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1W. IMPERIAL COLLEGE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. April, 1920. CONTENTS CHAP. PAGE I NATURE AND THOUGHT i II THEORIES OF THE BIFURCATION OF NATURE . 26 ' III TIME 49 ' IV THE METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION . 74 ' V SPACE AND MOTION 99 VI CONGRUENCE 120 VII OBJECTS 143 VIII SUMMARY 164 IX THE ULTIMATE PHYSICAL CONCEPTS . .185 NOTE : On the Greek Concept of a Point . . .197 NOTE: On Significance AND Infinite Events . . 197 INDEX 199 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE CHAPTER I NATURE AND THOUGHT The subject-matter of the Tarner lectures is defined by the founder to be ' the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Relations or Want of Relations between the different Departments of Knowledge.' It is fitting at the first lecture of this new foundation to dwell for a few moments on the intentions of the donor as expressed in this definition; and I do so the more willingly as I shall thereby be enabled to introduce the topics to which the present course is to be devoted. We are justified, I think, in taking the second clause of the definition as in part explanatory of the earlier clause. What is the philosophy of the sciences.'' It is not a bad answer to say that it is the study of the rela- tions between the different departments of knowledge. Then with admirable solicitude for the freedom of learning there is inserted in the definition after the word 'relations' the phrase 'or want of relations.' A disproof of relations between sciences would in itself constitute a philosophy of the sciences. But we could not dispense either with the earlier or the later clause. It is not every relation between sciences which enters into their philosophy. For example biology and physics are connected by the use of the microscope. Still, I may safely assert that a technical description of the uses of the microscope in biology is not part of the philosophy of the sciences. Again, you cannot abandon the later W.N. I 2 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [cH. clause of the definition; namely that referring to the relations between the sciences, without abandoning the explicit reference to an ideal in the absence of which philosophy must languish from lack of intrinsic interest. That ideal is the attainment of some unifying concept which will set in assigned relationships within itself -all that there is for knowledge, for feeling, and for emotion. That far off ideal is the motive power of philosophic research; and claims allegiance even as you expel it. The philosophic pluralist is a strict logician; the Hegelian thrives on contradictions by the help of his absolute; the Mohammedan divine bows before the creative will of Allah ; and the pragmatist will swallow anything so long as it 'works.'
2The philosophic pluralist is a strict logician; the Hegelian thrives on contradictions by the help of his absolute; the Mohammedan divine bows before the creative will of Allah ; and the pragmatist will swallow anything so long as it 'works.' The mention of these vast systems and of the age- long controversies from which they spring, warns us to concentrate. Our task is the simpler one of the philosophy of the sciences. Now a science has already a certain unity which is the very reason why that body of knowledge has been instinctively recognised as forming a science. The philosophy of a science is the endeavour to express explicitly those unifying charac- teristics which pervade that complex of thoughts and make it to be a science. The philosophy of the sciences — conceived as one subject — -is the endeavour to exhibit all sciences as one science, or — in case of defeat — the disproof of such a possibility. Again I will make a further simplification, and con- fine attention to the natural sciences, that is, to the sciences whose subject-matter is nature. By postulating a common subject-matter for this group of sciences, a unifying philosophy of natural science has been thereby presupposed. 1] NATURE AND THOUGHT 3 What do we mean by nature? We have to discuss the philosophy of natural science. Natural science is the science of nature. But — What is nature? ^ Nature is that which we observe in perception through the senses. In this sense-perception we are aware of something which is not thought and which is self-contained for thought. This property of being self- contained for thought lies at the base of natural science. It means that nature can be thought of as a closed system whose mutual relations do not require the expression of the fact that they are thought about. Thus in a sense nature is independent of thought. By this statement no metaphysical pronouncement is in- tended. What I mean is that we can think about nature without thinking about thought. I shall say that then we are thinking ' homogeneously ' about nature. Of course it is possible to think of nature in conjunc- tion with thought about thjB'fact that nature is thought about. In such a case I shall say that we are thinking * hieterogeneously ' about nature. In fact during the last few minutes we have been thinking heterogeneously about nature. Natural science is exclusively concerned with homogeneous thoughts about nature.
