The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)
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66. 3. Madhyamika. It is not so! Both cases are not comparable. Indeed the words «body» and «liead*> are used in connection with other features (usually) coexisting with them, e. g., brains etc. 2 (in the head), hands etc. (with the body). Therefore if a representation arises 3 whose object is suggested by these words taken by themselves, we naturally expect to find the usually coexi¬ sting parts also. The questions,«whose is the body?**, «whose is the head?»,(natu¬ rally suggest themselves). And if someone is desirous to indicate that (in the present case) the usual appurtenances are absent, 4 he repudiates the expec¬ tations (of his interlocutor) by using words according to their conventional meaning in life, where they suggest such (really existing) appurtenances. 5 But in the (other) case no relation (or characterization) at all is possible, because there altogether are no solid bodies 6 over and above (the sensedatum) of resistance. 7
66. 9. Logician. Non-Buddhists 8 assume a separate reality of substance 9 (and
1 Lit., p. 66.1—3. «Further also, it may be that in «the body of a statue», «the head of Rahu**,even if there is no characteristic beyond a body and a head, there is a relation of characte¬ ristic and characterized; just so in «the proper characteristic (essence) of earths, although there
• is no earth beyond the proper characteristic, there will be (this relation)*).
2 buddliyddi.
3 buddhy-vpajananah for upajata-buddhih, or °dlambana-buddhy-upajananah (sc. purusuh).
4 Read p. 66.6, viSesanantara-sambandha, and in the Tib. khyad-par-gzhan.
5 Lit., p. 66. 3—7. «Indeed, since the words «body** and «head» are used in association ( sapeksatd-prairttau ) with other coexisting things, thoughts etc., hands etc., (a man) who pro¬ duces a thought intent upon only the words body and head is always (eva) in expectation of the coexisting other things, «wbose the body**, «whose the head**? And another (man), wishing to discard the connection with other appurtenances, cuts off the expectation of his interlocutor (prativaktuh) by (availing himself of expressions) suggestive (dhvanind) of the (non existing) appurtenances of the statue and of Rahu, (expressions) which agree with their import in every¬ day life. This is natural. But here...**. Prati-kartuh = na vastutah kartuh , the «supposed agent** of the possessive relation, or the counterpart of such relation, pratikartuh = pratiyoginah , (the expectation) «of the counterpart**.
6 prthivyadi. 7 kathinyadi.
* tirthika.
2 laksya. C. assails the doctrine of the absolute sva-laksana on the ground that thera must be a laksya behind the laksana and this remembers the realistic doctrine of the Vaisesikas about a relation of inherence (samavdya) between substance and quality, a relation which no
Buddhist has ever admitted to be real. The suggestion of the Logician is evidently ironical, it is a quality). (Are you not inclined), in order to do them pleasure, 1 to assert that the use of adjectives in speech 2 is quite all right, (that it corresponds to a real relation)?
Madhyamika. No, indeed, (for you) it is not admissible to intro- 67 . 1 . duce into your system such categories as have been imagined by non-Buddhists on very poor grounds, or else you will be obliged equally to admit (their number) of additional sources of cognition 3 and other things also!
The Logician. But (is not our example of a merely verbal relation 67. 3. just the same as the generally admitted among Buddhists fact of) the nomi¬ nal 4 personal identity 5 (in every individual’s life)?
Madhyamika. (No, it is not the same!) Your example refers to an 67. 2 . (expression, not to a theory). The (possessive) relation as a mode of expressing one self in every-day conversation, without enquiring into its reality, exists.
(In speaking) there is a possessor of a body. The statue (we say), possesses its own body. And there is a Rahu, the possessor of a head which is his pos¬ session, (but in speech only). This your example proves nothing! 6
Logician. However there is here nothing else than a mere body and 67. 6. a mere head, (no possessors of them), they are the only objects apprehen¬ ded. The example is quite all right!
jeer at the fact that the Madhyamika prefers the realistic logic of the Naiyayiks and rejects the reforms of the Buddhist logicians.
1 tad-anurodhena .
2 viSesana-abhidhana.
3 C. admits the four pramanas of the Naiyayikas, cp. below, text p. 75, with the proviso that they will not help in the cognition of the Absolute. He here answers the gibe of the Logician with a counter gibe. He apparently wishes to say, «I can admit the realistic logic without forsaking my transcendental doctrine, but you cannot. For you the acceptance of the Naiyayika doctrine about the sources of our knowledge (pramdna) would mean that you would be obliged to give up your doctrine about the double aspect of existence, your two sources of knowledge, your «thing in itself**, in fact all your epistemology**.
4 prajnapli, a cheda is needed after prajnaptivat.