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1This closure of nature does not carry with it any metaphysical doctrine of the disjunction of nature and mind. It means that in sense-perception nature^ Js_ disclosed as a compjex o^entities whose mutual relations I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 5 are_exBressibl e in thou ght without reference to mind, that is, withouLl^erence either to ae nse-awarene ss ore to ihoughL- Furthermore, I do not wish to be under- ; stood as implying that sense-awareness and thought are the only activities which are to be ascribed to mind. Also I am not denying that there are relations of natural . entities to mind or minds other than being the termini of the sense-awarenesses of minds. Accordingly I will extend the meaning of the terms 'homogeneous thoughts' and 'heterogeneous thoughts' which have already been introduced! We are thinking ' homogene- ' ously' about nature when we are thinking about it without thinking about thought or about sense-aware- ness, and we are thinking ' heterogeneously ' about nature when we are thinking about it in conjunction with thinking either about thought or about sense- awareness or about both. I also take the homogeneity of thought about nature as excluding any reference to moral or aesthetic values whose apprehension is vivid in proportion to self- conscious activity. The values of nature are perhaps the key to the metaphysical synthesis of existence. But such a synthesis is exactly what I am not attempting. I am concerned exclusively with the generalisations of widest scope which can be effected respecting that which is known to us as the direct deliverance of sense-awareness. I have said that nature is disclosed in sense-percep- tion as a complex of entities. It is worth considering what we mean by an entity in this connexion. 'Entity' is simply the Latin equivalent for ' thing ' unless some arbitrary distinction is drawn between the words for technical purposes. All thought has to be about things. We can gain some idea of this necessity of things for 6 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [cH. thought by examination of the structure of a proposi- tion. Let us suppose that a proposition is being communi- cated by an expositor to a recipient. Such a proposition is composed of phrases ; some of these phrases may be demonstrative and others may be descriptive. By a demonstrative phrase I mean a phrase which makes the recipient aware of an entity in a way which is independent of the particular demonstrative phrase. You will understand that I am here using 'demonstra- tion' in the non-logical sense, namely in the sense in which a lecturer demonstrates by the aid of a frog and a microscope the circulation of the blood for an ele- mentary class of medical students. I will call such demonstration 'speculative' demonstration, remember- ing Hamlet's use of the word ' speculation' when he says, There is no speculation in those eyes.
2I will call such demonstration 'speculative' demonstration, remember- ing Hamlet's use of the word ' speculation' when he says, There is no speculation in those eyes. Thus a demonstrative phrase demonstrates an entity speculatively. It may happen that the expositor has meant some other entity — namely, the phrase demon- strates to him an entity which is diverse from the entity which it demonstrates to the recipient. In that case there is confusion ; for there are two diverse propositions, namely the proposition for the expositor and the pro- position for the recipient. I put this possibility aside as irrelevant for our discussion, though in practice it may be difficult for two persons to concur in the con- sideration of exactly the same proposition, or even for one person to have determined exactly the proposition which he is considering. Again the demonstrative phrase may fail to demon- strate any entity. In that case there is no proposition I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 7 for the recipient. I think that we may assume (perhaps rashly) that the expositor knows what he means. A demonstrative phrase is a gesture. It is not itself a constituent of the proposition, but the entity which it demonstrates is such a constituent. You may quarrel with a demonstrative phrase as in some way obnoxious to you; but if it demonstrates the right entity, the proposition is unaffected though your taste may be offended. This suggestiveness of the phraseology is part of the literary quality of the sentence which conveys the proposition. This is because a sentence directly conveys one proposition, while in its phraseology it suggests a penumbra of other propositions charged with emotional value. We are now talking of the one pro- position directly conveyed in any phraseology. This doctrine is obscured by the fact that in most cases what is in form a mere part of the demonstrative gesture is in fact a part of the proposition which it is desired directly to convey. In such a case we will call the phraseology of the proposition elliptical. In ordinary intercourse the phraseology of nearly all propositions is elliptical. Let us take some examples. Suppose that the ex- positor is in London, say in Regent's Park and in Bedford College, the great women's college which is situated in that park. He is speaking in the college hall and he says, 'This college building is commodious.' The phrase ' this college building ' is a demonstrative phrase. Now suppose the recipient answers, * This is not a college building, it is the lion-house in the Zoo.' 'Then, provided that the expositor's original proposi- 8 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [cH- tion has not been couched in elHptical phraseology, the expositor sticks to his original proposition when he replies, 'Anyhow, it is commodious.'
