The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

Logician. (We do not admit the reality of a cognizing Soul, but the element) of pure, (indefinite) sensation 1 may be imagined (as playing the part corresponding to some sort of) agent.

Madhyamika. Even (that sort of agent) cannot be acquiesced in, be¬ cause (according to your theory), the function of pure sensation (in the process of cognition) is to indicate the mere presence of something. The object is, after that, qualified by (other) mental processes . 3 It is indeed a tenet accepted (by you) that «pure sensation 3 apprehends the (pure) object, its qualities 4 are apprehended by (other) mental processes)).

Indeed an instrument, (an object and an agent) are assumed to be a real instrument, (a real object and a real agent), when there is one single action (accomplished by a variety of factors). We may then admit that every one of these factors performs some special function of its own, and thus be¬ comes a component part (of the principal action by the production of some change or of new) qualities (in its object ). 5 But here, between definite

1 citta = wjfiana, cp. Central Conception, p. 16.

2 caitasa = caitta = citta-samprayulcta-samskdra , cp. ibid. p. 18.

3 vijnana = citta, cp. ibid. p. 36. * 4 Tib. read dei kliyad-par ....

5 Lit., p. 65.4—5. «When one principal action is performed, instrument etc. possess instru¬ mentality etc., because we admit their membership through the medium of producing qualities and actions for themselves respectively ». The action of cooking rice, e. g., consists in fetching fuel, pouring water into the kettle, putting on fire, throwing rice into the vessel, etc. All these factors (kdrala) concur in producing the central result, they are either instruments or object or appendix: candrakIrti’s comment on relativity, l 149 2cognition 1 and pure sensation, 2 there is no such central action. On the con¬ trary (every part has its own separate function). There is an independent action of indicating the mere presence of something, it is performed by pure sensation, and (there is another separate action) of cognizing the qualities of the object. This is performed by (constructive) thought. It thus becomes impos¬ sible (to impute the part of) an instrument to qualifying thought, 3 and the part of an agent to pure sensation. Therefore (your theory that in the absolu¬ tely particular essence of existence there is an immanent objectivity and an immanent instrumentality, cannot be saved). Our criticism stands.

But perhaps (the Hiuayanist will, to a certain extent, concede this point 65 . 9 . about the agent, because he also maintains) that there is altogether 4 no real agent, since, according to Scripture, all elements 5 (into which existence is analysed represent separate momentary flashes, there is between them) no Soul 6 (or agent, or continuant stuff). Indeed (impersonal) motions and (pro¬ cesses) are clearly going on (in nature) without any conscious agent.

Madhyamika. You have quite misunderstood the Scriptural tea- 65. 10 . ching about the (separate momentary elements of existence). Neither do (these separate elements really) exist. We have made this clear in our «Introduction into the Madhyamika System)). 7

XL. Vindication of Phenomenal Reality.