Life of Pythagoras — Iamblichus, trans. Thomas Taylor (1818)

This is the 9th Symbol in the Protreptics, and is thus explained by Iamblichus. ‘This symbol exhorts to prudence. For it excites in us an appropriate conception with respect to the propriety of not opposing sharp words to a man full of fire and wrath, nor contending with him. For frequently by words you will agitate and disturb an ignorant man, and will yourself suffer things dreadful and unpleasant. Heraclitus also testifies to the truth of this symbol. For he says, “It is difficult to fight with anger: for whatever is necessary to be done redeems the soul.” And this he says truly. For many, by gratifying anger, have changed the condition of their soul, and have made death preferable to life. But by governing the tongue, and being quiet, friendship is produced from strife, the fire of anger being extinguished; and you yourself will not appear to be destitute of intellect.”

P.146. But this follows from the whole being naturally prior to the part, and not the part to the whole.

For whole co-subverts, but is not co-subverted by part: since if whole is taken away, part also is taken away; but the contrary does not follow.

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P. 167. Such therefore as have the intellective and gnostic part of virtue, are denominated skilful and intelligent: but such as have the ethical and preelective part of it, are denominated useful and equitable.

The following account of the virtues is extracted from the Notes to my Translation of the Phedo of Plato: The first of the virtues are the physical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining tothe animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament: or that they are the result of energies in a former life. Of these Plato speaks in the Politicus and the Laws. ‘The ethical virtues, which are above these, are ingenerated by custom and a certain right opinion, and are the virtues of children when well educated. These virtues also are to be found in some brute animals. They likewise transcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato delivers in the Laws. They pertain however at the same time both to reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these are the political virtues, which pertain to reason alone; for they are scientific. But they are the virtues of reason adorning the irrational part as its instrument; through prudence adorning the gnostic, through fortitude the irascible, and through temperance the epithymetic power, (or the power which is the source of desire;) but adorning all the parts of the irrational nature through justice. And of these virtues Plato speaks much in the Republic. These virtues too follow each other. Above these are the cathartic virtues, which pertain to reason alone, withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the instruments of sense as vain, repressing ae the

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energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. Plato particularly unfolds these virtues in the Phedo.

Prior to these however are the theoretic virtues, which pertain to the soul, introducing itself to natures superior to itself, not only gnostically, as some one may be induced to think from the name, but also orectically: for it hastens to become, as it were, intellect instead of soul; and intellect possesses both desire and knowledge.

These virtues are the converse of the political: for as the latter energize about things subordinate according to reason, so the former about things more excellent according to intellect. These virtues Plato delivers in the Theztetus.