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1Accordingly the sentence ' This college building is commodious ' means probably 'This college building is commodious as a college building.' But it will be found that in the above discussion we can replace 'commodious' by 'commodious as a college building' without altering our conclusion; though we can guess that the recipient, who thought lo THE CONCEPT OF NATURE L*^"- he was in the lion-house of the Zoo, would be less likely to assent to * Anyhow, it is commodious as a college building. A more obvious instance of elliptical phraseology arises if the expositor should address the recipient with the remark, 'That criminal is your friend.' The recipient might answer, 'He is my friend and you are insulting.' Here the recipient assumes that the phrase 'That criminal' is elliptical and not merely demonstrative. In fact, pure demonstration is impossible though it is the ideal of thought. This practical impossibility of pure demonstration is a difficulty which arises in the com- munication of thought and in the retention of thought. Namely, a proposition about a particular factor in nature can neither be expressed to others nor retained for repeated consideration without the aid of auxiliary com- plexes which are irrelevant to it. I now pass to descriptive phrases. The expositor says, * A college in Regent's Park is commodious.' The recipient knows Regent's Park well. The phrase 'A college in Regent's Park' is descriptive for him. If its phraseology is not elliptical, which in ordinary life it certainly will be in some way or other, this proposition simply means, 'There is an entity which is a college building in Regent's Park and is commodious.' If the recipient rejoins, ' The lion-house in the Zoo is the only commodious building in Regent's Park,' he now contradicts the expositor, on the assumption that a lion-house in a Zoo is not a college building. t] NATURE AND THOUGHT ii Thus whereas in the first dialogue the recipient merely quarrelled with the expositor without con- tradicting him, in this dialogue he contradicts him. Thus 1 descriptive phrase is part of the proposition which it helps to express, whereas a demonstrative phrase is not part of the proposition which it helps to express. Again the expositor might be standing in Green Park — ^where there are no college buildings — and say, 'This college building is commodious.' Probably no proposition will be received by the recipient because the demonstrative phrase, 'This college building' has failed to demonstrate owing to the absence of the background of sense-awareness which it presupposes. But if the expositor had said, 'A college building in Green Park is commodious,' the recipient would have received a proposition, but a False one.
2But if the expositor had said, 'A college building in Green Park is commodious,' the recipient would have received a proposition, but a False one. Language is usually ambiguous and it is rash to make general assertions as to its meanings. But phrases which commence with ' this ' or ' that ' are usually demonstrative, whereas phrases which commence with 'the' or *a' are often descriptive. In studying the theory of pro- positional expression it is important to remember the wide difference between the analogous modest words 'this' and 'that' on the one hand and 'a' and 'the' on the other hand. The sentence 'The college building in Regent's Park is com- modious ' means, according to the analysis first made by Bertrand Russell, the proposition, ' There is an entity which (i) is a college building in Regent's Park and (ii) is commodious and (iii) is such 12 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch. that any college building in Regent's Park is identical with it.' The descriptive character of the phrase ' The college building in Regent's Park' is thus evident. Also the proposition is denied by the denial of any one of its three component clauses or by the denial of any combination of the component clauses. If we had substituted 'Green Park' for 'Regent's Park' a false proposition would have resulted. Also the erection of a second college in Regent's Park would make the pro- position false, though in ordinary life common sense would politely treat it as merely ambiguous. * The Iliad ' for a classical scholar is usually a demon- strative phrase ; for it demonstrates to him a well-known poem. But for the majority of mankind the phrase is descriptive, namely, it is synonymous with * The poem named "the Iliad".' Names may be either demonstrative or descriptive phrases. For example 'Homer' is for us a descriptive phrase, namely, the word with some slight difference in suggestiveness means 'The man who wrote the Iliad.' This discussion illustrates that thought places before itself bare objectives, entities as we call them, which the thinking clothes by expressing their mutual rela- tions. Sense-awareness discloses fact with factors which are the entities for thought. The separate distinction of an entity in thought is not a metaphysical assertion, but a method of procedure necessary for the finite expression of individual propositions. Apart from entities there could be no finite truths ; they are the means by which the infinitude of irrelevance is kept out of thought. To sum up: the termini for thought are entities, I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 13 primarily with bare individuality, secondarily with properties and relations ascribed to them in the pro- cedure of thought ; the termini for sense-awareness are factors in the fact of nature, primarily relata and only secondarily discriminated as distinct individualities.
