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1The sense-perception of some lower forms of life may be conjectured to approximate to this character habitually. Also occasion- ally our own sense-perception in moments when thought- activity has been lulled to quiescence is not far off the attainment of this ideal limit. The process of discrimination in sense-awareness has two distinct sides. There is the discrimination of fact into parts, and the discrimination of any part of fact as exhibiting relations to entities which are not parts of fact though they are ingredients in it. Namely the^ immediate fact for awareness is the whole occurrence Df nature. It is nature as an event present for sense- , iwareness, and essentially passing. There is no holding I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 15 nature still and looking at it. We cannot redouble our eiforts to improve our knowledge of the terminus of our present sense-awareness; it is our subsequent oppor- tunity in subsequent sense-awareness which gains the benefit of our good resolution. Thus the ultimate fact for sense-awareness is an event. This whole event is discriminated by us into partial events. We are aware of an event which is our bodily life, of an event which is the course of nature jwithin thisraom^ and of a vaguely perceived aggregate of other partial events. This is the discrimination in sense-awareness of fact into parts. I shall use the term 'part' in the arbitrarily limited sense of an event which is part of the whole fact dis- closed in awareness. Sense-awareness also yields to us other factors in nature which are not events. For example, sky-blue is seen as situated in a certain event. This relation of situation requires further discussion which is postponed to a later lecture. My present point is that sky-blue is found in nature with a definite implication in events, but is not an event itself. Accordingly in addition to events, there are other factors in nature directly dis-^ closed to us in sense-awareness. The conception in thought of all the factors in nature as distinct entities with definite natural relations is what I have in another place^ called the 'diversification of nature.' There is one general conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion. It is that the first task of a philo- sophy of science should be some general classification of the entities disclosed to us in sense-perception. Among the examples of entities in addition to ' events ' which we have used for the purpose of illustration are 1 Cf. Enquiry. i6 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch.
2Among the examples of entities in addition to ' events ' which we have used for the purpose of illustration are 1 Cf. Enquiry. i6 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch. the buildings of Bedford College, Homer, and sky-blue. Evidently these are very different sorts of things ; and it is likely that statements which are made about one kmd of entity will not be true about other kinds. If human thought proceeded with the orderly method which abstract logic would suggest to it, we might go further and say that a classification of natural entities should be the first step in science itself. Perhaps you will be inclined to reply that this classification has already been effected, and that science is concerned with the ad- ventures of material entities in space and time. The history of the doctrine of matter has yet to be written. It is the history of the influence of Greek philosophy on science. That influence has issued in one long misconception of the metaphysical status of natural entities. The entity has been separated from the factor which is the terminus of sense-awareness. It has become the substratum for that factor, and the factor has been degraded into an attribute of the entity. In this way a distinction has been imported into nature which is in truth no distinction at all. A natural entity is merely a factor of fact, considered in itself. Its dis- connexion from the complex of fact is a mere abstraction. It is not the substratum of the factor, but the very factor itself as bared in thought. Thus what is a mere procedure of mind in the translation of sense-awareness into discursive knowledge has been transmuted into a fundamental character of nature. In this way matter has emerged as being the metaphysical substratum of its properties, and the course of nature is interpreted as the history of matter. Plato and Aristotle found Greek thought preoccupied with the quest for the simple substances in terms of NATURE AND THOUGHT 17 hich the course of events could be expressed. We ay formulate this state of mind in the question, What nature made of? The answers which their genius ive to this question, and more particularly the con- ;pts which underlay the terms in which they framed leir answers, have determined the unquestioned pre- ippositions as to time, space and matter which have ;igned in science.
