) one, and only one, relation of the system relates each pair of its members; and (ii) these relations are instances of a general principle; and (iii) the relation (in the system) between any member A and any other member B does not also relate A and a member of the nexus other than B; and (iv) the relations (in the system) between A and B and between A and C suffice to define the relation (in the system) between B and C, where A, B, and C are any three members of the nexus.

Thus if A and X be any two members of the nexus, and if X has knowledge of A’s systematic relation to it and also of A’s systematic relations to B, C, and D, where B,C, and D are members of the nexus, then X has knowledge of its own systematic relations to B, C, and D, and of the mutual systematic relations between B, C, and D. Such a nexus admits of the precise indication of its members from the standpoint of any one of them. The relative ‘where’ presupposes a nexus exhibiting an indicative system. More complex types of indicative systems can be defined; but the simplest type suffices to illustrate the principle involved. We have been defining Aristotle’s category of ‘position.’ It will be noticed that in a nexus with an indicative system of relations, the subjective aspect of experience can be eliminated from propositions involved. For a knowledge of B and C and D as from Ap. 297 yields a proposition concerning C and D as from B. Thus the prevalent notion, that the particular subject of experience can, in the nature of the case, never be eliminated from the experienced fact, is quite untrue.

Every proposition presupposes some general nexus with an indicative relational system. This nexus includes its locus of judging subjects and also its logical subjects. This presupposition is part of the proposition, and the proposition cannot be entertained by any subject for which the presupposition is not valid. Thus in a proposition certain characteristics are presupposed for the judging subject and for the logical subjects. This presupposition of character can be carried further than the mere requirements of indication require. For example, in ‘Socrates is mortal’ the mere spatio-temporal indicative system may be sufficient to indicate ‘Socrates.’ But the proposition may mean “The man Socrates is mortal,’ or “The philosopher Socrates is mortal.’ The superfluous indication may be part of the proposition. Anyhow, the principle that a proposition presupposes the actual world as exhibiting some systematic aspect has now been explained.

This discussion can be illustrated by the proposition, ‘Caesar has crossed the Rubicon.’ This form of words symbolizes an indefinite number of diverse propositions. In its least abstract form ‘Caesar’ stands for a society of settled actual entities in the actual world from the standpoint of the judging subject, with their objectifications consciously perceived by the subject. The whole theory of perception will come up for further discussion in a later chapter (cf. Part III); at this point it can be assumed. The word ‘Rubicon’ is to be explained in the same way as the word ‘Caesar.’ The only points left ambiguous respecting ‘Caesar’ and ‘Rubicon’ are that these societies—either or both, and each with its defining characteristic—may be conjecturally supposed to be prolonged up to the world contemporary with the judging subject, or, even more conjecturally, into the future