3In such a case I shall say that we are thinking * hieterogeneously ' about nature. In fact during the last few minutes we have been thinking heterogeneously about nature. Natural science is exclusively concerned with homogeneous thoughts about nature. But sense-perception has in it an element which is not thought. It is a difficult psychological question whether sense-perception involves thought; and if it does involve thought, what is the kind of thought which it necessarily involves. Note that it has been stated above that sense-perception is an awareness of some- thing which is not thought. Namely, nature is not thought. But this is a different question, namely that the fact of sense-perception has a factor which is not thought. I call this factor 'sense-awareness.' Accord- 4 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch. ingly the doctrine that natural science is exclusively concerned with homogeneous thoughts about nature does not immediately carry with it the conclusion that natural science is not concerned with sense-awareness. However, I do assert this further statement ; namely, that though natural science is concerned with nature which is the terminus of sense-perception, it is not con- cerned with the sense-awareness itself. I repeat the main line of this argument, and expand it in certain directions. Thought about nature is different from the sense- perception of nature. Hence the fact of sense-perception has an ingredient or factor which is not thought. I call this ingredient sense-awareness. It is indifferent to my argument whether sense-perception has or has not thought as another ingredient. If sense-perception does not involve thought, then sense-awareness and sense- perception are identical. But the something perceived is perceived as an entity which is the terminus of the sense-awareness, something which for thought is beyond the fact of that sense-awareness. Also the something perceived certainly does not contain other sense-awarenesses which are different from the sense- awareness which is an ingredient in that perception. Accordingly nature as disclosed in sense-perception is self-contained as against sense-awareness, in addition to being self-contained as against thought. I will also express this self-containedness of nature by saying that nature is closed to m'nd. This closure of nature does not carry with it any metaphysical doctrine of the disjunction of nature and mind. It means that in sense-perception nature^ Js_ disclosed as a compjex o^entities whose mutual relations I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 5
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
1W. IMPERIAL COLLEGE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. April, 1920. CONTENTS CHAP. PAGE I NATURE AND THOUGHT i II THEORIES OF THE BIFURCATION OF NATURE . 26 ' III TIME 49 ' IV THE METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION . 74 ' V SPACE AND MOTION 99 VI CONGRUENCE 120 VII OBJECTS 143 VIII SUMMARY 164 IX THE ULTIMATE PHYSICAL CONCEPTS . .185 NOTE : On the Greek Concept of a Point . . .197 NOTE: On Significance AND Infinite Events . . 197 INDEX 199 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE CHAPTER I NATURE AND THOUGHT The subject-matter of the Tarner lectures is defined by the founder to be ' the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Relations or Want of Relations between the different Departments of Knowledge.' It is fitting at the first lecture of this new foundation to dwell for a few moments on the intentions of the donor as expressed in this definition; and I do so the more willingly as I shall thereby be enabled to introduce the topics to which the present course is to be devoted. We are justified, I think, in taking the second clause of the definition as in part explanatory of the earlier clause. What is the philosophy of the sciences.'' It is not a bad answer to say that it is the study of the rela- tions between the different departments of knowledge. Then with admirable solicitude for the freedom of learning there is inserted in the definition after the word 'relations' the phrase 'or want of relations.' A disproof of relations between sciences would in itself constitute a philosophy of the sciences. But we could not dispense either with the earlier or the later clause. It is not every relation between sciences which enters into their philosophy. For example biology and physics are connected by the use of the microscope. Still, I may safely assert that a technical description of the uses of the microscope in biology is not part of the philosophy of the sciences. Again, you cannot abandon the later W.N. I 2 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [cH. clause of the definition; namely that referring to the relations between the sciences, without abandoning the explicit reference to an ideal in the absence of which philosophy must languish from lack of intrinsic interest. That ideal is the attainment of some unifying concept which will set in assigned relationships within itself -all that there is for knowledge, for feeling, and for emotion. That far off ideal is the motive power of philosophic research; and claims allegiance even as you expel it. The philosophic pluralist is a strict logician; the Hegelian thrives on contradictions by the help of his absolute; the Mohammedan divine bows before the creative will of Allah ; and the pragmatist will swallow anything so long as it 'works.'