3The answers which their genius ive to this question, and more particularly the con- ;pts which underlay the terms in which they framed leir answers, have determined the unquestioned pre- ippositions as to time, space and matter which have ;igned in science. In Plato the forms of thought are more fluid than in ristotle, and therefore, as I venture to think, the more iluable. Their importance consists in the evidence ley yield of cultivated thought about nature before it ad been forced into a uniform mould by the long adition of scientific philosophy. For example in the imaeus there is a presupposition, somewhat vaguely ^pressed, of a distinction between the general becoming F nature and the measurable time of nature. In a later :cture I have to distinguish between what I call the assage of nature and particular time-systems which sihibit certain characteristics of that passage. I will not so far as to claim Plato in direct support of this octrine, but I do think that the sections of the Timaeus 'hich deal with time become clearer if my distinction i admitted. This is however a digression. I am now concerned ith the origin of the scientific doctrine of matter in Jreek thought. In the Timaeus Plato asserts that nature 1 made of fire and earth with air and water as inter- lediate between them, so that ' as fire is to air so is air ) water, and as air is to water so is water to earth.' He [so suggests a molecular hypothesis for these four iements. In this hypothesis everything depends on the bape of the atoms ; for earth it is cubical and for fire W. N, 2 i8 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch. it is pyramidal. To-day physicists are again discussing the structure of the atom, and its shape is no sHght factor in that structure. Plato's guesses read much more fantastically than does Aristotle's systematic analysis; but in some ways they are more valuable. The main outline of his ideas is comparable with that of modern science. It embodies concepts which any theory of natural philosophy must retain and in some sense must explain. Aristotle asked the fundamental question, What do we mean by ' substance ' ? Here the reaction between his philosophy and his logic worked very unfortunately. In his logic, the fundamental type of affirmative proposition is the attribution of a predicate to a subject. Accordingly, amid the many current uses of the term ' substance ' which he analyses, he emphasises its meaning as 'the ultimate substratum which is no longer predicated of anything else.' The unquestioned acceptance of the Aristotelian logic has led to an ingrained tendency to postulate a sub- stratum for whatever is disclosed in sense-awareness, namely, to look below what we are aware of for the substance in the sense of the 'concrete thing.' This is the origin of the modern scientific concept of matter and of ether, namely they are the outcome of this insistent habit of postulation.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
1The sense-perception of some lower forms of life may be conjectured to approximate to this character habitually. Also occasion- ally our own sense-perception in moments when thought- activity has been lulled to quiescence is not far off the attainment of this ideal limit. The process of discrimination in sense-awareness has two distinct sides. There is the discrimination of fact into parts, and the discrimination of any part of fact as exhibiting relations to entities which are not parts of fact though they are ingredients in it. Namely the^ immediate fact for awareness is the whole occurrence Df nature. It is nature as an event present for sense- , iwareness, and essentially passing. There is no holding I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 15 nature still and looking at it. We cannot redouble our eiforts to improve our knowledge of the terminus of our present sense-awareness; it is our subsequent oppor- tunity in subsequent sense-awareness which gains the benefit of our good resolution. Thus the ultimate fact for sense-awareness is an event. This whole event is discriminated by us into partial events. We are aware of an event which is our bodily life, of an event which is the course of nature jwithin thisraom^ and of a vaguely perceived aggregate of other partial events. This is the discrimination in sense-awareness of fact into parts. I shall use the term 'part' in the arbitrarily limited sense of an event which is part of the whole fact dis- closed in awareness. Sense-awareness also yields to us other factors in nature which are not events. For example, sky-blue is seen as situated in a certain event. This relation of situation requires further discussion which is postponed to a later lecture. My present point is that sky-blue is found in nature with a definite implication in events, but is not an event itself. Accordingly in addition to events, there are other factors in nature directly dis-^ closed to us in sense-awareness. The conception in thought of all the factors in nature as distinct entities with definite natural relations is what I have in another place^ called the 'diversification of nature.' There is one general conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion. It is that the first task of a philo- sophy of science should be some general classification of the entities disclosed to us in sense-perception. Among the examples of entities in addition to ' events ' which we have used for the purpose of illustration are 1 Cf. Enquiry. i6 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch.