3No characteristic of nature which is immediately posited for knowledge by sense-awareness can be explained. It is impenetrable by thought, in the sense that its peculiar essential character which enters into experience by sense-awareness is for thought merely the guardian of its individuality as a bare entity. Thus for thought 'red' is merely a definite entity, though for awareness * red ' has the content of its individuality. The transition from the 'red' of awareness to the 'red' of thought is accompanied by a definite loss of content, namely by the transition from the factor 'red' to the entity 'red.' This loss in the transition to thought is compensated by the fact that thought is communicable whereas sense-awareness is incommunicable. Thus there are three components in our knowledge of nature, namely, fact, factors, and entities. Fact is the undiff"erentiated terminus of sense-awareness; factors are termini of sense-awareness, diff"erentiated as elements of fact ; entities are factors in their function as the ter- mini of thought. The entities thus spoken of are natural entities. Thought is wider than nature, so that there are entities for thought which are not natural entities. When we speak of nature as a complex of related entities, the 'complex' is fact as an entity for thought, to whose bare individuality is ascribed the property of embracing in its complexity the natural entities. It is our business to analyse this conception and in the course of the analysis space and time should appear. Evidently 14 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [CH. Ithe relations holding between natural entities are 4hemselves natural entities, namely they are also factors of fact, there for sense-awareness. Accordingly the structure of the natural complex can never be com- pleted in thought, just as the factors of fact can never be exhausted in sense-awareness. Unexhaustiveness is an essential character of our knowledge of nature. Also nature does not exhaust the matter for thought, namely there are thoughts which would not occur in any homo- geneous thinking about nature. The question as to whether sense-perception involves thought is largely verbal. If sense-perception involves a cognition of individuality abstracted from the actual position of the entity as a factor in fact, then ii un- doubtedly does involve thought. But if it is conceived as sense-awareness of a factor in fact competent to evoke emotion and purposeful action without further cognition, then it does not involve thought. In such a case the terminus of the sense-awareness is something for mind, but nothing for thought. The sense-perception of some lower forms of life may be conjectured to approximate to this character habitually. Also occasion- ally our own sense-perception in moments when thought- activity has been lulled to quiescence is not far off the attainment of this ideal limit.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
1Accordingly the sentence ' This college building is commodious ' means probably 'This college building is commodious as a college building.' But it will be found that in the above discussion we can replace 'commodious' by 'commodious as a college building' without altering our conclusion; though we can guess that the recipient, who thought lo THE CONCEPT OF NATURE L*^"- he was in the lion-house of the Zoo, would be less likely to assent to * Anyhow, it is commodious as a college building. A more obvious instance of elliptical phraseology arises if the expositor should address the recipient with the remark, 'That criminal is your friend.' The recipient might answer, 'He is my friend and you are insulting.' Here the recipient assumes that the phrase 'That criminal' is elliptical and not merely demonstrative. In fact, pure demonstration is impossible though it is the ideal of thought. This practical impossibility of pure demonstration is a difficulty which arises in the com- munication of thought and in the retention of thought. Namely, a proposition about a particular factor in nature can neither be expressed to others nor retained for repeated consideration without the aid of auxiliary com- plexes which are irrelevant to it. I now pass to descriptive phrases. The expositor says, * A college in Regent's Park is commodious.' The recipient knows Regent's Park well. The phrase 'A college in Regent's Park' is descriptive for him. If its phraseology is not elliptical, which in ordinary life it certainly will be in some way or other, this proposition simply means, 'There is an entity which is a college building in Regent's Park and is commodious.' If the recipient rejoins, ' The lion-house in the Zoo is the only commodious building in Regent's Park,' he now contradicts the expositor, on the assumption that a lion-house in a Zoo is not a college building. t] NATURE AND THOUGHT ii Thus whereas in the first dialogue the recipient merely quarrelled with the expositor without con- tradicting him, in this dialogue he contradicts him. Thus 1 descriptive phrase is part of the proposition which it helps to express, whereas a demonstrative phrase is not part of the proposition which it helps to express. Again the expositor might be standing in Green Park — ^where there are no college buildings — and say, 'This college building is commodious.' Probably no proposition will be received by the recipient because the demonstrative phrase, 'This college building' has failed to demonstrate owing to the absence of the background of sense-awareness which it presupposes. But if the expositor had said, 'A college building in Green Park is commodious,' the recipient would have received a proposition, but a False one.
