Phenomenology of Spirit — G. W. F. Hegel

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 571 enlightenment as much an abomination as its negative attitude towards behef.

This enhghtened insight into absolute Eeahty, that sees nothing in it but just absolute Reality, the etre supreme, the great Void — this intention to find that everything in its immediate existence is inherently real {an sich) or good, and finally to find the relation of the particular con- j^/2 scious entity to the Absolute Being, Rehgion, exhaustively summed up in the conception of profitableness — all this is for belief utterly and simply revolting.

This special and peculiar wisdom of enlightenment necessarily seems at the same time to the believing mind to be sheer insipidity and the confession of insipidity ; because it consists in knowing nothing of absolute Being, or, what amounts to the same thing, in knowing this entirely accurate platitude regarding it, — that it is merely absolute Being, and, again, in knowing nothing but finitude, taking this, moreover, to be the truth, and thinking this knowledge about finitude qua truth to be the highest knowledge attainable.

Behef has a divine right as against enlightenment, the right of absolute self-identity or of pure thought; and it finds itself utterly wronged by enlightenment ; for enlightenment distorts all its moments, and makes them something quite different from what they are in it.

Enlightenment, on the other hand, has merely a human right as against behef, and can only put in a human claim for its own truth ; for the wrong it commits is the right of disunion, of discordance, and consists in perverting and altering, a right that belongs to the nature of self -consciousness in opposition to the simple ultimate essence or thought. But

572 Phenomenology of Mind since the right of enhghtenment is the right of selfconsciousness, it will not merely retain its own right, too, in such a way that two equally valid rights of spirit would be left standing in opposition to one another without either satisfying the claims of the other ; it will maintain the absolute right, because self-consciousness is the negative function of the notion {Begriff), a function which does not merely operate on its own account, but also gets control over its opposite.

And because belief is a mode of consciousness, it will not be able to balk enlightenment of that right. For enlightenment does not operate against the believing mind with special principles of its own, but with those which belief itself implies and contains. Enlightenment merely brings together and presents to belief its own thoughts, the thoughts that lie scattered and apart within belief, all unknown to it.

Enlightenment merely reminds behef, when one of its own forms is present, of others it also has, but which it is always L ) 3 forgetting when the one is there.

Enlightenment shows itself to belief to be pure insight, by the fact that it, in a given determinate moment, sees the whole, brings forward the opposite element standing in direct relation to that moment and, converting the one into the other, brings out the principle operating negatively on both thoughts — the notion. It appears, therefore, to belief to be distortion and lies, because it shows up the other side in the moments of belief.

Enlightenment seems, in consequence, directly to make something else out of them than they are in their own particularity ; but this other is equally essential, and in reality is to be found in the believing mind itself, only the latter does not think about it, but keeps it some-

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 573 where else. Hence neither is the result foreign to behef nor can belief reject its truth. Enlightenment itself, however, which reminds behef of the opposite of its various separate moments, is just as little enlightened regarding its own nature.

It takes up a purely negative attitude to belief, so far as it excludes its own content from its own pure activity and takes that content to be negative of itself. Consequently, neither in this negative, in the content of belief, does it recognise itself, nor, for this reason, does it bring together the two thoughts, the one which it contributes and the one against which it brings the first.

Since it does not know that what it condemns in the case of belief is directly its very own thought, it has its own being in the opposition of both moments, only one of which, — viz. in every case the one opposed to belief — it acknowledges, but cuts off the other from the first, just as belief does.

Enlightenment, consequently, does not bring out the unity of both as their unity, i.e. the notion ; but the notion arises before it and comes to Hght of its own accord, in other words, enhghtenment finds the notion merely as something lying ready at hand.

For in itself the process of realising pure insight is just this, that insight, whose essential nature is the notion, comes before itself to begin with in the shape of an absolute other, and repudiates itself (for the opposite of the notion is an absolute opposite), and then out of this otherness comes to itself or comes to its notion.

Enhghtenment, however, is merely this process, it i^/y is the activity of the notion in still unconscious form, an activity which no doubt comes to itself qua object, but takes this object for an external other, and does not even know the nature of the notion, i.e. does not know