Phenomenology of Spirit — G. W. F. Hegel

568 Phenomenology of Mind Lastly, the third moment of the truth of enhghtenment is the relation of the particular entities to Absolute Being, is the relation of the first two moments to one another. Insight, qua pure insight of what is identical or unrestricted, also transcends the unhke or diverse, i.e. transcends finite reality, or transcends itself qua mere otherness.

The " beyond " of this otherness it takes to be the void, to which it thus relates the facts of sense. In determining this relation both the terms do not enter the relation as its content ; for the one is the void, and thus a content is only to be had through the other, through sense reality.

The form the relation assumes, however, to the determination of which the aspect of immanent and ultimate being {Ansich) contributes, can be shaped just as we please ; for the form is something inherently and essentially negative, and therefore something self-opposed, being as well as nothing, inherent and ultimate {Ansich) as well as ^ I If the opposite ; or, what is the same thing, the relation of actuahty to an inherent essential being qua something beyond, is as much a negating as a positing of that actuahty.

Finite actualities can, therefore, properly speaking, be taken just in the way people have need of them. Sense facts are thus related now positively to the Absolute qua something ultimate {Ansich), and sense reahty is itself ultimate fer se ; the Absolute makes them, fosters and cherishes them.

Then, again, they are related to it as an opposite, that is to their own non-being ; in this case they are not something ultimate, they have being only for an other. Whereas in the preceding mode of consciousness the conceptions involved in the opposition took shape as good and bad, in the case of pure insight they pass into the more

The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition 569 abstract forms of what is fer se (Ansich) and what is for an other being. Both ways of deahng with the positive as well as the negative relation of finitude to what is ultimate (Ansich) are, however, equally necessary as a matter of fact, and everything is thus as much something per se (an sich) as it is something for an other : in other words everyt'hing is " useful.

Everything is now at the mercy of other things, lets itself now be used by others, and exists for them ; and then again it, so to say, gets up on its hind legs, fights shy of the other, exists for itself on its own account, and on its side uses the other too. From this, as a result, man, being the thing conscious of this relation, derives his true nature and place.

As he is immediately, man is good, qua natural consciousness per se, absolute qua individual, and all else exists for him : and further, — since the moments have the significance of universality for him qua self-conscious animal, — everything exists to pleasure and delight him, and, as he first comes from the hand of God, he walks the earth as in a garden planted for him.

He is bound also to pluck the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil ; he claims to have a use for it which distinguishes him from every other being, for, as it happens, his inherently good nature is so constituted that the superfluity of delight does it harm, or rather his particularity contains as a factor in its constitution a principle that goes beyond it ; his particularity can overreach itself and destroy itself.

To prevent this, he finds reason a useful means for duly restraining this self-transcendence, or rather for preserving himself when he does go beyond determinate

570 Phenomenology of Mind limits : for such is the force of consciousness. The enjoyment of this conscious and essentially universal being must, in manifold variety and duration, be itself universal and not something determinate.

The principle of measure or proportion has, therefore, the determinate function of preventing pleasure in its variety and duration from being quite broken off: i.e. the "measure" is determined with respect to immoderation. As everything is useful for man, man is likewise useful too, and his characteristic determination consists in making himself a member of the human herd, of use for the common good, and serviceable to all.

The extent to which he looks after his own interests is the measure with which he must also serve the purpose of others, and so far as he serves their turn, he is taking care of himself : the one hand washes the other. But wherever he finds himself there he is in his right: he makes use of others and is himself made use of. Different things are serviceable to one another in different ways.

All things, however, have this reciprocity of utility by their very nature, by being related to the Absolute in the twofold manner, the one positive, whereby they have a being all their own, the other negative, and thereby exist for others.

The relation to Absolute Reality, or Religion, is therefore of all forms of profitableness the most supremely profitable;* for it is profiting pure and simple ; it is that by which all things stand — by which they have a being all their own — and that by which all things fall — have an existence for something else. BeUef, of course, finds this positive outcome of * Cp, 1 Timothy iv. 8 : "Godliness is profitable unto all things."