Process and Reality — the Gifford Lectures, 1929

When Hume passes on to complex impressions and ideas, his admirable clearness partially deserts him. He fails to distinguish sufficiently between (i) the ‘manner’ (or ‘order’) in which many simples constitute some one complex perception, i.e. impression or idea; and (ii) the efficacious fact by reason of which this complex perception arises; and (iii) the mere multiplicity of simples which constitute the complex perception in this definite manner. In this respect Hume’s followers only differ from Hume by discarding some of that clarity which never wholly deserts him. Each one of these three notions is an essential element in his argument. He writes:

2 Cf. Treatise, Part I, Sect. I. * Treatise, Part I, Sect. I.

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“| | we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these colored points, and of the manner of their appearance.” ‘ Also he writes: “Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, change alone would join them; and it is impossible the same simple ideas would fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do), without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another. This uniting principle among ideas is not to be considered as an inseparable connection; for that has been already ° excluded from the imagination; nor yet are we to conclude, that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty; but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other; Nature, in a manner, pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one.” ° As a final quotation, to illustrate Hume’s employment of the third notion, we have: “The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them.

. . But the difference betwixt these ideas consists in this, that the particular qualities, which form the substance, are commonly referred to an unknown something [italics Hume’s], in which they are supposed to inhere; or granting this fiction should not take place, are at least supposed to be closely and inseparably connected by the relations of contiguity and causation. The effect of this is, that whatever new simple quality we discover to have the same connection with the rest, we immediately comprehend it among them, even though it did not enter into the first conception of the substance. . . . The principle of union being regarded as the chief part of the complex

“Cf. Treatise, Part II, Sect. IIT.

° Cf. Hume’s previous section. ° Cf. Treatise, Part I, Sect. IV.

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idea, gives entrance to whatever quality afterwards occurs, and is equally comprehended by it, as are the others, which first presented themselves. . . .”*

In this last quotation, the phrase ‘principle of union’ is ambiguous as between ‘manner’ and ‘efficacious’ reason. In either sense, it is inconsistent with the phrase ‘nothing but a collection,’ which at the beginning of the quotation settles so simply the notion of ‘substance.’

Returning to the first of this sequence of three quotations, we note that any particular ‘manner’ of composition must itself be a simple idea, or impression. For otherwise we require yet another ‘manner’ of composition for the original manner, and so on indefinitely. Thus there is either a vicious infinity or a final simple idea. But Hume admits that there are novel compound ideas which are not copies of compound impressions. Thus he should also admit that there is a novel simple idea conveying the novel ‘manner,’ which is not a copy of an impression. He has also himself drawn attention to another exception in respect to missing shades of colour in a graduated colour scheme. This exception cannot be restricted to colour, and must be extended to sound, and smell, and to all graduations of sensations. Thus Hume’s proposition, that simple ideas are all copies of simple impressions, is subject to such considerable qualifications that it cannot be taken for an ultimate philosophical principle, at least not when enunciated in Hume’s unguarded fashion. Hume himself, in the passage (Part I, Sect. IV) quoted above for its relevance to his doctrine of the association of ideas, says, “. . . for nothing is more free than that faculty (i.e. the imagination).” But he limits its freedom to the production of novel complex ideas, disregarding the exceptional case of missing shades. This question of imaginative freedom is obviously treated very superficially by Hume. Imagination is never very free: it does not seem to be limited to complex ideas, as asserted by

7 Cf. Treatise, Part I, Sect. VI. Italics not in edition quoted, except where noted.

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him; but such freedom as it has in fact seems to establish the principle of the possibility of diverse actual entities with diverse grades of imaginative freedom, some more, some less, than the instances in question.

In this discussion of Hume’s doctrine of imaginative freedom, two other points have been left aside. One such point is the difference between various grades of generic abstraction, for example, scarlet, red, colour, sense-datum, manner of connectedness of diverse sense-data. The other point is the contrast between ‘simplicity’ and ‘complexity.’ We may doubt whether ‘simplicity’ is ever more than a relative term, having regard to some definite procedure of analysis. I hold this to be the case; and by reason of this opinion find yet another reason for discarding Hume’s doctrine which would debar imagination from the free conceptual production of any type of eternal objects, such as Hume calls ‘simple.’ But there is no such fact as absolute freedom; every actual entity possesses only such freedom, as is inherent in the primary phase ‘given’ by its standpoint of relativity to its actual universe. Freedom, givenness, potentiality, are notions which presuppose each other and limit each other.

SECTION II

Hume, at the end of this passage on the connectedness of ideas, places the sentence “. . . Nature, in a manner, pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one.” Hume’s philosophy is occupied with the double search, first, for manners of unity, whereby many simples become one eomplex impression; and secondly, for a standard of propriety by which to criticize the production of ideas.

Hume can find only one standard of propriety, and that is, repetition. Repetition is capable of more or less: the more often impressions are repeated, the more proper it is that ideas should copy them. Fortunately, and without any reason so far as Hume can discover, complexp. 203 impressions, often repeated, are also often copied by their corresponding complex ideas.

Also the frequency of ideas following upon the frequency of their correlate impressions is also attended by an expectation of the repetition of the impression. Hume also believes, without any reason he can assign, that this expectation is pragmatically justified. It is this pragmatic justification, without metaphysical reason, which constitutes the propriety attaching to ‘repetition.’ This is the analysis of the course of thought involved in Hume’s doctrine of the association of ideas in its relation to causation, and in Hume’s final appeal to practice.