Process and Reality — the Gifford Lectures, 1929

data involved are not necessarily elements in the ‘real internal constitution’ of this chair-image: they are elements—in some way of feeling—in the ‘real internal constitutions’ of those antecedent organs of the human body with which we perceive the ‘chair.’ The direct recognition of such antecedent actual entities, with which we perceive contemporaries, is hindered and, apart from exceptional circumstances, rendered impossible by the spatial and temporal vagueness which infect such data. Later (cf. Part III, Chs. III to V) the whole question of this perception of a nexus vaguely, that is to say, without distinction of the actual entities composing it, is discussed in terms of the theory of prehensions, and in relation to the Category of Transmutation.

SECTION II

This account of ‘presentational immediacy’ presupposes two metaphysical assumptions:

(i) That the actual world, in so far as it is a community of entities which are settled, actual, and already become, conditions and limits the potentiality for creativeness beyond itself. This ‘given’ world provides determinate data in the form of those objectifications of themselves which the characters of its actual entities can provide. This is a limitation laid upon the general potentiality provided by eternal objects, considered merely in respect to the generality of their natures. Thus, relatively to any actual entity, there is a ‘given’ world of settled actual entities and a ‘real’ potentiality, which is the datum for creativeness beyond that standpoint. This datum, which is the primary phase in the process constituting an actual entity, is nothing else than the actual world itself in its character of a possibility for the process of being felt. This exemplifies the metaphysical principle that every ‘being’ is a potential for a ‘becoming.’ The actual world is the ‘objective content’ of each new creation.

Thus we have always to consider two meanings ofp. 102 potentiality: (a) the ‘general’ potentiality, which is the bundle of possibilities, mutually consistent or alternative, provided by the multiplicity of eternal objects, and (b) the ‘real’ potentiality, which is conditioned by the data provided by the actual world. General potentiality is absolute, and real potentiality is relative to some actual entity, taken as a standpoint whereby the actual world is defined. It must be remembered that the phrase ‘actual world’ is like ‘yesterday’ and ‘tomorrow,’ in that it alters its meaning according to standpoint. The actual world must always mean the community of all actual entities, including the primordial actual entity called ‘God’ and the temporal actual entities.

Curiously enough, even at this early stage of metaphysical discussion, the influence of the ‘relativity theory’ of modern physics is important. According to the classical ‘uniquely serial’ view of time, two contemporary actual entities define the same actual world. According to the modern view no two actual entities define the same actual world. Actual entities are called ‘contemporary’ when neither belongs to the ‘given’ actual world defined by the other.

The differences between the actual worlds of a pair of contemporary entities, which are in a certain sense ‘neighbours,’ are negligible for most human purposes. Thus the difference between the ‘classical’ and the ‘relativity’ view of time only rarely has any important relevance. I shall always adopt the relativity view; for one reason, because it seems better to accord with the general philosophical doctrine of relativity which is presupposed in the philosophy of organism; and for another reason, because with rare exceptions the classical doctrine can be looked on as a special case of the relativity doctrine—a case which does not seem to accord with experimental evidence. In other words, the classical view seems to limit a general philosophical doctrine; it is the larger assumption; and its consequences, taken in conjunction with other scientific principles, seem to be false.

p. 103

(ii) The second metaphysical assumption is that the real potentialities relative to all standpoints are coordinated as diverse determinations of one extensive continuum. This extensive continuum is one relational complex in which all potential objectifications find their niche. It underlies the whole world, past, present, and future. Considered in its full generality, apart from the additional conditions proper only to the cosmic epoch of electrons, protons, molecules, and star-systems, the properties of this continuum are very few and do not include the relationships of metrical geometry. An extensive continuum is a complex of entities united by the various allied relationships of whole to part, and of overlapping so as to possess common parts, and of contact, and of other relationships derived from these primary relationships. The notion of a ‘continuum’ involves both the property of indefinite divisibility and the property of unbounded extension. There are always entities beyond entities, because nonentity is no boundary. This extensive continuum expresses the solidarity of all possible standpoints throughout the whole process of the world. It is not a fact prior to the world; it is the first determination of order—that is, of real potentiality—arising out of the general character of the world. In its full generality beyond the present epoch, it does not involve shapes, dimensions, or measurability; these are additional determinations of real potentiality arising from our cosmic epoch.

This extensive continuum is ‘real,’ because it expresses a fact derived from the actual world and concerning the contemporary actual world. All actual entities are related according to the determinations of this continuum; and all possible actual entities in the future must exemplify these determinations in their relations with the already actual world. The reality of the future is bound up with the reality of this continuum. It is the reality of what is potential, in its character of a real component of what is actual. Such a real component must be interpreted inp. 104 terms of the relatedness of prehensions. This task will be undertaken in Chapter V of Part IV of these lectures.