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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1view, the Upanishads, which still show these rudera of the ancient temples, would have to be considered as more primitive even than those in which the idea of the Brahman or the Highest Self has reached its utmost purity. It has been considered a very strong argument in support of the modern and sectarian character of the Svetasvatara-upanishad, that ‘it inculcates what is called Bhakti’, or implicit reliance on the favour of the deity worshipped.’ Now it is quite true that this Upanishad possesses a very distinct character of its own, by the stress which it lays on the personal, and sometimes almost mythical character of the Supreme Spirit; but, so far from inculcating bhakti, in the modern sense of the word, it never mentions that word, except in the very last verse, a verse which, if necessary, certain critics would soon dispose of as a palpable addition. But that verse says no more than this: ‘If these truths (of the Upanishad) have been told to a high-minded man, who feels the highest devotion for God, and for his Guru as for God, then they will shine forth indeed.’ Does that prove the existence of Bhakti as we find it in the Sandilya-sitras? ? Again, it has been said that the Svetasvatara-upanishad is sectarian in a philosophical sense, that it is in fact an Upanishad of the Sankhya system of philosophy, and not of the Vedanta. Now I am quite willing to admit that, in its origin, the Vedanta philosophy is nearer to the Vedic literature than any other of the six systems of philosophy, and that if we really found doctrines, peculiar to the Sankhya, and opposed to the Ved4nta, in the SvetAsvataraupanishad, we might feel inclined to assign to our Upanishad a later date. But where is the proof of this? No doubt there are expressions in this Upanishad which remind us of technical terms used at a later time in the Sankhya system of philosophy, but of Sankhya doctrines, which I had myself formerly suspected in this Upanishad,
2SSRs <a. cotchomamen, 2 Es ee) a : Weber, Ind. Stud. I, 422; and History of Indian Literature, p. 238. The Aphorisms of Sandilya, or the Hindu Doctrine of F aith, translated by E. B, Cowell, Calcutta, 1878. :
3INTRODUCTION. XXX V oa I can on closer study find very little. I think it was Mr. Gough who, in his Philosophy of the Upanishads, for the first time made it quite clear that the teaching of our Upanishad is, in the main, the same as that of the other Upanishads. ‘The ‘Svethevataent upanishad teaches,’ as he says, ‘the unity of souls in the one and only Self; the unreality of the world as a series of figments of the selffeigning world-fiction; and as the first of the fictitious emanations, the existence of the Demiurgos or universal soul present in every individual soul, the deity that projects the world out of himself, that the migrating souls may find the recompense of their works in former lives.’ I do not quite agree with this view of the fsvara, whom Mr. Gough calls the Demiurgos, but he seems to me perfectly right when he says that the Svet4svatara-upanishad propounds in Sankhya terms the very principles that the Sankhya philosophers make it their business to subvert. One might doubt as to the propriety of calling certain terms ‘SAnkhya terms’ in a work written at a time when a Sankhya philosophy, such as we know it as a system, had as yet no existence, and when the very name sankhya meant something quite different from the Sankhya system of Kapila. Sankhya is derived from sankhya, and that meant counting, number, name, corresponding very nearly to the Greek Adyos. Sankhya, as derived from it, meant originally no more than theoretic philosophy, as opposed to yoga, which meant originally practical religious exercises and penances, to restrain the passions and the senses in general. All other interpretations of these words, when they had become technical names, are of later date. But even in their later forms, whatever we may think of the coincidences and differences between the Sankhya and Vedanta systems of philosophy, there is one point on which they are diametrically opposed. Whatever else the Sankhya may be, it is dualistic; whatever else the Vedanta may be, it is monistic. In the Sankhya, nature, or whatever else we may call it, is independent of the purusha; im the Vedanta it is not. Now the Svet4svatara-upanishad states distinctly that nature, or what in the Sankhya philosophy Ci2
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1view, the Upanishads, which still show these rudera of the ancient temples, would have to be considered as more primitive even than those in which the idea of the Brahman or the Highest Self has reached its utmost purity. It has been considered a very strong argument in support of the modern and sectarian character of the Svetasvatara-upanishad, that ‘it inculcates what is called Bhakti’, or implicit reliance on the favour of the deity worshipped.’ Now it is quite true that this Upanishad possesses a very distinct character of its own, by the stress which it lays on the personal, and sometimes almost mythical character of the Supreme Spirit; but, so far from inculcating bhakti, in the modern sense of the word, it never mentions that word, except in the very last verse, a verse which, if necessary, certain critics would soon dispose of as a palpable addition. But that verse says no more than this: ‘If these truths (of the Upanishad) have been told to a high-minded man, who feels the highest devotion for God, and for his Guru as for God, then they will shine forth indeed.’ Does that prove the existence of Bhakti as we find it in the Sandilya-sitras? ? Again, it has been said that the Svetasvatara-upanishad is sectarian in a philosophical sense, that it is in fact an Upanishad of the Sankhya system of philosophy, and not of the Vedanta. Now I am quite willing to admit that, in its origin, the Vedanta philosophy is nearer to the Vedic literature than any other of the six systems of philosophy, and that if we really found doctrines, peculiar to the Sankhya, and opposed to the Ved4nta, in the SvetAsvataraupanishad, we might feel inclined to assign to our Upanishad a later date. But where is the proof of this? No doubt there are expressions in this Upanishad which remind us of technical terms used at a later time in the Sankhya system of philosophy, but of Sankhya doctrines, which I had myself formerly suspected in this Upanishad,
2SSRs <a. cotchomamen, 2 Es ee) a : Weber, Ind. Stud. I, 422; and History of Indian Literature, p. 238. The Aphorisms of Sandilya, or the Hindu Doctrine of F aith, translated by E. B, Cowell, Calcutta, 1878. :
3INTRODUCTION. XXX V oa I can on closer study find very little. I think it was Mr. Gough who, in his Philosophy of the Upanishads, for the first time made it quite clear that the teaching of our Upanishad is, in the main, the same as that of the other Upanishads. ‘The ‘Svethevataent upanishad teaches,’ as he says, ‘the unity of souls in the one and only Self; the unreality of the world as a series of figments of the selffeigning world-fiction; and as the first of the fictitious emanations, the existence of the Demiurgos or universal soul present in every individual soul, the deity that projects the world out of himself, that the migrating souls may find the recompense of their works in former lives.’ I do not quite agree with this view of the fsvara, whom Mr. Gough calls the Demiurgos, but he seems to me perfectly right when he says that the Svet4svatara-upanishad propounds in Sankhya terms the very principles that the Sankhya philosophers make it their business to subvert. One might doubt as to the propriety of calling certain terms ‘SAnkhya terms’ in a work written at a time when a Sankhya philosophy, such as we know it as a system, had as yet no existence, and when the very name sankhya meant something quite different from the Sankhya system of Kapila. Sankhya is derived from sankhya, and that meant counting, number, name, corresponding very nearly to the Greek Adyos. Sankhya, as derived from it, meant originally no more than theoretic philosophy, as opposed to yoga, which meant originally practical religious exercises and penances, to restrain the passions and the senses in general. All other interpretations of these words, when they had become technical names, are of later date. But even in their later forms, whatever we may think of the coincidences and differences between the Sankhya and Vedanta systems of philosophy, there is one point on which they are diametrically opposed. Whatever else the Sankhya may be, it is dualistic; whatever else the Vedanta may be, it is monistic. In the Sankhya, nature, or whatever else we may call it, is independent of the purusha; im the Vedanta it is not. Now the Svet4svatara-upanishad states distinctly that nature, or what in the Sankhya philosophy Ci2
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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