2The philosophic pluralist is a strict logician; the Hegelian thrives on contradictions by the help of his absolute; the Mohammedan divine bows before the creative will of Allah ; and the pragmatist will swallow anything so long as it 'works.' The mention of these vast systems and of the age- long controversies from which they spring, warns us to concentrate. Our task is the simpler one of the philosophy of the sciences. Now a science has already a certain unity which is the very reason why that body of knowledge has been instinctively recognised as forming a science. The philosophy of a science is the endeavour to express explicitly those unifying charac- teristics which pervade that complex of thoughts and make it to be a science. The philosophy of the sciences — conceived as one subject — -is the endeavour to exhibit all sciences as one science, or — in case of defeat — the disproof of such a possibility. Again I will make a further simplification, and con- fine attention to the natural sciences, that is, to the sciences whose subject-matter is nature. By postulating a common subject-matter for this group of sciences, a unifying philosophy of natural science has been thereby presupposed. 1] NATURE AND THOUGHT 3 What do we mean by nature? We have to discuss the philosophy of natural science. Natural science is the science of nature. But — What is nature? ^ Nature is that which we observe in perception through the senses. In this sense-perception we are aware of something which is not thought and which is self-contained for thought. This property of being self- contained for thought lies at the base of natural science. It means that nature can be thought of as a closed system whose mutual relations do not require the expression of the fact that they are thought about. Thus in a sense nature is independent of thought. By this statement no metaphysical pronouncement is in- tended. What I mean is that we can think about nature without thinking about thought. I shall say that then we are thinking ' homogeneously ' about nature. Of course it is possible to think of nature in conjunc- tion with thought about thjB'fact that nature is thought about. In such a case I shall say that we are thinking * hieterogeneously ' about nature. In fact during the last few minutes we have been thinking heterogeneously about nature. Natural science is exclusively concerned with homogeneous thoughts about nature.
3In such a case I shall say that we are thinking * hieterogeneously ' about nature. In fact during the last few minutes we have been thinking heterogeneously about nature. Natural science is exclusively concerned with homogeneous thoughts about nature. But sense-perception has in it an element which is not thought. It is a difficult psychological question whether sense-perception involves thought; and if it does involve thought, what is the kind of thought which it necessarily involves. Note that it has been stated above that sense-perception is an awareness of some- thing which is not thought. Namely, nature is not thought. But this is a different question, namely that the fact of sense-perception has a factor which is not thought. I call this factor 'sense-awareness.' Accord- 4 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch. ingly the doctrine that natural science is exclusively concerned with homogeneous thoughts about nature does not immediately carry with it the conclusion that natural science is not concerned with sense-awareness. However, I do assert this further statement ; namely, that though natural science is concerned with nature which is the terminus of sense-perception, it is not con- cerned with the sense-awareness itself. I repeat the main line of this argument, and expand it in certain directions. Thought about nature is different from the sense- perception of nature. Hence the fact of sense-perception has an ingredient or factor which is not thought. I call this ingredient sense-awareness. It is indifferent to my argument whether sense-perception has or has not thought as another ingredient. If sense-perception does not involve thought, then sense-awareness and sense- perception are identical. But the something perceived is perceived as an entity which is the terminus of the sense-awareness, something which for thought is beyond the fact of that sense-awareness. Also the something perceived certainly does not contain other sense-awarenesses which are different from the sense- awareness which is an ingredient in that perception. Accordingly nature as disclosed in sense-perception is self-contained as against sense-awareness, in addition to being self-contained as against thought. I will also express this self-containedness of nature by saying that nature is closed to m'nd. This closure of nature does not carry with it any metaphysical doctrine of the disjunction of nature and mind. It means that in sense-perception nature^ Js_ disclosed as a compjex o^entities whose mutual relations I] NATURE AND THOUGHT 5
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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