Phenomenology of Spirit — G. W. F. Hegel

628 Phenomenology of Mind to be taken seriously. But, as a matter of fact, the actual deed done is the action of a particular consciousness, and so is itself merely something particular, and the result contingent.

The end of reason, however, being the all-comprehensive universal end, is nothing short of the entire world — a final purpose which goes far beyond the content of this particular act, and therefore is to be placed altogether above anything actually done. Because the universal best ought to be carried out, nothing good is done.

In point of fact, however, the nothingness of actual action and the reality of the entire purpose alone, which are here upheld— these are on all hands again " shifted " or dissembled. The moral act is not something contingent and restricted ; its essential nature hes in pure duty.

This pure duty constitutes the sole entire purpose ; and the act, whatever may be the limitation of the content, being the actualisation of that purpose, is the accomplishment of the entire absolute purpose.

Or, if again we take the reality in the sense of nature, which has laws of its own and stands over against pure duty, and take it in such a way that duty cannot realise its law within nature, then, since duty as such is the essential element, we are, when acting, not in fact concerned about the accomplishment of pure duty which is the whole purpose ; for the accompHshment would then rather have as its end not pure duty, but the opposite, viz. reahty.

But there is again a " shifting " from the position that it is not reality with which we have to do. For, by the very notion of moral action, pure duty is essentially an iy { active consciousness. Action thus ought certainly to take place, absolute duty ought to be expressed in the whole of nature, and " moral law " to become " natural law."

Dissemblance 629 If, then, we allow this highest good to stand for the essentially real, consciousness is not altogether in earnest with moraUty. For, in this highest good, nature has not a different law from what morality has. Moral action itself, in consequence, drops, for action takes place only under the assumption of a negative or opposing element which is to be cancelled by means of the act.

But if nature conforms to the moral law, then undoubtedly this moral law would be violated by acting, by cancelling what already exists. On that mode of interpretation, then, there has arisen as the essential situation one which renders moral action superfluous and in which moral action does not take place at all.

Hence the postulate of the harmony between morahty and reality — a harmony involved in the very notion of moral action, which means bringing the two into agreement — finds on this view, too, an expression which takes the form : — " because moral action is the absolute purpose, the absolute purpose is — that moral action do not take place at all.

If we put these moments together, through which consciousness has gone on presenting its ideas of its moral life, we see that it cancels each one again in its opposite. It starts from the position that, for it, morality and reahty do not make a harmony ; but it is not in earnest with that, for in the moral act it is conscious of the presence of this harmony.

But neither is it in earnest with this action, since the action is something particular ; while it has such a high purpose, the highest good. This, however, is once more merely a dissemblance of the actual fact, for thereby all action and all morahty would fall to the ground. In other words, it is not strictly in earnest with moral action ; on the con-

630 Phenomenology of Mind trary, it really feels that, what is most to be wished for, the absolutely desirable, is that the highest good were carried out and moral action superfluous. From this result consciousness must go on still fur- IfS ther in its contradictory procedure, and must of necessity again dissemble the aboKtion of moral action.

Morality is the inherently essential (Ansich) ; in order that it may have place, the final end of the world cannot be carried out ; rather, the moral consciousness must exist for itself, and must find lying before it a nature opposing it. But it miist per se be completed. This leads to the second postulate of the harmony of itself and sensibility, the " nature " immediately within it.

Moral self-consciousness sets up its purpose as pure purpose, as independent of inclinations and impulses, so that this bare purpose has abolished within itself the ends of sensibility. But this cancelling of the element of sense is no sooner set up than it is again dissembled.

The moral consciousness acts, it brings its purpose into reality ; and selfconscious sensibility, which should be done away with, is precisely the mediating element between pure consciousness and reality — is the instrument used by the former for the realisation of itself, or is the organ of what is called impulse, inclination.

It is thus not really in earnest in cancelling inclinations and impulses, for these are just self-consciousness making itself actual. Moreover, they ought not to be suppressed, but merely to be in conformity with reason. They, are, too, in conformity with it ; for moral action is nothing else than self-realising consciousness — consciousness taking on the form of an impulse, i.e. it is immediately the realised, actually present harmony