3Note that the recipient's answer accepts the specula- tive demonstration of the phrase ' This college building.' He does not say, ' What do you mean ? ' He accepts the phrase as demonstrating an entity, but declares that same entity to be the lion-house in the Zoo. In his reply, the expositor in his turn recognises the success of his original gesture as a speculative demonstration, and waives the question of the suitability of its mode of suggestiveness vnth an 'anyhow.' But he is now in a position to repeat the original proposition with the aid of a demonstrative gesture robbed of any suggestiveness, suitable or unsuitable, by saying, 'It is commodious.' The 'W of this final statement presupposes that thought has seized on the entity as a bare objective for consideration. We confine ourselves to entities disclosed in sense- awareness. The entity is so disclosed as a relatum in the complex which is nature. It dawns on an observer because of its relations ; but it is an objective for thought in its own bare individuality. Thought cannot proceed otherwise ; namely, it cannot proceed without the ideal bare 'it' which is speculatively demonstrated. This setting up of the entity as a bare objective does not ascribe to it an existence apart from the complex in which it has been found by sense-perception. The 'it' for thought is essentially a relatum for sense-awareness. The chances are that the dialogue as to the college building takes another form. Whatever the expositor I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 9 originally meant, he almost certainly now takes his former statement as couched in elliptical phraseology, and assumes that he was meaning, 'This is a college building and is commodious.' Here the demonstrative phrase or the gesture, which demonstrates the 'it' which is commodious, has now been reduced to ' this ' ; and the attenuated phrase, under the circumstances in which it is uttered, is sufficient for the purpose of correct demonstration. This brings out the point that the verbal form is never the whole phrase- ology of the proposition ; this phraseology also includes the general circumstances of its production. Thus the aim of a demonstrative phrase is to exhibit a definite ' it ' as a bare objective for thought; but the modus operandi of a demonstrative phrase is to produce an awareness of the entity as a particular relatum in an auxiliary complex, chosen merely for the sake of the speculative demon- stration and irrelevant to the proposition. For example, in the above dialogue, colleges and buildings, as related to the 'it' speculatively demonstrated by the phrase 'this college building,' set that 'it' in an auxiliary complex which is irrelevant to the proposition ' It is commodious.' Of course in language every phrase is invariably highly elliptical. Accordingly the sentence ' This college building is commodious ' means probably 'This college building is commodious as a college building.'
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
1This closure of nature does not carry with it any metaphysical doctrine of the disjunction of nature and mind. It means that in sense-perception nature^ Js_ disclosed as a compjex o^entities whose mutual relations I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 5 are_exBressibl e in thou ght without reference to mind, that is, withouLl^erence either to ae nse-awarene ss ore to ihoughL- Furthermore, I do not wish to be under- ; stood as implying that sense-awareness and thought are the only activities which are to be ascribed to mind. Also I am not denying that there are relations of natural . entities to mind or minds other than being the termini of the sense-awarenesses of minds. Accordingly I will extend the meaning of the terms 'homogeneous thoughts' and 'heterogeneous thoughts' which have already been introduced! We are thinking ' homogene- ' ously' about nature when we are thinking about it without thinking about thought or about sense-aware- ness, and we are thinking ' heterogeneously ' about nature when we are thinking about it in conjunction with thinking either about thought or about sense- awareness or about both. I also take the homogeneity of thought about nature as excluding any reference to moral or aesthetic values whose apprehension is vivid in proportion to self- conscious activity. The values of nature are perhaps the key to the metaphysical synthesis of existence. But such a synthesis is exactly what I am not attempting. I am concerned exclusively with the generalisations of widest scope which can be effected respecting that which is known to us as the direct deliverance of sense-awareness. I have said that nature is disclosed in sense-percep- tion as a complex of entities. It is worth considering what we mean by an entity in this connexion. 'Entity' is simply the Latin equivalent for ' thing ' unless some arbitrary distinction is drawn between the words for technical purposes. All thought has to be about things. We can gain some idea of this necessity of things for 6 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [cH. thought by examination of the structure of a proposi- tion. Let us suppose that a proposition is being communi- cated by an expositor to a recipient. Such a proposition is composed of phrases ; some of these phrases may be demonstrative and others may be descriptive. By a demonstrative phrase I mean a phrase which makes the recipient aware of an entity in a way which is independent of the particular demonstrative phrase. You will understand that I am here using 'demonstra- tion' in the non-logical sense, namely in the sense in which a lecturer demonstrates by the aid of a frog and a microscope the circulation of the blood for an ele- mentary class of medical students. I will call such demonstration 'speculative' demonstration, remember- ing Hamlet's use of the word ' speculation' when he says, There is no speculation in those eyes.
