Phenomenology of Spirit — G. W. F. Hegel

658 Phenomenology of Mind that has a vakie, but what is known of the circumstances. It puts into duty, which is the universal immanent essence, the content which it derives from its natural individuality ; for the content is one that is present in its own being.

This content, in virtue of the universal medium wherein it exists, becomes the duty which it carries out, and empty bare duty is, through this very fact, affirmed to be something transcended, a moment. This content is its emptiness, transcended and cancelled, i.e. is the fulfilhng of pure duty. But at the same time conscience is detached from every possible content. It absolves itself from every specific duty, which would try to pass for a law.

In the strength of its certainty of itself, it has the majesty of absolute self-sufficiency, of absolute avrdpKeia, to bind or to loose. This self-determination is at once, therefore, absolute conformity to duty. Duty is the knowledge itself ; this pure and simple selfhood, however, is the immanent principle and essence ; for this inherent principle is pure self-identity, and self-identity lies in this consciousness.

This pure knowledge is immediately objective, is existence-for-another ; for, qua pure self-identity, it is immediacy, it is objective being. This being, however, is at the same time pure universality, the selfhood of all : in other words, action is acknowledged, and hence actual.

This being forms the element by which conscience directly stands on a footing of equality with every self-consciousness ; and this relation means not an abstract impersonal law, but the self of conscience. In that this right which conscience does is at the same time, however, a fact for others, a disparity seems

Conscience 659 to affect conscience. The duty which it fulfils is a determinate content; that content is, no doubt, the self of consciousness, and so its knowledge of itself, its identity with its self. But when fulfilled, when planted in the general element of existence, this identity is no longer knowledge, no longer this process of distinction which directly and at the same time does away with its distinctions.

Rather, in the sphere of existence, distinction is set up as subsistent, and the act is a i^y/^ determinate specific one, not identical with the element of everybody's self-consciousness, and hence not necessarily acknowledged and recognised. Both aspects, conscience qua acting, and the general consciousness acknowledging this act to be duty, stand equally loose from the specific character belonging to this deed.

On account of this freedom and detachment, the relation of the two within the common medium of their connection is rather a relationship of complete disparity — as a result of which, the consciousness doing and owning the act finds itself in complete uncertainty regarding the spirit which does the act and is " certain of itself.

This spirit acts and places in existence a particular determinate characteristic ; others hold to this existence, as its truth, and are therein certain of this spirit ; it has therein expressed what it takes to be its duty.

But it is detached and free from any specific duty ; it has, therefore, left the point where other people think it actually to be ; and this very medium of existence and duty as inherently existing are held by it to be merely transitory moments. What it thus places before them, it also " displaces " again, or rather has, eo ipso, immediately " displaced. For its reahty is, for it, not the duty and determinate content thus

660 Phenomenology of Mind put forward, but rather is the reahty which it has in its absolute certainty of itself. The other self-consciousnesses do not know, then, whether this particular conscience is morally good or is wicked ; or, rather, not merely can they not know this conscience, but they must take it to be also wicked.

For just as it stands loose to the determinate content of duty, and detached from duty as inherently existing, so do they likewise.

What is placed before them, they themselves know how to " displace "' or dissemble : it is something expressing merely the self of another individual, not their own : they do not merely know themselves to be detached and free from it, but have to resolve and dissipate it within their own consciousness, reduce it to nothingness by judgments and explanations in order to preserve their own self.

But the act of conscience is not merely this determination of existence, a determinate content forsaken by the pure self. What ought to be binding as duty and KMi get recognised as such, only is so through knowledge and conviction as to its being duty, by knowledge of self in the deed done. WTien the deed ceases to have in it this element of self, it ceases to be what is alone its essential nature.

Its existence, if deserted by this consciousness of self, would be an ordinary reality, and the act would appear to us a way of fulfilling one's pleasure and desire. What ought to exist has here essentiality only by its being known to be individuality giving itself expression. And its being thus known is the fact acknowledged and recognised by others, and is that which as such ought to have existence. The self enters existence as self. The spirit which is certain of itself exists as such for others ; its immediate