Life of Pythagoras — Iamblichus, trans. Thomas Taylor (1818)

co-adaptation, is for intellect not to be prevented from accomplishing its proper work, either by indigence, or excess. For that which is less excellent, is co-arranged for the sake of that which is more excellent. Thus in the world, every part that is always passive, subsists for the sake of that which is always moved. And in the conjunction of animals, the female subsists for the sake of the male.

For the latter sows, generating a soul ; but the former alone imparts matter to that which is generated. In the soul however, the irrational subsists for the sake of the rational part. For anger and desire are co-arranged in subserviency to the first part of the soul; the former as a certain satellite, and guardian of the body; but the latter as a dispensator and provident curator of necessary wants.

But intellect being established in the highest summit of the body, and having a prospect in that which is on all sides splendid and transparent,! investigates the wisdom of [real] beings. And this is the work of it according to nature, viz. having investigated, and obtained the possession [of truth] to follow those beings who are more excellent and more honorable than itself. For the knowledge of things divine and most honorable, is the principle, cause, and rule of human blessedness.

live. In the etherial vehicle of the soul, which when the soul energizes intellectually is spherical, and is moved circularly. This vehicle also is ai-yoedys, or luciform, throughout diaphanous, and of a star-like nature. Hence Marcus Antoninus beautifully observes ; oPaupad Pux7s abroedys, (lege avyoedys) Stay pyre éxreivyrac éme tt, pyre tow ovvtpéxy pyre clic, GAAA Gre Aaprytar, w TH dAyOeay Spa riv Tavtwv, Kat Tiv év airy. Lib. II. ie. “ The sphere of the soul is then luciform, when the soul is neither extended to anything [external] nor inwardly concurs with it, nor is depressed by it, but is illuminated with a light by which she sees the truth of all things, and the truth that is in herself.”

FROM METOPUS, IN HIS TREATISE

CONCERNING VIRTUE.

Tue virtue of man is the perfection of the nature of man. For every being becomes perfect, and arrives at the summit of excellence according to the proper nature of its virtue. Thus the virtue of a horse, is that which leads the nature of a horse to its summit. And the same reasoning is applicable to che several parts ofathing. Thus the virtue of the eyes is acuteness of vision: and this in the nature of the eyes is the summit. The virtue of the ears also, is acuteness of hearing: and this is the summit of the nature of the ears. Thus too, the virtue of the feet is swiftness: and this is the summit of the nature of the feet. It is necessary however, that every virtue should have these three things, reason, power, and deliberate choice; reason indeed, by which it judges and contemplates; power, by which it prohibits and vanquishes; and deliberate choice, by which it loves and delights in [what is proper]. ‘To judge, therefore, and contemplate, pertain to the dianoetic part of the soul; but to prohibit and vanquish are the peculiarity of the irrational 1 part of the soul;

1M. Meibomius observes, that Canter did not see that Aoytorixw should be written in this place for dAoyw. Canter however was right in retaining dAoyw. For the dianoetic is the same with the logistic part of the soul; and it is evident that a part of the soul different from the dianoetic is here intended to be signified. Besides, as Aristotle shows in his Nicomachean Ethics, when the irrational becomes obedient to the rational part of the soul, the former then prohibits and vanquishes base appetites in conjunction with the latter. 164

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