Phenomenology of Spirit — G. W. F. Hegel

622 Phenomenology of Mind The fijst stage, which forms the starting point, is the actual moral self-consciousness, or is the fact that there is such a self-consciousness at all.

For the notion establishes moral self-consciousness in the form that, for it, all reality in general has essential being only so far as such reality is in conformity with duty; and that notion estabhshes this essential element as knowledge, i.e. in immediate unity with the actual self. This unity is thus itself actual, is a moral actual consciousness.

The latter, now, qua consciousness, presents its content to itself as an object, viz. as the final purpose of the world, as the harmony of morality with all reality.

Since, however, it represents this unity as object and is not yet the complete notion, which has the object as such in its grasp, this unity is taken to be something negative of or opposed to self -consciousness, i.e. the unity falls outside l^ Iß it, as something beyond its actual reality, but at the same time of such a nature as to be also existent, though merely thought of.

This self-consciousness, which, qua self-consciousness, is something other than the object, thus finds itself left with the want of harmony between the consciousness of duty and actual reality, a reality, too, which is its own.

The proposition consequently now runs thus: "there is no morally complete actual self-consciousness"; and, since what is moral only is in the long run so far as it is complete, — for duty is the pure unadulterated ultimate element [Ansicli), and morality consists merely in conformity to this pure principle — the second proposition runs : " there is no morally actual existence at all. Since, however, in the third place, it is a self, it is inherently the unity of duty and actual reality. This

The Moral View of the World 623 unity thus becomes its object, as completed m^orality — but as something beyond its actual reality, and yet a " beyond " which still ought to be real. In this final stage and last expression of the sjnithetic unity of the two first propositions, the self-conscious reality, as well as duty, is only affirmed as a transcended or superseded moment.

For neither of them is alone, neither is isolated ; on the contrary, these factors, whose essential characteristic lies in being free from one another, are thus each in that unity no longer free from the other ; each is transcended.

Hence, as regards content, they become, as such, object, each of them holds good for the other; and, as regards form, they become such that this interchange on their part is, at the same time, merely in idea, is merely ideally presented. Or, again, the actually non-moral, because it is, at the same time, pure thought and elevated above its own actual reality, is in idea still moral, and is taken to be entirely sufficing.

In this way the first proposition, that there is a moral self-consciousness, is reinstated, but bound up with the second that there is none ; that is to say, there is one, but merely in idea. In other words, there is indeed none, but it is all the same allowed by some other consciousness to pass for one.

h Dissemblance [The first stage fails as it stands to do complete justice to the full meaning of morality. Both elements in the spiritually complete individual are essential, and each has to be recognised. The universal must be objectified in nature ("external nature" and "sensibility"), and nature must be subjectivised in spirit. Another condition or stage of the moral consciousness, therefore, is found where the equality of value of the' elements of the moral consciousness is admitted, without these elements being completely fused into a single and total attitude. The universal is realised in many ways and forms, and each is accepted in turn as the true moral reality. The mind passes from one to the other ; when one is accejited the other is set aside. The moral consciousness tries, so to say, to hide from itself the endless diversity of its appearances, simply because it clings tenaciously to the idea that the inherent self-completeness of itself is a unity 2^er se which can only admit diversity on sufferance. Formerly it eliminated all diversity by eliminating the source of diversity — nature. Here it is forced to admit diversity, and yet cannot give up the claim to be an abstract single unity independent of dift'erence. Thus its condition here is a mixture of self-realisation and self -sophistication — a condition which Hegel characterises as "Dissemblance," and which borders upon and may pass into " Hypocrisy." Hegel regards this attitude as the inevitable outcome of the preceding.]

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