Life of Pythagoras — Iamblichus, trans. Thomas Taylor (1818)

1 Canter, in his version of these Pythagoric fragments, uniformly translates edrvyia felicitas, contrary to the obvious meaning of the word, as is evident in this, and many other passages. It is also directly contrary to what Aristotle says in cap. 13. lib. 7. of his Nicomachean Ethics: da de to rpoadacbae trys Tuxys, Soxer tise TavTov evar y evTuxia TH Evdatpovig, OUK OVTA: EEL KaL aUTN VTEPBadXAoUTA, EeuTrodios ectt. i.e. ‘* Because felicity requires fortune, it appears to some persons that prosperity is the same with felicity. This however is not the case ; since prosperity, when it is excessive, is an impediment to felicity.” But Canter did not, I believe, pretend to have any knowledge of philosophy ;: and Gale, who did, has not corrected him in this and many other places in which he has erred through the want of this knowledge. Gale however, though verbally learned, was but a garrulous smatterer in philosophy, as is evident from his notes on Iamblichus de Mysteriis.

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pertaining to things divine and demoniacal; and by prudence, the wisdom pertaining to human concerns, and the affairs of life. For it is requisite to call the virtues which employ reasonings and demonstrations, sciences.

But it 1s fit to denominate virtue ethical, and the best habit of the irrational part of the soul, according to which we are said to possess certain qualities ertaining to manners; viz. by which we are called iberal, just, and temperate. But it is requisite to call prosperity, the preter-rational presence of goods, [or a supply of goods without the assistance of reason, | and which is not effected on account of it.

Since therefore virtue and science are in our power, but prosperity is not; and since also felicity consists in the contemplation and performance of things [truly] beautiful; but contemplations and actions, when they are not prosperous, are attended with ministrant offices and necessity, but when they proceed in the right path, produce delight and felicity; and these things are effected in prosperity ;—this being the case, it is evident that felicity 15 nothing else than the use of virtue in prosperity.

Hence the good man is disposed with respect to prosperity, in the same manner as he who has an excellent and robust body. For such a one is able to endure heat and cold, to raise a great burden, and to sustain easily many other molestations.

Since therefore felicity is the use of virtue in prosperity, we must speak concerning virtue and prosperity, and in the first place concerning prosperity. For of goods, some indeed do not admit of excess, and this is the case with virtue. For there is not any virtue which is excessive, nor any worthy man who is beyond measure good. For virtue has the fit and becoming for a rule, and is the habit of the decorous in practical concerns. But prosperity receives excess and diminution. And when it is excessive indeed, it generates certain vices, and removes a man from his natural habit; so that he frequently through this opposes the constitu159 tion of virtue. And this is not only the case with prosperity, but many other causes likewise may effect the same thing. For it is by no means proper to wonder, that some of those who play on the pipe should be arrogant men, who, bidding farewell to truth, ensnare by a certain false imagination those who are unskilled in music; and to disbelieve that a thing of this kind does not take place in virtue. For the more venerable a thing is, so much the more numerous are those that pretend to the possession of it. For there are many things which distort the habit and form of virtue; some of which are insidious arts and affectation; others are kindred physical passions, which sometimes