Process and Reality — the Gifford Lectures, 1929

The history of philosophy discloses two cosmologies which at different periods have dominated European thought, Plato’s Timaeus,* and the cosmology of the seventeenth century, whose chief authors were Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Locke. In attempting an enterprise of the same kind, it is wise to follow the clue that perhaps the true solution consists in a fusion of the two previous schemes, with modifications demanded by self-consistency and the advance of knowledge. The cosmology explained in these lectures has been framed in accordance with this reliance on the positive value of the philosophical tradition. One test of success is adequacy in the comprehension of the variety of experience within the limits of one scheme of ideas. The endeavour to satisfy this condition is illustrated by comparing Chapters ITI, VII, and X of Part II, respectively entitled ‘The Order of Nature,’ ‘The Subjectivist Principle,’ and ‘Process,’ with Chapter

2T derive my comprehension of this element in Descartes’ thought from Professor Gilson of the Sorbonne. I believe that he is the first to insist on its importance. He is, of course, not responsible for the use made of the notion in these lectures.

>I regret that Professor A. E. Taylor’s Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus was only published after this work was prepared for the press.

Thus, with the exception of one small reference, no use could be made of it. I am very greatly indebted to Professor Taylor’s other writings.

X PREFACE

V of Part III, entitled ‘The Higher Phases of Experience,’ and with Chapter V of Part IV, entitled ‘Measurement,’ and with Chapter II of Part V, entitled ‘God and The World.’ These chapters should be recognizable as the legitimate outcome of the one scheme of ideas stated in the second chapter of Part I.

In these lectures I have endeavoured to compress the material derived from years of meditation. In putting out these results, four strong impressions dominate my mind: First, that the movement of historical, and philosophical, criticism of detached questions, which on the whole has dominated the last two centuries, has done its work, and requires to be supplemented by a more sustained effort of constructive thought. Secondly, that the true method of philosophical construction is to frame a scheme of ideas, the best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme. Thirdly, that all constructive thought, on the various special topics of scientific interest, is dominated by some such scheme, unacknowledged, but no less influential in guiding the imagination. The importance of philosophy lies in its sustained effort to make such schemes explicit, and thereby capable of criticism and improvement.

There remains the final reflection, how shallow, puny, and imperfect are efforts to sound the depths in the nature of things. In philosophical discussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement is an exhibition of folly.

In the expansion of these lectures to the dimensions of the present book, I have been greatly indebted to the critical difficulties suggested by the members of my Harvard classes. Also this work would never have been written without the constant encouragement and counsel which I owe to my wife.

A. N. W.

Harvard University
January, 1929

CONTENTS

PREFACE

e e ° eo e Vv

PART I

THE SPECULATIVE SCHEME
CHAPTER

ABSTRACT . . 5 pp ane ae ee 3 I. SPECULATIVE PuiLosoray ae oan Die PIES. :, 4 UL, “tees Crumaretovsiovn Seisanas! 4 4 5°56 4 5 6 . 4 Le SOME SL IERTVATIVE. NOTIONS .)0s © .)": Ds). > 46

PART 11

DISCUSSIONS AND APPLICATIONS

CER ACEMEM Be cnc ee os ge a BT

• I. Fact anp Form. . . Sr Obs Wee est eee 62
• Il. Tue Extensive ContTINUuUM ee ee ts ye OS. ipo tan Orpen or NATURE. . . . . = ... 127
• IV. ORGANISMS AND ENVIRONMENT. . ... .. 168 NWEELOCKECAND ELUME. 6 . 4 « » «. « . ~. L198
• VI. From Descartes to Kant. ..... . 218
• Vil. Tue Supsgectivist PrRincipte . .... .. 238 VINI. SymponicoRermerENce . ... . . ..« 255 XPD GOPOSITIONS: . « «2 « © 6 + -» «~~ « “280 DOPE EO Croissance ce et OLY

PART III

THE THEORY OF PREHENSION

Pe ACT ee Wf pager. esas a) | Ok

• I. Frevines . er Pes ore) et re ood
• Il. Tuer Primary F EELINGS Per At! SOF ies Lub TRANSMISSION OF FEELINGS. . . . . . 3/38
• IV. PRoposiTions AND FEerincs. . . .. . . 93891

