The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)
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63 . 8. We thus reject Introspection. (We now return to the single moment of sensation which was supposed to be characterized by self-awareness). Since there is no such (self-awareness, when we say that it is a «thing in itself», a thing characterized ((exclusively by itself», what do we mean?) who is characterized by whom ? 6
63. 9 . And then (we ask), is there here (in this thing which is its own essence) any difference between the essence and the thing possessing that essence, or is there none? In the first case, the essence will be different from the thing, and it will cease to be its essence. It will be in the same condition as any other thing which is not supposed to be its essence. Similarly the thing
1 yoniSah prciyukta.
2 This is the third smriy-upasthdna exercise. That the Mahay'anistic exercise is meaiit is clear, because it results in identifying one’s own consciousness with tathata = tsunyatd.
* 3 Cp. M. vr., p. 536.14, purantam samasritya drstili.
4 cittasvnldksana, Burnouf — la pens6e «contenue en elle-meme».
5 Lit.,63.5. «He does not produce Annihilation*),sc.as theYogininHmayimaissupposedtodo.
6 The Logician, i. e. Dignaga, posits as absolutely real (paramartha sat), unimagined (androptta) existence, the single moment ( ksana ) of existence which is then supposed to coalesce with the single moment of sensation characterized by self-awareness. This moment cannot be characterized by something else, since this would convert it in a relational existence. It is charac¬ terized by itself ( sva-laksana ), it is the «thing in itself». But for the Madhyamika it is relational nevertheless.
appendix: candrakirti’s comment on relativity, i 147 being different from its essence, it will not be the thing possessing that essence, just as any other thing which also does not possess it. And then, if the essence be different from the thing, the thing will be severed 64. 2. from its essence, and (the result will be that) being detached from its own essence it will be nothing, (a non-entity) like a flower in the sky. Now, supposing the thing and its essence are identical. In that case the thing cha¬ racterized ceases to be characterized, since it has coalesced with its own characteristic, (it looses its separate existence), just as the characteristic also looses its owm separate existence. Neither does the essence retain its separate existence, because it has coalesced with the thing characterized. Just as the latter (which has then lost) its own Self (it becomes also lost).
Accordingly it has been said 1 — 64 . 4 .
Characteristic from the thing is different?
The thing is then without characteristic.
And if both are identical,
T’is clear, You have declared
That neither really does exist.
And there is no middle course to be taken between identity and 64 . 7. otherness, if you (wish) to establish the reality of the thing characterized and its characteristic. The author will state this in the following verse. 2
(Supposing thus we have two things) 64. 8.
They are not really one, nor are they two,
(What are they then indeed) ?
How can we their reality assume ?
The Logician further (makes the following suggestion). (Just as the 64. 10. Madhyamika asserts that ultimate reality is something unspeakable, we shall also say that the relation between the thing characterized and its characte¬ ristic is something) unspeakable and thus establish their reality. 3
Madhyamika. This is impossible. Unspeakable reality is assumed by 64. 10.
1 Lokatita-stava, 11 (M. de la Y. P.). 2 II. 21.
3 Lit.,p.64.10—11.« Otherwise,(wct/atetobeomitted,cp.Tib.)(their) reality (siddhi) could (be established) as unspeakable ? It is not so. Indeed unspeakableness, for sure, appears when a mutual split cannot be thoroughly realized ». paraspara-vibhaga is here the same as dvaidhi-karana or vikalpa , a division of something into Aand non—A, involving the so called infinite judgment. Such dichotomy is then called also vikalpa and identified with kalpand « arrangement)) { — yojana), it then covers, directly or indirectly, the whole range of thought, the active element of cognition. Cf.M. vr.,p. 350.12 ff.
io*
64. 14
65. 1
65. 1-2
65. 4 us (when we have proved) that a dichotomy does not resist scrutiny. Indeed, a dichotomy is untenable when it is proved that we cannot independently cognize «this is the characteristic, this is the thing characterized)), we then conclude that both are unreal.
But to establish (the reality of both the members of a dichotomy, as unspeakables), is impossible.
XXXIX. Is THERE A COGNIZER ?
(Further, after having discussed the question whether our knowledge can be regarded as playing the part of) an instrument through the medium of which an object becomes cognized, (it is natural to ask the question whe¬ ther there is something playing the part of a cognizing) agent (in this pro¬ cess of cognition), because neither an instrument, (nor an action, nor its object) are possible without an agent, just as the action of cutting (wood is impossible without an agent).