Process and Reality — the Gifford Lectures, 1929

In the prehending subject, these analogous, pure physical feelings originate a conceptual feeling, according to Category IV; and, according to Category V, there may be a reverted conceptual feeling. There will be only one direct conceptual feeling; for the simple physical feelings (in the final subject) are analogous in the sense of exemplifying the same eternal object. (If there be no reversion, this analogy extends over the pure and the hybrid physical feelings. If there be important reversion, this analogy only extends over the hybrid feelings with the reverted conceptual feelings as data. This latter case is only important when the reverted feelings involve the predominantly intense valuation.) Thus these many physical feelings of diverse actualities originate in the final subject one conceptual feeling. This single conceptual feeling has therefore an impartial reference throughout the actualities of the nexus. Also reverted conceptual feelings in the nexus are, in this connection, negligible unless they preserved this impartiality of reference throughout the nexus. Excluding for the moment the consideration of reverted feelings in the actualities of the nexus, the hybrid physical feelings in the prehending subject also, by Category IV, generate one conceptual feeling with impartial reference; also it is the same conceptual feeling as that generated by the pure physical feelings (in the final subject). Thus (with no reversion) the influence of the hybrid physical feelingsp. 386 is to enhance the intensity of the conceptual feeling derived from the pure physical feelings. But there may be reversions to be considered, that is to say, reversions with impartial reference throughout the nexus. The reversion may originate in the separate actualities of the nexus, or in the final prehending subject, or there may be a double reversion involving both sources. Thus we must allow for the possibility of diverse reverted feelings, each with impartial reference. In so far as there is concordance and the reversions are dominant, there will issue one conceptual feeling of enhanced intensity. When there is discordance among these various conceptual feelings, there will be elimination, and in general no transmutation. But when, from some (or all) of these sources of impartial conceptual feelings, one dominant impartial conceptual feeling emerges with adequate intensity, transmutation will supervene.

This impartiality of reference has then been transmuted into the physical feeling of that nexus, whole or partial, contrasted with some one eternal object. It will be noted that this one impartial conceptual feeling is an essential element of the process, whereby an impartial reference to the whole nexus is introduced. Otherwise there would be no element to transmute particular relevancies to the many members into general relevance to the whole.

The eternal object which characterizes the nexus in this physical feeling may be an eternal object characterizing the analogous physical feelings, belonging to all, or some, of the members of the nexus. In this case, the nexus as a whole derives a character which in some way belongs to its various members.

Again in the transmuted feeling only part of the original nexus may be objectified, and the eternal object may have been derived from members of the other part of the original nexus. This is the case for perception in the mode of ‘presentational immediacy,’ to be further discussed in a later chapter (cf. Part IV, Ch. V, and also

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Part II, Ch. II, Sect. I, and Part II, Ch. IV, Sect. VII, and Part II, Ch. VIII).

Also the eternal object may be the datum of a reverted conceptual feeling, only indirectly derived from the members of the original nexus. In this case, the transmuted feeling of the nexus introduces novelty; and in unfortunate cases this novelty may be termed ‘error.’ But all the same, the transmuted feeling, whatever be its history of transmutation, is a definite physical fact whereby the final subject prehends the nexus. For example, considering the example of presentational immediacy, colourblindness may be called ‘error’; but nevertheless, it is a physical fact. A transmuted feeling comes under the definition of a physical feeling.

Our usual way of consciously prehending the world is by these transmuted physical feelings. It is only when we are consciously aware of alien mentalities that we even approximate to the conscious prehension of a single actual entity. It will be found that transmuted feelings are very analogous to propositional feelings, and to conscious perceptions and judgments in their sequence of integration. Vagueness has its origin in transmuted feelings. For a quality, characterizing the mutual prehensions of all the members of a nexus, is transmuted into a predicate of the nexus. The intensity arising from the force of repetition makes this transmuted perception to be the prominent type of those feelings which in further integrations acquire consciousness as an element in their subjective forms. It represents a simplification of physical feeling, effected in the course of integration.

According to this category the conceptual feelings entertained in any nexus modify the future réle of that nexus as a physical objective datum. This category governs the transition from conceptual feelings in one actual entity to physical feelings either in a supervening phase of itself or in a later actual entity. What is conceptual earlier is felt physically later in an extended réle. Thus, for instance, a new ‘form’ has its emergent ingression conp. 388ceptually by reversion, and receives delayed exemplification physically when the other categoreal conditions permit.

This joint operation of Categories IV and VI produces what has been termed ‘adversion’ and ‘aversion.’ For the conceptual feelings in the actualities of the nexus, produced according to Category IV, have data identical with the pattern exemplified in the objective data of the many physical feelings. If in the conceptual feelings there is valuation upward, then the physical feelings are transmuted to the new concrescence with enhanced intensity in its subjective form. This is ‘adversion.’

But if in the conceptual feelings there is valuation downward, then the physical feelings are (in the later concrescence) either eliminated, or are transmitted to it with attenuated intensity. This is ‘aversion. Thus ‘adversion’ and ‘aversion’ are types of ‘decision.’

Thus the conceptual feeling with its valuation has primarily the character of purpose, since it is the agent whereby the decision is made as to the causal efficacy of its subject in its objectifications beyond itself. But it only achieves this character of purpose by its integration with the physical feeling from which it originates. This integration is considered in Chapter V on ‘Comparative Feelings.’

It is evident that adversion and aversion, and also the Category of Transmutation, only have importance in the case of high-grade organisms. They constitute the first step towards intellectual mentality, though in themselves they do not amount to consciousness. But an actual entity which includes these operations must have an important intensity of conceptual feelings able to mask and fuse the simple physical feelings.

Also the examination of the Category of Transmutation shows that the approach to intellectuality consists in the gain of a power of abstraction. The irrelevant multiplicity of detail is eliminated, and emphasis is laid on the elements of systematic order in the actual world. In

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