V. Tue Hicguer PHases of EXPERIENCE. . . . 406 xi xii CONTENTS

PART TV
THE THEORY OF EXTENSION

CHAPTER PAGE
ABSTRACT . . Oe eee on ee oe eee Book
I. CoorDINATE Division. Ne Oe Sn ee Ge We ce BARS
II. Exrensive CoNNECTION ow ay, ae eee eee
Til. “Paar Locks % 4) See st Ge ee
IV. Srrains. Joie at bitldtimin cent ae ee
Ne MEASUREMENT | ee abu ae ce ee ee

PARTE AW,

FINAL INTERPRETATION

ABSTRACT . . ies, | eee es oem Yon
I. Tue Ipeau OpposrrEs fa SAR eee Oe 2 er Ole
Il; Gop ann ren Wortp! 2) ie = Were eae Se
ENDE Xeon ee, ace ee ce OSL.

CORRIGENDAs- «ck elupearpce ees ee es cer es eee

PART!
THE SPECULATIVE SCHEME

: WRAR | me) ov ee

—_ >= = - oe

— =

ABSTRACT

Cuaprer I. SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

SECTION

p. 1

tip

III.

IV.

II.
Ly

Speculative Philosophy; Coherent, Logical, Necessary System of Ideas; Interpretation of Experience.

Defects of Insight and of Language; Conditions for Observation; Rigid Empiricism, Imagination, Generalization; Coherence and Incoherence; Creativity, the Ultimate.

Rationalism and Dogmatism; Scheme as a Matrix, False and True Propositions, Use of the Matrix; Experimental Adventure.

Philosophy and Science, Grades of Generality; Dogmatic Influence of Mathematics; Progress of Philosophy.

. Defects of Language; Propositions and Their Background;

Metaphysical Presupposition; Excessive Trust in Language;
Metaphysics and Practice; Metaphysics and Linguistic
Expression.

Speculative Philosophy and Overambition; Overambition, Dogmatism and Progress; Interpretation and Metaphysics; The Higher Elements of Experience, Subjectivity and the Metaphysical Correction; Morality, Religion, Science, Connected by Philosophy; Contrast Between Religion and Science; Conclusion,

CuaptTer II]. Tue CaATrecorEAL SCHEME

. Four notions, namely, Actual Entity, Prehension, Nexus, the

Ontological Principle; Descartes and Locke; Philosophy
Explanatory of Abstraction, Not of Concreteness.

. The Four Sets of Categories; The Category of the Ultimate;

Conjunction and Disjunction; Creativity, the Principle of
Novelty, Creative Advance; Togetherness, Concrescence;
Eight Categories of Existence; Twenty-seven Categories of
Explanation.

Nine Categoreal Obligations.

Preliminary Notes; Complete Abstraction Self-Contradictory; Principles of Unrest and of Relativity; Actual Entities Never Change; Perishing of Occasions and Their Objective Immortality; Final Causation and Efficient Causation; Multiplicities; Substance.

p. 3

p. 4

Cuapter III. Some Derivative Notions

SECTION

I. Primordial Nature of God; Relevance, the Divine Ordering; Consequent Nature of God; Creativity and Its Acquirement of Character; Creatures, Objective Immortality, Appetition, Novelty, Relevance; Appetition and Mentality, Conceptual Prehensions, Pure and Impure Prehensions; Synonyms and Analogies, namely Conceptual Prehension, Appetition, Intuition, Physical Purpose, Vision, Envisagement.

II. Social Order, Defining Characteristic, Substantial Form; Personal Order, Serial Inheritance, Enduring Object; Corpuscular Societies.

III. Classic Notion of Time, Unique Seriality; Continuity of Becoming, Becoming of Continuity, Zeno; Atomism and Continuity; Corpuscular and Wave Theories of Light.

IV. Consciousness, Thought, Sense-Perception are unessential elements in an instance of experience,

CHAPTER I
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY
SECTION I
Tuts course of lectures is designed as an essay in
Speculative Philo . Its first task must be to define

speculative philosophy,’ and to defend it as a method productive of important knowledge.

Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary_system of general ideas in terms of which eye xperience can be interpreted, By this notion of ‘interpretation’ I mean