2I will call such demonstration 'speculative' demonstration, remember- ing Hamlet's use of the word ' speculation' when he says, There is no speculation in those eyes. Thus a demonstrative phrase demonstrates an entity speculatively. It may happen that the expositor has meant some other entity — namely, the phrase demon- strates to him an entity which is diverse from the entity which it demonstrates to the recipient. In that case there is confusion ; for there are two diverse propositions, namely the proposition for the expositor and the pro- position for the recipient. I put this possibility aside as irrelevant for our discussion, though in practice it may be difficult for two persons to concur in the con- sideration of exactly the same proposition, or even for one person to have determined exactly the proposition which he is considering. Again the demonstrative phrase may fail to demon- strate any entity. In that case there is no proposition I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 7 for the recipient. I think that we may assume (perhaps rashly) that the expositor knows what he means. A demonstrative phrase is a gesture. It is not itself a constituent of the proposition, but the entity which it demonstrates is such a constituent. You may quarrel with a demonstrative phrase as in some way obnoxious to you; but if it demonstrates the right entity, the proposition is unaffected though your taste may be offended. This suggestiveness of the phraseology is part of the literary quality of the sentence which conveys the proposition. This is because a sentence directly conveys one proposition, while in its phraseology it suggests a penumbra of other propositions charged with emotional value. We are now talking of the one pro- position directly conveyed in any phraseology. This doctrine is obscured by the fact that in most cases what is in form a mere part of the demonstrative gesture is in fact a part of the proposition which it is desired directly to convey. In such a case we will call the phraseology of the proposition elliptical. In ordinary intercourse the phraseology of nearly all propositions is elliptical. Let us take some examples. Suppose that the ex- positor is in London, say in Regent's Park and in Bedford College, the great women's college which is situated in that park. He is speaking in the college hall and he says, 'This college building is commodious.' The phrase ' this college building ' is a demonstrative phrase. Now suppose the recipient answers, * This is not a college building, it is the lion-house in the Zoo.' 'Then, provided that the expositor's original proposi- 8 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [cH- tion has not been couched in elHptical phraseology, the expositor sticks to his original proposition when he replies, 'Anyhow, it is commodious.'
3Note that the recipient's answer accepts the specula- tive demonstration of the phrase ' This college building.' He does not say, ' What do you mean ? ' He accepts the phrase as demonstrating an entity, but declares that same entity to be the lion-house in the Zoo. In his reply, the expositor in his turn recognises the success of his original gesture as a speculative demonstration, and waives the question of the suitability of its mode of suggestiveness vnth an 'anyhow.' But he is now in a position to repeat the original proposition with the aid of a demonstrative gesture robbed of any suggestiveness, suitable or unsuitable, by saying, 'It is commodious.' The 'W of this final statement presupposes that thought has seized on the entity as a bare objective for consideration. We confine ourselves to entities disclosed in sense- awareness. The entity is so disclosed as a relatum in the complex which is nature. It dawns on an observer because of its relations ; but it is an objective for thought in its own bare individuality. Thought cannot proceed otherwise ; namely, it cannot proceed without the ideal bare 'it' which is speculatively demonstrated. This setting up of the entity as a bare objective does not ascribe to it an existence apart from the complex in which it has been found by sense-perception. The 'it' for thought is essentially a relatum for sense-awareness. The chances are that the dialogue as to the college building takes another form. Whatever the expositor I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 9 originally meant, he almost certainly now takes his former statement as couched in elliptical phraseology, and assumes that he was meaning, 'This is a college building and is commodious.' Here the demonstrative phrase or the gesture, which demonstrates the 'it' which is commodious, has now been reduced to ' this ' ; and the attenuated phrase, under the circumstances in which it is uttered, is sufficient for the purpose of correct demonstration. This brings out the point that the verbal form is never the whole phrase- ology of the proposition ; this phraseology also includes the general circumstances of its production. Thus the aim of a demonstrative phrase is to exhibit a definite ' it ' as a bare objective for thought; but the modus operandi of a demonstrative phrase is to produce an awareness of the entity as a particular relatum in an auxiliary complex, chosen merely for the sake of the speculative demon- stration and irrelevant to the proposition. For example, in the above dialogue, colleges and buildings, as related to the 'it' speculatively demonstrated by the phrase 'this college building,' set that 'it' in an auxiliary complex which is irrelevant to the proposition ' It is commodious.' Of course in language every phrase is invariably highly elliptical. Accordingly the sentence ' This college building is commodious ' means probably 'This college building is commodious as a college building.'
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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