2Among the examples of entities in addition to ' events ' which we have used for the purpose of illustration are 1 Cf. Enquiry. i6 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch. the buildings of Bedford College, Homer, and sky-blue. Evidently these are very different sorts of things ; and it is likely that statements which are made about one kmd of entity will not be true about other kinds. If human thought proceeded with the orderly method which abstract logic would suggest to it, we might go further and say that a classification of natural entities should be the first step in science itself. Perhaps you will be inclined to reply that this classification has already been effected, and that science is concerned with the ad- ventures of material entities in space and time. The history of the doctrine of matter has yet to be written. It is the history of the influence of Greek philosophy on science. That influence has issued in one long misconception of the metaphysical status of natural entities. The entity has been separated from the factor which is the terminus of sense-awareness. It has become the substratum for that factor, and the factor has been degraded into an attribute of the entity. In this way a distinction has been imported into nature which is in truth no distinction at all. A natural entity is merely a factor of fact, considered in itself. Its dis- connexion from the complex of fact is a mere abstraction. It is not the substratum of the factor, but the very factor itself as bared in thought. Thus what is a mere procedure of mind in the translation of sense-awareness into discursive knowledge has been transmuted into a fundamental character of nature. In this way matter has emerged as being the metaphysical substratum of its properties, and the course of nature is interpreted as the history of matter. Plato and Aristotle found Greek thought preoccupied with the quest for the simple substances in terms of NATURE AND THOUGHT 17 hich the course of events could be expressed. We ay formulate this state of mind in the question, What nature made of? The answers which their genius ive to this question, and more particularly the con- ;pts which underlay the terms in which they framed leir answers, have determined the unquestioned pre- ippositions as to time, space and matter which have ;igned in science.
3The answers which their genius ive to this question, and more particularly the con- ;pts which underlay the terms in which they framed leir answers, have determined the unquestioned pre- ippositions as to time, space and matter which have ;igned in science. In Plato the forms of thought are more fluid than in ristotle, and therefore, as I venture to think, the more iluable. Their importance consists in the evidence ley yield of cultivated thought about nature before it ad been forced into a uniform mould by the long adition of scientific philosophy. For example in the imaeus there is a presupposition, somewhat vaguely ^pressed, of a distinction between the general becoming F nature and the measurable time of nature. In a later :cture I have to distinguish between what I call the assage of nature and particular time-systems which sihibit certain characteristics of that passage. I will not so far as to claim Plato in direct support of this octrine, but I do think that the sections of the Timaeus 'hich deal with time become clearer if my distinction i admitted. This is however a digression. I am now concerned ith the origin of the scientific doctrine of matter in Jreek thought. In the Timaeus Plato asserts that nature 1 made of fire and earth with air and water as inter- lediate between them, so that ' as fire is to air so is air ) water, and as air is to water so is water to earth.' He [so suggests a molecular hypothesis for these four iements. In this hypothesis everything depends on the bape of the atoms ; for earth it is cubical and for fire W. N, 2 i8 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch. it is pyramidal. To-day physicists are again discussing the structure of the atom, and its shape is no sHght factor in that structure. Plato's guesses read much more fantastically than does Aristotle's systematic analysis; but in some ways they are more valuable. The main outline of his ideas is comparable with that of modern science. It embodies concepts which any theory of natural philosophy must retain and in some sense must explain. Aristotle asked the fundamental question, What do we mean by ' substance ' ? Here the reaction between his philosophy and his logic worked very unfortunately. In his logic, the fundamental type of affirmative proposition is the attribution of a predicate to a subject. Accordingly, amid the many current uses of the term ' substance ' which he analyses, he emphasises its meaning as 'the ultimate substratum which is no longer predicated of anything else.' The unquestioned acceptance of the Aristotelian logic has led to an ingrained tendency to postulate a sub- stratum for whatever is disclosed in sense-awareness, namely, to look below what we are aware of for the substance in the sense of the 'concrete thing.' This is the origin of the modern scientific concept of matter and of ether, namely they are the outcome of this insistent habit of postulation.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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