The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

However M. de la Vallee Poussin explains Buddha’s silence by his incapacity in the philosophical field. He did not know what to answer! 2 He was prepared to answer the question of the existence of an eternal Soul in the affirmative, if his interlocutor preferred so, if not, he did not mind denying it (p. 119). This is confirmed by a reference to Kumaralabha who is quoted by Vasubandu in the course of a very long discussion about the cardinal tenet of all Buddhists, the «personalists» (pudgalavadins) not excluded, i. e. the non-existence of a substantial Soul. This tenet is here masterly discussed with perfect clearness and every possible detail. 8 Buddha denies an eternal Soul as against the Eternalists, but maintains moral responsibility as against the Materialist. Both extremes are declared to be follies against which the doctrine of Buddha is directed.

wise called a place where there is no birth, vnajayati, najiyati , na miyati ti amatam ti vuccati » (Comm. Khuddaka, p. 180). Just as birth always means rebirth, death means reiterated death, cf. Oldenberg, Buddha 2 , p. 46.

1 They are questions which « human reason in its natural progress must necessarily encounter», (Kant, critique of Pure Reason, transl. by Max Muller, p. 340). Cp. 0. Franke, Kant u. die altindische Philosophie, in «Zur Erinnerang an Emanuel Kant» (Halle, 1904), p. 137—8.

2 The same explanation is given by B. Keith, op. cit., p. 63.

3 Translated by M. de la V. P. in the last volume of his Abhidharmakosa, pp. 128 ff. and by me in the Bulletin de l’Acad6mie des Sciences de Russie, 1919, pp. 823 ff

NIRVANA

VI. THE POSITION OF THE LATER SCHOOLS OF THE HINA YANA

He has sought and found a «midd!e path» which evades the dangers of both extremes. How then could such a categorical denial and emphatic protest against two extremes be turned into a connivence in them? This is as much a riddle as the conversion of the Pali Kanon into a manual of thaumaturgy. It would be interesting to know when did Buddha «teach to some persons the existence of Self» (p. 119), i. e., a full blown atmavada or satkayodrsti ?

In many systems, ancient and modern, eastern and western, the reality in itself, the pith of reality, is declared to be something incognisable. It is therefore quite natural to find in the sutra literature, where the style of popular discourses is adopted, the device of impressing upon the audience the mystic character of the Absolute by silence. The Mahayana sutras do not tarry in characterising it as «unspeakable», «unknowable», «undefinable» etc. A long discussion about the essence of the absolute is given in the Vimalakirti-sutra. The question is tackled from different sides, and when Yinnalakirti is at length asked to summarise, he remains silent. Whereupon Bodhisattva Manjusri exclaims, «Well done! Well done! non¬ duality is truly above words U. 1

Nor is this feature limited to Buddhist literature. The Vedantins resorted to the same device when wishing to bring home the transcendental character of their advaita-brahma. Sankara reports a case when the question about the essence of brahma was reiterated three times, without eliciting any answer. 2 At last, when it was asked, «Why don’t you answer?» the reply was, «I do answer (sc. by silence), but you do not understand me». Is it permissible to draw the conclusion that Vimalakirti and those men to whom SankaracSrya refers had themselves no reasoned opinion about the Absolute or that they were quite indifferent and prepared to answer, just as the questioner prefered, in the affirmative or in the negative? 3

1 Cf. Suzuki, Mahayana, p. IOC—107.

2 Ad V. S., III. 2, 17.

3 Vasubandhu (Ab. Kosa, V. 22) reports that it was a rule of dialectics at the time of Buddha to answer by silence those questions which were wrongly formulated, e.g.,all questions regarding the properties of a non-existing thing. Prof. H. 01 den berg rightly remarks on an other occasion, Upanishaden p. 133, «Die eigenste Sprache dieser Mystik, wie aller Mystik, ist Schweigen ».

VI. The position of the later schools of the HInayana