Phenomenology of Spirit — G. W. F. Hegel

Legal Status 485 hence is merely beside itself, and is indeed the very abandonment and rejection of its own self-consciousness. Such, then, is the constitution of that aspect in which self-consciousness qua absolute being is actual. The consciousness, however, that is driven back into itself out of this actuality, thinks this its insubstantiality, makes it an object of thought.

Formerly we saw the stoical independence of pure thought pass through Scepticism and find its true issue in the "unhappy consciousness,'' — the truth about what constitutes its inherent and exphcit nature, its final reahty. If this knowledge appeared at that stage ;;■; merely as the one-sided view of a consciousness qua consciousness, here the actual truth of that view has made its appearance.

The truth consists in the fact that this universal accepted objectivity of self-consciousness is reahty estranged from it. This objectivity is the ^ef:hn universal actuahty of the self; but this actuality is directly the perversion of the self as well — it is the loss of its essential being. The reality of the self that was not found in the ethical world, has been gained by its reverting into the " person.

What in the case of the former was all harmony and union, comes now on the scene, no doubt in developed form, but selfestranged.

B Spirit in Self-estrangement — The Discipline of Culture [The life of spirit as found in the social self-consciousneas has two fundamental factors, the universal spirit or social whole as such, and the individual member as such. The interrelation of these constitutes the spiritual existence of society. Each by itself is abstract, but the realisation of complete spiritual life through and in each is absolutely essential for spiritual fulfilment.

In the preceding analysis of spirit, one form of this process has been considered, the realisation of the objective social order in and through individuals. In the succeeding section, with its various subsections, the other process of securing the same general result is analysed : we have the movement by which, starting from the individual spirit, the realisation of comj^lete spiritual existence is established.

The former starts from the compact solidarity of the social substance, and results in the establishment of separate and individually complete legal personalities. The latter process starts from the rigidly exclusive unity of the individual self and issues in the establishment of a social order of absolutely universal and therefore absolutely free wills.

Both processes are ^er se abstract, necessary though they are : hence, as we shall find, a further stage in the evolution of spirit has still to appear.

The process of spirit in this second stage assumes from the start a conscious contrast between the individual spirit and a universal spiritual whole, a contrast, which, while profound, the individual seeks to remove, because the universality of spiritual existence which he seeks to attain is implicitly involved in his very being as a spiritual entity.

His spiritual life seems, to begin with, rent in twain, so complete is the sense of the opposition of these factors constituting his life. His true life, his objective embodiment, seems outside him altogether and yet is felt to be his own self. He seems " estranged " from his complete self, and the estrangement seems his own doing, becavise the substance from which he is cut oflf is felt to be his own.

The contrast is the deepest that spirit can possibly experience, just because spirit is and knows itself to be self-contained and self -complete, " the only reality. The contrast can only be removed by effort and struggle, for the individual spirit has to create or recreate for itself and by its own activity a universal objective spiritual realm, which 486

Spirit in Self-estrangement 487 It implies and in which alone it can be free and feel itself at home. The struggle spirit goes through is thus the greatest in the whole range of its experience, for the opposition to be overcome is the profoundest that exists. Since its aim is to achieve the highest for itself, nothing sacred can be allowed to stand in its way.

It will make any sacrifice, and, if necessary, produce the direst spiritual disaster, a spiritual "reign of terror," to accomplish its result. The movement of spirit here analysed covers every form of the individual's "struggle for a substantial spiritual life. It embraces the " intellectual," " economic," " religious," and the " ethical " in the narrower sense of these terms ; it embraces all that we mean by " culture " and " civilisation.

Hence the various parts of the argument : — spiritual " discipline," "enlightenment," the pursuit of "wealth," "belief" and "superstition," " absolute freedom. The process of spiritual life passed under critical review here is familiar to a greater or less extent in every age and every society.

But the actual historical material present to the mind of the writer is derived from (1) the period of European history embracing the entrance of Christianity and Christian philosophy into European civilisation after the fall of the Roman Empire, and the intellectual, " humanistic," awakening of the Renaissance which led on to the ecclesiastical revolution known as the Reformation : (2) the rationalistic movement of the eighteenth century, the so-called "Enlightenment" which preceded and culminated in the French Revolution, the supreme outburst of spiritual emancipation known in European history.

These two periods, far removed as they are in time, have much in common. They embody principles of spiritual development fundamentally alike, and are therefore freely drawn upon in the analysis, regardless of historicity. Much of Hegel's analysis of the first stage of this spiritual movement has also directly in view the character of Rameau in Diderot's dialogue Le neveu de Rameau.

This remarkable work was written in 1760, but was first brought to the notice of the literary public by Goethe, who translated and published the work in 1805. It thus came into Hegel's hands while he was writing the Phenomenology : and this perhaps accounts for the repeated references to it in the argument. The term " self -estranged spirit" with which he heads this section occurs in Goethe's translation.

Rameau is an extreme type of such a spirit. With this section should be read Hegel's Philosophy of History, Pt. Ill, § 3, c. 2 ; Pt. IV, § 2, c. 1, § 3, c. 1, 3 : the History of Philosophy, Pt. 3, Introduction, and c. 2, " The French Philosophy and the German Enlightenment."]