2But if the expositor had said, 'A college building in Green Park is commodious,' the recipient would have received a proposition, but a False one. Language is usually ambiguous and it is rash to make general assertions as to its meanings. But phrases which commence with ' this ' or ' that ' are usually demonstrative, whereas phrases which commence with 'the' or *a' are often descriptive. In studying the theory of pro- positional expression it is important to remember the wide difference between the analogous modest words 'this' and 'that' on the one hand and 'a' and 'the' on the other hand. The sentence 'The college building in Regent's Park is com- modious ' means, according to the analysis first made by Bertrand Russell, the proposition, ' There is an entity which (i) is a college building in Regent's Park and (ii) is commodious and (iii) is such 12 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch. that any college building in Regent's Park is identical with it.' The descriptive character of the phrase ' The college building in Regent's Park' is thus evident. Also the proposition is denied by the denial of any one of its three component clauses or by the denial of any combination of the component clauses. If we had substituted 'Green Park' for 'Regent's Park' a false proposition would have resulted. Also the erection of a second college in Regent's Park would make the pro- position false, though in ordinary life common sense would politely treat it as merely ambiguous. * The Iliad ' for a classical scholar is usually a demon- strative phrase ; for it demonstrates to him a well-known poem. But for the majority of mankind the phrase is descriptive, namely, it is synonymous with * The poem named "the Iliad".' Names may be either demonstrative or descriptive phrases. For example 'Homer' is for us a descriptive phrase, namely, the word with some slight difference in suggestiveness means 'The man who wrote the Iliad.' This discussion illustrates that thought places before itself bare objectives, entities as we call them, which the thinking clothes by expressing their mutual rela- tions. Sense-awareness discloses fact with factors which are the entities for thought. The separate distinction of an entity in thought is not a metaphysical assertion, but a method of procedure necessary for the finite expression of individual propositions. Apart from entities there could be no finite truths ; they are the means by which the infinitude of irrelevance is kept out of thought. To sum up: the termini for thought are entities, I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 13 primarily with bare individuality, secondarily with properties and relations ascribed to them in the pro- cedure of thought ; the termini for sense-awareness are factors in the fact of nature, primarily relata and only secondarily discriminated as distinct individualities.
3No characteristic of nature which is immediately posited for knowledge by sense-awareness can be explained. It is impenetrable by thought, in the sense that its peculiar essential character which enters into experience by sense-awareness is for thought merely the guardian of its individuality as a bare entity. Thus for thought 'red' is merely a definite entity, though for awareness * red ' has the content of its individuality. The transition from the 'red' of awareness to the 'red' of thought is accompanied by a definite loss of content, namely by the transition from the factor 'red' to the entity 'red.' This loss in the transition to thought is compensated by the fact that thought is communicable whereas sense-awareness is incommunicable. Thus there are three components in our knowledge of nature, namely, fact, factors, and entities. Fact is the undiff"erentiated terminus of sense-awareness; factors are termini of sense-awareness, diff"erentiated as elements of fact ; entities are factors in their function as the ter- mini of thought. The entities thus spoken of are natural entities. Thought is wider than nature, so that there are entities for thought which are not natural entities. When we speak of nature as a complex of related entities, the 'complex' is fact as an entity for thought, to whose bare individuality is ascribed the property of embracing in its complexity the natural entities. It is our business to analyse this conception and in the course of the analysis space and time should appear. Evidently 14 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [CH. Ithe relations holding between natural entities are 4hemselves natural entities, namely they are also factors of fact, there for sense-awareness. Accordingly the structure of the natural complex can never be com- pleted in thought, just as the factors of fact can never be exhausted in sense-awareness. Unexhaustiveness is an essential character of our knowledge of nature. Also nature does not exhaust the matter for thought, namely there are thoughts which would not occur in any homo- geneous thinking about nature. The question as to whether sense-perception involves thought is largely verbal. If sense-perception involves a cognition of individuality abstracted from the actual position of the entity as a factor in fact, then ii un- doubtedly does involve thought. But if it is conceived as sense-awareness of a factor in fact competent to evoke emotion and purposeful action without further cognition, then it does not involve thought. In such a case the terminus of the sense-awareness is something for mind, but nothing for thought. The sense-perception of some lower forms of life may be conjectured to approximate to this character habitually. Also occasion- ally our own sense-perception in moments when thought- activity has been lulled to quiescence is not far off the attainment of this ideal limit.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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