Life of Pythagoras — Iamblichus, trans. Thomas Taylor (1818)

It will doubtless be objected by most of the present period, who believe in nothing beyond the information of their senses, that plants, animals, and stones, no longer possess those wonderful sympathetic powers, which are mentioned by Proclus in the above extract. In answer to any such objector, whose /itnle soul, (in the language of the Emperor Julian) is indeed acute, but sees nothing with a vision healthy and sound, it must be said, that this is not at all wonderful at a period, when, as the author of the Asclepian dialogue justly observes, ‘“‘there is a lamentable departure of divinity from man, when nothing worthy of heaven, or celestial concerns, is heard or believed, and when every divine voice is by a necessary silence dumb.”! But to the philosophic reader, it must be observed, that as in the realms of generation, or in other words, the sublunary region, wholes, viz. the spheres of the different elements, remain perpetually according to nature; but their parts are sometimes according, and some times contrary to nature; this must also be true of the parts of the earth. When those circulations therefore take place, during which the parts of the earth subsist according to nature, and which are justly called, by Plato, fertile periods, the powers of plants, animals, and stones, magically sympathize with superior natures, in consequence of a more abundant participation of them, through a greater degree of aptitude to receive, and alliance to the participated powers. But during those circulations, in

1 See an extract of some length, and of the greatest importance, from this dialogue, in my translation of Select Works of Plotinus, Pp: 553, &c.

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which the parts of the earth subsist contrary to nature, as at present, and which Plato calls barren periods, the powers of plants, animals, and stones, no longer possess a magic sympathy, and consequently are no longer capable of producing magical operations.

P. 78. The eternal essence of number 1s the most providential principle of the universe, Sc.

The following account of the manner in which the Pythagoreans philosophized about numbers, is extracted from my Theoretic Arithmetic, and the information contained in it is principally derived from the great Syrianus.

“The Pythagoreans, turning from the vulgar paths, and delivering their philosophy in secret to those alone who were worthy to receive it, exhibited it to others tnrough mathematical names. Hence, they called forms, numbers, as things which are the first separated from impartible union; for the natures which are above forms, are also above separation.! The all-perfect multitude of forms, therefore, they obscurely signified through the duad; but they indicated the first formal principles by the monad and duad, as not being numbers; and also by the first triad and tetrad, as being the first numbers, the one being odd, and the other even, from which by addition the decad is generated; for the sum of I, 2, 3, and 4, is ten. But after numbers, in secondary and multifarious lives, introducing geometrical prior to physical magnitudes; these also they referred to numbers, as to formal causes and the principles of these; referring the point indeed,

1 Forms subsist at the extremity of the intelligible triad, which triad consists of being, life, and intellect. But being and life, with all they contain, subsist here involved in impartible union. See my Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

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as being impartible, to the monad; but a line, as the first interval, to the duad; and again, a superficies, as having a more abundant interval, to the triad; and a solid to the tetrad. They also called, as is evident from the testimony of Aristotle, the first length the duad; for it is not simply length, but the first length, in order that by this cee might signify cause.

In a similar manner also, they denominated the first breadth, the triad; and the first depth the tetrad. They also referred to formal principles all psychical knowledge.

And intellectual knowledge indeed, as being contracted according to impartible union, they referred to the monad; but scientific knowledge, as being evolved, and as proceeding from cause to the thing caused, yet through the inerratic, and always through the same things, they referred to the duad; and opinion to the triad, because the power of it is not always directed to the same thing, but at one time inclines to the true, and at another to the false.

And they referred sense to the tetrad, because it has an apprehension of bodies ; for in the duad, indeed, there is one interval from one monad to the other; but in the triad there are two intervals from any one monad to the rest; and in the tetrad there are three. ‘They referred, therefore, to principles every thing knowable, viz. beings, and the gnostic powers of these.

But they divided beings not according to breadth, but according to depth; into intelligibles, objects of science, objects of opinion, and sensibles. In a similar manner, also, they divided knowledge into intellect, science, opinion, and sense.

The extremity, therefore, of the intelligible triad, or animal itself, as it is called by Plato in the Timeeus, is assumed from the division of the objects of knowledge, manifesting the intelligible order, in which forms themselves, viz. the first forms and the principles of these, are contained, viz. the idea of the one itself, of the first length, which is the duad itself, and also the ideas of the first breadth and the first depth; (for in common