The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

5 pudgala, the personality is different at every moment, its identity is a mental con¬ struction, it Is an entity purely nominal ( prajnapti-sat — Sabda-mdtram).

6 Lit.,p. 67.3—5. ((Moreoverlike the nominal entity (pr«jnq?»tt)ofapersonetc.?Becausethere exists the characteristic, being a part of usual conversation, well known without pondering, (the characteristic) of the statue, the possessor ( upadatr ) of the possession of its own body ( sva-Safira), and because Rahu, the possessor of the possession of a head, exists, this example is not suitable ». Although it incidentally happens that there is no real possessive relation, nevertheless the expres¬ sion is not wrong, since in other cases the relation exists. The relation of substance and quality can be condemned on other, philosophical, grounds, not on the ground of an inadequate expression.

67. 7. Madhvamika. It is not at all so! Your example is taken from com¬ mon conversation, (it refers only to what holds good in a conversation) in which there is no philosophic investigation of reality and the usual catego¬ ries are accepted as real without scrutiny. 1 (Quite different is the case when the relation of substance and its appurtenance is philosophically considered).

67. 8. The notion of a substance, 2 indeed, when critically examined, contains nothing real over and above the corresponding sense-data. Nevertheless the conven¬ tional thinking of common life (assumes) it to exist. It imputes it to the (under¬ lying reality) of the groups 3 (of sense-data and mental phenomena). But your example does not mean that the same applies to the statue and to Balm. 4

67. 10 . That there is thus no substance 5 in solid bodies 6 over and above the quality (orsense-datum) of resistance 7 is proved by philosophical criticism. 8 (It is true) that a quality 9 (cannot be imagined) without the support of some substance, but this is just (what we call) «the surfaced 0 (or phenomenal reality). (Substance and quality are correlative terms), our Master (Nagarjuna) has established their reality 11 (in that sense), i. e., as a reality of mutual correlation, 12 (none of them is real separately).

67. 12 . The Madhy amika (continues). This point is of capital importance, it must necessarily be conceded. 13 If it is not conceded, (viz. if it is not admitted that phenomenal means relative), it will prove impossible to separate the pheno-

1 Lit., p. 67.7—8. «Itis not so, since in common-life-conversation there is no investigation of reality ( itthamvicara ) going on and the categories of common life exist without scrutiny ».

2 atvian, cp. anatman = 12 ayatana — sense data and the mind, but no substance, citmagabdo’yam svabhava-Sabda-parydyah, M. vr., p. 437. 4.

3 slcandhn.

4 Lit. p. 67.9. a There is no such establishing of the example (on the score) that the same applies to the torso and to Rahu ».

5 laksya.

6 prthivyadi.

7 kathinyadi.

s vicarymanam ruisti

9 laksana.

10 samvrtir eva iti.

11 siddhi.

12 Lit., p. 67.11—12. ^Nevertheless the Master has established the reality (siddhim) (sc.of the phenomenal world, of the samvrli) by the reality (siddhya) of them both in as much as they are mutually dependent upon one another#. The idea of C. is that the <fthinginitsetf»(st*alo7isuno)is r.r> exception to the law of Universal Relativity. The phenomenal is here an equivalent of the re¬ lative. In the example of the body and the statue or Rahil and his head there is uo mutual inter¬ dependence of two phenomenal realities, but simply a wrong verbal expression.

13 "Lit., p. 67.12 . a Of all necessity (ca avadhdram) this must be admitted so! » it ss a j.oir.t cl' capital importance that the world as it is conceived phenomenally and Relativity are equivalents.

p. 153

meual from what is logically consistent 1 (and therefore real); and then every thing will be absolute reality, 2 (since there will be no difference); there will be no phenomenal reality at all. You must not indeed think that the «body of a 68. 1 statue» and similar (relations) are the only case where a thing, upon investi¬ gation, reveals itself as (merely verbal and) non existing. We will prove (in our fourth chapter) 3 that colour, feeling and other (fundamental sense-data) are likewise (relational constructions and) are impossible (by themselves). Does it mean that we must deny their phenomenal reality, just as we deny even the phenomenal reality of, e. g., a (separate) body in the statue?

This is impossible. Therefore (your vindication of the absolute, rela- 68. 3 tionless «thing in itsell'»and the example adduced to illustrate it) is wrong. 4