Phenomenology of Spirit — G. W. F. Hegel

Conscience 649 self-existence : so contrasted and opposed, it is objective being, it is being for something else. Duty itself now, qua duty deserted by the self, is known and thought to be merely a moment ; it has ceased to mean absolute being, it has become degraded to something which is not a self, does not exist on its own account, and is thus what exists for something else.

But this existing-for-something-else remains just for that reason an essential moment, because self, qrm consciousness, constitutes and establishes the opposition between existence-for-self and existencefor-another ; and now duty essentially means something immediately actual, and is no longer a mere abstract consciousness of duty. This existence for something else is, then, the inherently essential substance distinguished from the self.

Conscience has not given up pure duty, the abstract imphcit essence : pure duty is the essential moment of relating itself, qua universahty, to others. Conscience is the common element of distinct self-consciousnesses ; and this is the substance in which the act secures subsistence and reality, the moment enabling recognition by others to take place.

The moral selfconsciousness does not possess this moment of recognition, of pure consciousness which has definite existence; and on that account really does not "act" at all, does not effectually actualise anything. Its inherent nature is for it either the abstract unreal essence, or else existence in the form of a reaUty which has no spiritual character.

The actual reality of conscience, however, is one which is a self, i.e. an existence conscious of itself, the spiritual element of being recognised. Doing something is, therefore, merely the translation

650 Phenomenology of Mind of its particular content into that objective element where it is universal and is recognised, and this very fact, that the content is recognised, makes the deed an actuality.

The action is recognised and thereby real, because the actual reality is immediately bound up with conviction or knowledge ; or, in other words, knowledge of its purpose is immediately and at once ^ i '} the element of existence, universal recognition. For the essence of the act, duty, consists in the conviction conscience has about it.

This conviction is just the inherent principle itself ; it is inherently universal selfconsciousness — in other words, is recognition and hence reality. The result achieved under conviction of duty is therefore directly one which has substantial solid existence. Thus, we hear nothing more there about good intention not coming to anything definite, or about the good man faring badly.

What is known as duty is carried out completely and becomes an actual fact, just because what is dutiful is the universal for all selfconsciousnesses, that which is recognised, acknowledged, and thus objectively is. Taken separately and alone, however, without the content of self, this duty is existence-for-another, the transparent element, which has merely the significance of an unsubstantial ultimate factor in general.

If we look back on the sphere where in general spiritual reality made its appearance, we find that the principle involved was that the utterance of individuality is the absolutely real, the ultimately self-sufficing. But the shape which, in the first instance, gave expression to this notion, was the " honest consciousness " * which was occupied and * v.p. 402 ff.

Conscience 651 concerned with abstract " fact itself. This " fact itself " was there a predicate. In conscience, however, it is for the first time a Subject, which has put all aspects of consciousness in it, and for which all these moments, substantiality in general, external existence, and essence of thought, are contained in this certainty of itself.

The " fact itself " has substantiality in general in the ethical order {Sittlichkeit), external existence in culture, self-knowing essence of thought in morality ; and in conscience it is the Subject, which knows these moments within itself.

While the " honest consciousness " is for ever grasping merely the bare and empty " fact itself," conscience, on the other hand, secures the " fact itself " in its fullness, a fullness which conscience of itself supplies. Conscience has this power through its knowing the moments of con- i^g sciousness as moments, and controlling them because it is their negative essential principle.

When conscience is considered in relation to the particular features of the opposition which appears in action, and when we consider its consciousness regarding the nature of those features, its attitude towards the reality of the particular case where action takes efiect is, in the first instance, that of knowledge.

So far as the aspect of universality is present in such knowledge, it is the business of conscientious action, qua knowledge, to compass the reality before it in an unrestricted exhaustive manner, and thus get to know exactly the circumstances of the case, and give them due consideration.

This knowledge, however, since it is aware of rmiversahty as a moment, is in consequence a kind of knowledge of these circumstances which is conscious all the while of not embracing