Phenomenology of Spirit — G. W. F. Hegel

616 Phenomenology of Mind A 1,3 thing which unquestionably has to be, and must not remain a problem : whether we imagine the moral consciousness quite cancelled in the attainment of this goal, or not. Which of these exactly is the case, cannot very well be clearly distinguished in the dim distance of infinitude, to which the attainment of the end has to be postponed, just because we cannot decide the point.

We shall be, strictly speaking, bomid to say that a definite idea on the matter ought to be of no interest and ought not to be sought for, because this leads to contradictions — the contradiction in speaking of an undertaking that at once ought to remain an undertaking and yet ought to be carried out, and the contradiction in speaking of a morality which is not consciousness, i.e. which is no longer actual.

By adopting the view, however, that morality when completed would contain a contradiction, the sacredness of moral truth would be seriously affected, and an unconditional duty would appear something unreal.

The first postulate was the harmony of morality and objective nature — the final piu-pose of the world : the other was the harmony of morality and will in its sensuous form, in the form of impulse, etc. — the final purpose of self-consciousness as such. The former is the harmony in the form of implicit immanent existence ; the latter, the harmony in the form of explicit self-existence.

That, however, which connects these two extreme final purposes which are thought, and operates as their mediating ground, is the process of concrete action itself. They are harmonies whose moments in their abstract distinctiveness from each other have not yet become definitely objective : this takes placG in concrete actuality, in which the aspects

The Moral View of the World 617 appear in consciousness proper, each as the other of the other. The postulates arising by this means contain harmonies which are now completely realised and objective, whereas formerly they were merely separated into implicit and explicit, immanent and self-existent.

The moral consciousness, qyxi bare and simple knowledge and willing of pure duty, is brought, by the process of acting upon an object opposed to that abstract simplicity, into relation with the manifold actuality which various cases present, and thereby assumes a moral attitude varied and manifold in character.

Hence arise, on the side of content, the plurality of laws generally, and, on the side of form, the contradictory powers of intelHgent knowing con- z^ x^ ^ sciousness and of a being devoid of consciousness.

To begin with, as regards the plurahty of duties, it is merely the aspect of pure or bare duty in them which in general appeals to the moral consciousness as being of significance : the many duties qua many are determinate and, therefore, are not, as such, anything sacred for the moral consciousness.

At the same time, however, being necessary, in virtue of the very nature of action which implicates a manifold actuality, and hence manifold types of moral attitude, those many duties must be looked on as having a substantial existence and value. Furthermore, since they can only exist in a moral consciousness, they exist at the same time in another consciousness than that for which only pure duty qua bare duty is sacred and self-sufficient.

It is thus postulated that there is another consciousness which renders them sacred, or which knows them as duties and wills them so. The first maintains pure duty indifferent towards all specific content, and duty

618 Phenomenology of Mind consists merely in being thus indifferent towards it. The other, however, contains the equally essential relation to the process of action, and the necessity, therefore, of determinate content : since duties for this other mean determinate duties, the content is thus, for it, just as essential as the form in virtue of which the content is a duty at all.

This consciousness is, consequently, such that in it the universal and the particular are, through and through, one ; its essential principle is thus the same as that of the harmony of morality and happiness. For this opposition between morality and happiness expresses in hke manner the separation of the self-identical moral consciousness from that actuality which, qua manifold existence, opposes and conflicts with the simple nature of duty.

While, however, the first postulate expresses merely the objective existential harmony between morahty and nature, because nature is therein the negative of self-consciousness, is the aspect of existence, this inherent harmony, on the other hand, is now affirmed essentially as a mode of consciousness. For existence now appears as the content of duty, as that in the determinate duty i^i^y which gives it specific determinateness.

The immanent harmony is thus the unity of elements which, qua simple ultimate elements, are essentially thought-created, and hence cannot exist except in a consciousness. This latter becomes now a master and ruler of the world, who brings about the harmony of morahty and happiness, and at the same time sanctifies duties in their multiplicity.

To sanctify these duties means this much, that the consciousness of pure duty cannot straightway and directly accept the determinate or specific duty as sacred ; but because a specific duty.