Phenomenology of Spirit — G. W. F. Hegel

482 Phenomenology of Mind subsistence. Just as was the case in Scepticism, the formahsm of "right" is, thus, by its very conception, without special content ; it finds at its hand the fact of " possession," a fact subsisting in multiphcity, and imprints thereon the abstract universaHty, by which it is called " property," — the same sort of abstraction as Scepticism made use of.

But while the reality so determined is in Scepticism called a mere appearance, a mere semblance, and has merely a negative value, in the case of right it has a positive significance.

The negative value in the former case consists in the real having the meaning of self qua thought, qua inherent universal; the positive significance in the latter case, however, consists in its being mine in the sense of the category, as something whose vahdity is admitted, recognised, and actual. Both are the same abstract uni- 3 5 ' versal.

The actual content, the proper value of what is " mine " — whether it be an external possession, or again inner riches or poverty of mind and character — is not contained in this empty form and does not concern it. The content belongs, therefore, to a peculiar specific power, which is something different from the formal universal, is chance and caprice.

Consciousness of right, therefore, in the course of the very process of making its claim good, finds that it loses its own reahty, discovers its complete lack of inherent substantiality, and that to describe an individual as a " person " is to use an expression of contempt. The free and unchecked power possessed by the content takes determinate shape in this way.

The absolute plurahty of dispersed atomic personahties is, by the nature of this characteristic feature gathered at the same time into a single centre, alien to

Legal Status 483 them and just as devoid of the hfe of spirit (geistlos).

That central point is, in one respect, Kke the atomic rigidity of their personaHty, a merely particular reahty ; but in contrast to their empty particularity, it has the significance of the entire content, and hence is taken to be the essential element; while again, in contrast to their pretended absolute, but inherently insubstantial, reahty, it is the universal power, and absolute actuahty.

This " lord and master of the world '' takes himself in this way to be the absolute person, comprising at the same time all existence within himself, for whom there exists no higher type of spirit. He is a person : but the sole and single person who has challenged, confronted, and conquered all.

These all constitute and establish the triumphant universality of the one person ; for this particular, as such, is truly what it is only qua universal plurality of particular units : cut off from this plurality, the solitary and single self is, in fact, a powerless and unreal self. At the same time, it is the consciousness of the content which is antithetically opposed to that universal personality.

This content, however, when liberated from its negative power, means chaos of spiritual powers, which, when let loose as elemental independent agencies, break out into wild extravagances and excesses, and fall on one another in mad destruction. Their helpless self- consciousness is the powerless inoperative enclosure and the arena of their chaotic tumult.

But this master and lord of the world, aware of his being the ^e'Z sum and substance of all actual powers, is the titanic self-consciousness, which takes itself to be the living God. Since, however, he exists merely qua formal self, which is unable to tame and subdue those powers, his

484 Phenomenology of Mind procedure and his self- enjoyment are equally gigantic extravagance.* The lord of the world becomes really conscious of what he is, — viz. the universal might of actuaUty, — by that power of destruction which he exercises against the contrasted selfhood of his subjects. For his power is not the spiritual union and concord in which the various persons might get to know their own selfconsciousness.

Eather they exist as persons separately for themselves, and all continuity with others is excluded from the absolute punctual atomicity of their nature. They are, therefore, in a merely negative relation, a relation of exclusion both to one another and to him, who is their principle of connection or continuity.

Qua this continuity, he is the essential being and content of their formal nature, — a content, however, foreign to them, and a being hostile in character, which abolishes just what they take to be their very essence, viz. bare subjectivity without any content, mere empty independent existence each on its own account. And, again, qua the continuity of their personality, he destroys this very personahty itself.

Juridical personahty thus finds itself, rather, without any substance of its own, since content ahen to it is imposed on it and holds good within it, — and does so there, because such content is the reahty of that ty3)e of personality. On the other hand the passion for destroying and turning over everything on this unreal field gains for itself the consciousness of its complete supremacy.

But this self is barren desolation, and * Cp. with the above Hobbes' Leviathan. The historical reference liere is to the "apotheosis" of the Roman Emperors,