Life of Pythagoras — Iamblichus, trans. Thomas Taylor (1818)

FROM THE TREATISE OF

ARCHYTAS ON ETHICAL ERUDITION.

I say that virtue will be found sufficient to the avoidance of infelicity, and vice to the non-attainment of felicity, if we judiciously consider the habits [by which these are produced]. For it is necessary that the bad man should always be miserable; whether he is in affluence, for he employs it badly; or whether he is in penury; just as the blind man, whether he has light, and the most splendid visible object before him, or whether he is in the dark [is always necessarily without sight]. But the good man is not always happy; for felicity does not consist in the possession, but in the use of virtue. For neither does he who has sight always see; for he will not see, if he is without light. Life, however, is divided into two paths; one of which is more arduous, and in which the patient Ulysses walked; but the other is more free from molestation, and is that in which Nestor proceeded. I say therefore that virtue desires the latter, but is able to proceed in the former of these paths. The nature however of felicity proclaims it to be a desirable and stable life, because it gives perfection to the decision of the soul. Hence the virtuous man who does not obtain such a life as this, is not indeed happy, nor yet entirely miserable. No one therefore will dare to say that the good man should be exempt from disease, and pain, and sorrow. For as we leave certain painful things to the 174

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body, so likewise we must permit them to be present with the soul. The sorrows, however, of fools are most irrational; but those of wise men proceed only as far as reason, which gives limitation to things, permits. Moreover, the boast of apathy dissolves the generosity of virtue, when it opposes itself to things of-an indifferent nature, and not to evils such as death, and pain, and poverty. For things which are not evils are easily vanquished. We should therefore exercise ourselves in the mediocrity of the passions, as we shall then equally avoid insensibility, and too much passivity, and shall not speak higher of our nature than we ought.

FROM ARCHYTAS, IN HIS TREATISE ON

THE GOOD AND HAPPY MAN.

I say then that the good man is one who uses in a beautiful manner great things and opportunities. He likewise is able to bear well both prosperity and adversity. In beautiful and honorable circumstances also, he becomes worthy of the condition in which he is placed; and when his fortune is changed, receives it in a proper manner. In short, on all occasions, he contends well from contingencies that may arise. Nor does he only thus prepare himself [for whatever may happen], but likewise those who confide in and contend together with him.

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FROM CRITO,

IN HIS TREATISE ON

PRUDENCE AND PROSPERITY.

PrupeNnce and prosperity subsist, with reference to each other, as follows: Prudence indeed is effable and possesses reason; for it is something orderly and definite. But prosperity is ineffable and irrational; for it is something disorderly and indefinite. And prudence, indeed, is prior, but prosperity is posterior in beginning and in power. For the former is naturally adapted to govern and define; but the latter to be governed and defined. Moreover, both prudence and prosperity receive co-adaptation, since they concur in one and the same thing. For it is always necessary that the thing which bounds and co-arranges, should have a nature which is effable and participates of reason; but that the thing which is bounded and coarranged, should be naturally ineffable and irrational. For the reason of the nature of the infinite and of that which bounds, thus subsists in all things. For infinites are always naturally disposed to be bounded and co-arranged by things which possess reason and prudence, since the former have the order of matter and essence with relation to the latter. But finites are co-arranged and bounded from themselves, since they have the order of cause, and of that which is energetic.

The co-adaptation, however, of these natures in different things, produces a great and various difference of co-adapted substances. For in the comprehension of the whole of things, the co-adaptation of

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