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1Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary_system of general ideas in terms of which eye xperience can be interpreted, By this notion of ‘interpretation’ I mean at everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed Se willed, or thought, shall have the character ol a particular instance of the general scheme. Thus the philosopitical scheme should be coher logical 1 Feces es interpretation, applicable and_adequate, ere ‘applicable’ means that some items of experience are Sus interpretable, and ‘adequate’ means that there are_ no items incapable of such interpretation, SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY 5 ‘Coherence,’ as here employed, means that the funda- mental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that i isolation they are mean: ingless 1s requirement does not mean that they are definable in terms of each other: it means that ae 18 indefinable in one such notion cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the other notions. It i ideal of peculative philoso that its fundamental ions sha. not seem capable of abstraction from each other, other words, it is presu ity ¢ - ceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that it is the ois s philosophy to exhibit this truth. This r_is its coherence, The term ‘logical’ has its ordinary meaning, including ‘logical’ consistency, or lack of contradiction, the defini- tion of constructs in logical terms, the exemplification of general logical notions in specific instances, and the principles of inference. It will be observed that logical notions must themselves find their places in the scheme of philosophic notions. It will also be noticed that this ideal of speculative Peery has its rational side and _ its empirical side e rational side 1s expressed by the terms ‘coherent: and ‘logical. e empirical side is expressed by the terms ‘a licablo’ and “adequats’7-—But the two’ sides are bound together by clearing away an ambiguity which remains in the previous explanation of the term ‘ade- quate.’ The adequacy of the scheme over every item does not mean adequacy over such items as happen to have been considered. It means that the texture of observed experience, as illustrating the philosophic scheme, is such that all related experience must exhibit the same texture. Thus the philosophic scheme should be ‘necessary,’ in the sense of bearing in itself its own warrant of univer- sality throughout all experience, provided that we confine ourselves to that which communicates with immediate matter of fact. But what does not so communicate is 6 PROCESS AND REALITY unknowable, and the unknowable is unknown’; and so this universality defined by ‘communication’ can suffice. This doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an essence to thé ich forbids relation- ships beyon ation of its rationality. Spec- ulative philosophy seeks that essence. SECTION II
2This doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an essence to thé ich forbids relation- ships beyon ation of its rationality. Spec- ulative philosophy seeks that essence. SECTION II Philosopners can never hope finally to formulate these metaphysical first principles. Weakness of insight and deficiencies of language stand in the way inexorably. Words and phrases must be stretched towards a general- ity foreign to their ordinary usage; and however such elements of language be stabilized as technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap. There is no first principle which is in itself unknow- able, not to be captured by a flash of insight. But, put- ting aside the difficulties of language, deficiency in imaginative penetration forbids progress in any form other than that of an asymptotic approach to a scheme of principles, only definable in terms of the ideal which they should satisfy. The difficulty has its seat in the empirical side of phil- osophy. Our-datum, is the actual world, including our- - selves; and this actual world spreads itself for observation in_the guise of the topic of our immediate ex perien ce fication for_any thou a and the starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience. But we are not conscious of any clear-cut complete analysis of immediate experience, in terms of the various details which comprise its definiteness. We habitually observe by the method of difference. Some- times we see an elephant, and sometimes we do not. The result is that an elephant, when present, is noticed. * This doctrine is a paradox. Indulging in a species of false modesty, ‘cautious’ philosophers undertake its definition. SPECUDATIVES PHILOSOPHY 7 Facility of observation depends on the fact that the object observed _is important when present, and sometimes_is absent,
3* This doctrine is a paradox. Indulging in a species of false modesty, ‘cautious’ philosophers undertake its definition. SPECUDATIVES PHILOSOPHY 7 Facility of observation depends on the fact that the object observed _is important when present, and sometimes_is absent, The metaphysical first principles _can_never fail _of exemplification. e can never catch the actual world taking a holiday from their sway. Thus, for the discovery of metaphysics, the method of pinning down thought to the strict systematization of detailed discrimination, already effected by antecedent observation, breaks down. This collapse of the method of rigid empiricism is not confined to metaphysics. It occurs whenever we seek the larger generalities. In natural science this rigid method is the Baconian method of induction, a method which, if consistently pursued, would have left science where it found it. What Bacon omitted was the play of a free imagination, controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic. The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imagina- tive generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation. The reason for the success of this method of imaginative rationalization is that, when the method of difference fails, factors which are constantly present may yet be observed under the influence of imaginative thought. Such thought supplies the differences which the direct observation lacks. It can even play with inconsistency; and can thus throw light on the consistent, and persistent, elements in experience by comparison with what in imagi- nation is inconsistent with them. The negative judg- ment is the peak of mentality. But the conditions for the success of imaginative construction must be rigidly adhered to. In the first place, this construction must have its origin in the generalization of particular factors discerned in particular topics of human interest; for ex- ample, in physics, or in physiology, or in psychology, or in aesthetics, or in ethical beliefs, or in sociology, or in lan- guages conceived as storehouses of human experience. In 8 PROCESS AND REALITY
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
1Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary_system of general ideas in terms of which eye xperience can be interpreted, By this notion of ‘interpretation’ I mean at everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed Se willed, or thought, shall have the character ol a particular instance of the general scheme. Thus the philosopitical scheme should be coher logical 1 Feces es interpretation, applicable and_adequate, ere ‘applicable’ means that some items of experience are Sus interpretable, and ‘adequate’ means that there are_ no items incapable of such interpretation, SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY 5 ‘Coherence,’ as here employed, means that the funda- mental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that i isolation they are mean: ingless 1s requirement does not mean that they are definable in terms of each other: it means that ae 18 indefinable in one such notion cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the other notions. It i ideal of peculative philoso that its fundamental ions sha. not seem capable of abstraction from each other, other words, it is presu ity ¢ - ceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that it is the ois s philosophy to exhibit this truth. This r_is its coherence, The term ‘logical’ has its ordinary meaning, including ‘logical’ consistency, or lack of contradiction, the defini- tion of constructs in logical terms, the exemplification of general logical notions in specific instances, and the principles of inference. It will be observed that logical notions must themselves find their places in the scheme of philosophic notions. It will also be noticed that this ideal of speculative Peery has its rational side and _ its empirical side e rational side 1s expressed by the terms ‘coherent: and ‘logical. e empirical side is expressed by the terms ‘a licablo’ and “adequats’7-—But the two’ sides are bound together by clearing away an ambiguity which remains in the previous explanation of the term ‘ade- quate.’ The adequacy of the scheme over every item does not mean adequacy over such items as happen to have been considered. It means that the texture of observed experience, as illustrating the philosophic scheme, is such that all related experience must exhibit the same texture. Thus the philosophic scheme should be ‘necessary,’ in the sense of bearing in itself its own warrant of univer- sality throughout all experience, provided that we confine ourselves to that which communicates with immediate matter of fact. But what does not so communicate is 6 PROCESS AND REALITY unknowable, and the unknowable is unknown’; and so this universality defined by ‘communication’ can suffice. This doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an essence to thé ich forbids relation- ships beyon ation of its rationality. Spec- ulative philosophy seeks that essence. SECTION II
2This doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an essence to thé ich forbids relation- ships beyon ation of its rationality. Spec- ulative philosophy seeks that essence. SECTION II Philosopners can never hope finally to formulate these metaphysical first principles. Weakness of insight and deficiencies of language stand in the way inexorably. Words and phrases must be stretched towards a general- ity foreign to their ordinary usage; and however such elements of language be stabilized as technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap. There is no first principle which is in itself unknow- able, not to be captured by a flash of insight. But, put- ting aside the difficulties of language, deficiency in imaginative penetration forbids progress in any form other than that of an asymptotic approach to a scheme of principles, only definable in terms of the ideal which they should satisfy. The difficulty has its seat in the empirical side of phil- osophy. Our-datum, is the actual world, including our- - selves; and this actual world spreads itself for observation in_the guise of the topic of our immediate ex perien ce fication for_any thou a and the starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience. But we are not conscious of any clear-cut complete analysis of immediate experience, in terms of the various details which comprise its definiteness. We habitually observe by the method of difference. Some- times we see an elephant, and sometimes we do not. The result is that an elephant, when present, is noticed. * This doctrine is a paradox. Indulging in a species of false modesty, ‘cautious’ philosophers undertake its definition. SPECUDATIVES PHILOSOPHY 7 Facility of observation depends on the fact that the object observed _is important when present, and sometimes_is absent,
3* This doctrine is a paradox. Indulging in a species of false modesty, ‘cautious’ philosophers undertake its definition. SPECUDATIVES PHILOSOPHY 7 Facility of observation depends on the fact that the object observed _is important when present, and sometimes_is absent, The metaphysical first principles _can_never fail _of exemplification. e can never catch the actual world taking a holiday from their sway. Thus, for the discovery of metaphysics, the method of pinning down thought to the strict systematization of detailed discrimination, already effected by antecedent observation, breaks down. This collapse of the method of rigid empiricism is not confined to metaphysics. It occurs whenever we seek the larger generalities. In natural science this rigid method is the Baconian method of induction, a method which, if consistently pursued, would have left science where it found it. What Bacon omitted was the play of a free imagination, controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic. The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imagina- tive generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation. The reason for the success of this method of imaginative rationalization is that, when the method of difference fails, factors which are constantly present may yet be observed under the influence of imaginative thought. Such thought supplies the differences which the direct observation lacks. It can even play with inconsistency; and can thus throw light on the consistent, and persistent, elements in experience by comparison with what in imagi- nation is inconsistent with them. The negative judg- ment is the peak of mentality. But the conditions for the success of imaginative construction must be rigidly adhered to. In the first place, this construction must have its origin in the generalization of particular factors discerned in particular topics of human interest; for ex- ample, in physics, or in physiology, or in psychology, or in aesthetics, or in ethical beliefs, or in sociology, or in lan- guages conceived as storehouses of human experience. In 8 PROCESS AND REALITY
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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