The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

1 From these words we must conclude that whatsoever is for C. logically consistent [yad yad upupnnnam ) represents not phenomenal, but absolute reality (na tat samvriih). But since nothing short of the whole is logically consistent and real (cp. the definition of reality, above p. 41), all particular objects are relative and logic dealing with them condemned.

2 tattvam eva.

3 skandha-piariksd.

4 This is a brilliant piece of very subtle dialectics about the conception of a «thing in itself». C.’s aim is to prove that it is also relational, since it is «a thing# characterized by «itself» and contrasted with a thing characterized not by itself, but by «non-self». Dignaga tries to prove by an example that the supposed relation is merely an inadequate expression. C. begins by criticisingthe example. The relation, says he (gudhabhisandhih), between, e. g., the elements of a personality ( pudgalci ) and the personality itself is not the same as the relation between the body of a statue and its possessor. In the first case we have a possessive relation, the identity reveals itself on philosophic examination, in the second there is no relation at all, but only a wrong expression. C. now discloses his aim (svcibhiprayam udghdtayati) and vindicates the phenomenal reality of the relation of substance and quality, and in the same time he vindicates, upon Kantian lines,the necessity of assuming a transcendental reality which however he imagines on monistic lines. The body, or bodily frame of a statue, is but an irregular and perversive manner of speaking, (it means as much as «the statue of a statue » would mean). There is no real possessive relation. But in such expressions as the « resistance of solid bodies» or «the elements of a personality)) there is a real possessive relation as far as phenomenal reality goes and its categories of substance and quality are regarded. It is not until philosophical analysis ( vicara ) has condemned this relation as involved in contradictions and logically untenable ( anupapanna) that we are obliged to reject it as ultimately unreal, whether reality be defined as efficiency ( artha - kriyd-kdra), or as independent ( anapeksa ) existence in itself ( sva-bhdva , sva-laksana). But empiri¬ cally there is absolutely nothing cognizable which would not involve this relation. The «thing in itself# (svalaktiana) which by Dignaga is supposed to represent the absolute reality, outside every kind of relation, C. holds equally to involve a double relation, first of all, a moment of objec¬ tive reality corresponding to the moment of pure sensation, and then the relation of «the thing# to its characteristic «in itself#, since this characteristic has a meaning only if contrasted with, or relative to, the thing «not in itself#, i. e., the general, the universal. The general and the extreme particular are thus correlative terms, the one is no more absolute than the other. This n■-..•i-rbsoleto, this being relative (paruspara-aj.iksa), means the same as being phenomenal sainrrti). If we do not accept that, there will be no line of demarcation between the phenomenal

NIRVANA

68. 5 . The Logician. Now, what is the use of such cavilling? (There is a general agreement between us). Indeed I do not in the least maintain that all our familiar conceptions of cognition and cognizable represent (absolute) truth. (I also deny the ultimate reality of the categories of substance and quality), but by this my epistemology 1 (I claim to have) established (upon a logical foundation) that condition (of the external world) which humanity at large believes to be real. 2

68. 7. Madhyamika. It is for me to ask you, what is the use of (your) sophi¬ stry? You only explain (the origin) of some (perverse) expressions current in common life! As to phenomenal reality, leave it alone, albeit its existence and shape is founded on mere confusion! It nevertheless is useful for accumulating those fundamental virtues which bring Final Deliverance to those who strive after it. 3 (It has some value only) as long as the philosophic comprehension of the absolute reality is not attained. But you, by your wrong logic, destroy

69 . i. (the foundation) of this phenomenal reality. The refinement of your intellect is led the wrong way, so far as the difference between what is absolutely real and what is only conventionally real is concerned. You are (apparently) establishing phenomenalism upon a logical basis in one point (by assuming the underlying «thing in itself®), but in the same time you are under¬ mining it by your wrong logic (in all other points). 4

69. 2 . Now I come with a theory which really explains the importance of