The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)
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and the absolutely real. C. thus maintains that he has both a phenomenal reality ( samvrti ) and a transcendental one ( sdn-vrta ); whereas Dignaga, in admitting the absolute reality of the «thing in itselfo, undermines this line of demarcation and has, as a matter of fact, no phenome¬ nal reality at all.—It would be of some interest to compare this doctrine of a «thing in itself ^ ( sva - laksana) with the doctrine of Kant. The argument that if we do not admit any absolute reality, then the phenomenal will cease to be phenomenal and will itself become absolute (tattvam eva syat, na samvrtih) is quite the same as with Kant, as well as the conception that the thing in itself is a «non-representable x». Kant is fully aware that his conception of a ((thing in itself» is relative, it is, in his words, «acorrelatum to the unity of the manifold in sensuous intuition » (Critique of Pure Reason, transl. by Max Muller, p. 204). For Candrakirti «being correlative» means ohaving no reality in itself ( svabhavena)» , he thus charges the thing in itself with being also phenomenal, and he maintains that there is no other phenomenality than relativity.
1 amuna nydyena. 2 lokhprasiddih.
3 This is the Madhyamika method of saving the moral law under phenomenalism. The phenomenal world is not real, but useful, since by accumulating merit and knowledge (both are inseparable) in it, we cognize its unreality. As far as I can see, this means that the phenomenal world, although unreal, is nevertheless partly real. Whether this method is a better one than the construction of a «categorical imperative» in a phenomenal surrounding, must be left for the specialists to decide.
4 Perhaps to read anyuyato 'nyato ndsayati.
appendix: candeakirti’s comment on relativity, i 155 empirical reality. I take my stand on our usual (unsophisticated conceptions), and then I set forth a series of arguments of which every one is intended to destroy some particular usual conception of mankind. By this method,
I thoroughly undermine the usual views. It is only you that 1, like a vene¬ rable authority, am keeping back from neglecting the rules of usual decent behaviour, (i. e., of logic), but I do not (undermine these rules, i. e. I do not deny) their empirical reality. 1
Therefore, if (it is true that you are also taking your stand upon) empi- 69. 5. rical reality 2 (in assuming your two essences, the strictly particular aud the universal), you are obliged to admit the existence of a stuff' which is charac¬ terized by these essences themselves. Our criticism thus stands, (i. e., the cri¬ ticism of the conception of an ultimate particular is not refuted). However, if we take our stand on transcendental (absolute) reality, then indeed we will deny the (separate) existence of a characterized substance. But then we will also deny both your essences, and both your sources of knowledge.
And moreover (you maintain that speech is not a source of knowledge 69. 8. and that the meaning of our words is purely negative), 3 you do not admit
1 Lit., p. 68.7—69.2 «We will also say the same! Wbatfor is this subtlety, which intro¬ duces us into an expression of common life? Let stand, first of all, yonder «surface» (samvrti) which has reached an existence of its individuality (dtma-bhdva) through logical inconsistency (« paryasa', it is a cause of accumulating the fundamental virtues which bring salvation to those who are desirous of Deliverance, (let it stand), until the knowledge of the Absolute ( tattva-adhigama ) is reached. But you, by your perversely sharp understanding of the division between phenomenal and absolute realities, after having introduced consistency (upapatti) into some points (Icvacit), you destroy (this division) by wrong logic (anydyatah). But here I (come), because I know how to establish phenomenalism (samvrti-satya), taking my stand just on the philosophy (paksa) of common sense (laukika), I (take) one argument (upapatty-antaram) which is adduced for the critique ( nirakarana ) of phenomenal reality and refute it by another (parallel) argument; like a mentor (loka-trddha) I call to order (nivartayami) just yourself, (whenever) you set aside the rules of decency (dcara) (accepted) in the world, [second sense, (dike an ancient authority (on logic, known throughout) the world, I am only refuting you whenever you depart from the ground of common sense ( lokdcara )], but I do not deny phenomenal reality ]». Thus Candra¬ kirti maintains 1) that the phenomenal world aud the world of Relativity are equivalents and 2) since logic is in any case doomed as a means of cognizing the Absolute, he prefers simple real¬ istic logic to a transcendental logical doctrine.
2 Cp. above, text p. 58. 14, transl. p. 140.