The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

1 Lit., p. 60.7—61.2 «By conceiving an instrumental essence in sensation the following is expressed, just the particular essence has objectivity, the character of being an instrument belongs to another particular essence, therefore if the particular essence in sensation is an instrument there should be an object different from it, thus the same faults.

2 Lit., p. 61.3—4. « Further it might be that the hardness etc. which is containedin earth etc, being apprehended by sensation, it (sc. hardness) i? just the object of that (sc. sensation), and it is not different from the particular essences.

3 vijudna-svalaksnnn.

4 Lit., p. 66.6—9. (fSome particular essence which is designated «what is characterized)) is object of cognition, some is not object of cognition which is designated «what is characterized through it». Further it also is object-production. Then its different instrument must exist. If the instrumentality of another knowledge is with an effort imagined ( pari-kcdpana ), the fault of an infinite regress is incurred)).

appendix: CANDRAKIRTI’S comment on RELATIVITY, I

XXXVII. Introspection.

The Madhvamika. But then you have (your theory) about Introspec- 6i. 10. tion. According to this theory, (that consciousness which represents our awa¬ reness of a point-instant of reality) is apprehended by introspection. It thus contains (inherent) objectivity (and immanent cognizability). 1

The Madhyamika. We answer. In our ((Introduction to the Madhya- gi. n. mika'Systemw we have already refuted at length this theory of Introspection. 2 That one particular essence (the point-instant) is characterized by another one, (i. e., by our awareness of it), and the latter by introspection — this is impossible!

Moreover (the criticism of Nagarjun a which we have mentioned above 3 62. l. remains). That very (moment of) consciousness cannot be real without having an essence of its own, it cannot exist (without it). And if (on the other hand) there is nothing of which it is the essence, the latter (i. e., the essence), having no support, will have no opportunity to realize itself.

What becomes then of introspection (which is supposed to apprehend such consciousness which is itself impossible)? 4

Accordingly it is said in the ((Questions of Ratnacuda», 5 — 62. 4 .

((Considering consciousness he(theBodhisattva)investigates 6 the stream of thought, 7 and asks wherefrom does it come. The following occurs to him. Cons¬ ciousness arises, if there is an (immanent) object. Does that mean that cons¬ ciousness is one thing and the object another, or that they are identical ? In the first case we shall have a double consciousness. But if they are identical, how is then consciousness to be cognized through consciousness? Consciousness cannot apprehend its own self. The trenchant of a sword cannot cut its own

1 Lit.,p.61.10—11. «Then you suppose that there is self-consciousness, therefore, objectivity existing because of apprehension through self-consciousness, there necessarily (cm) is inclusion in cognizahi]ity».

2 VI. 73 (p. 167. ff.).

3 Text, p. 59.10; transl. p. 142.

4 Lit., p. 62.1—3. ((Moreover, this very knowledge, for sure, not being real separately from the particular essence (and therefore) being impossible, (and) in; the absence of the thing characterized, not being able to operate as a characteristic without any substratum, alto¬ gether does not exist, thus wherefrom self-consciousness? »

5 Translated partly by Burnouf, Introduction 2 , p. 500.

6 Notwithstanding the Tibetan, we prefer here to read with Burnouf cittarn samanupaSyan, justasinthe sequel, p. 62 7 and 63.6. asamanupasyan could only mean «not having yet fully realized what consciousness is (i. e. not having yet attained vipaSyana), he investigates...)).

7 citta-dhara, Burnouf — «le tranchant (de la pensee)».

to

NIRVANA

trenchant. The tip of a finger cannot touch that very tip. Similarly this, consciousness cannot be conscious of its own self*).

63. 2 . «Thus it is that when (a Saint) is thoroughly attentive , 1 (when he is engaged in the spiritual exercise of the Mahayauistic application of mindful¬ ness 2 towards his own consciousness), then it appears to him as undefinable, It neither has an end nor a beginning . 3 It is not changeless, it is not causeless, it does not conflict with the interdependence (of the elements), but it is neither identical, nor non-identical, neither with itself,nor with others. He then cognizes this stream of thought, of thought (as thin as) a creeper, the thought-element, indefinite thought, non-manifested thought, imperceptible thought, thought as a thing in itself . 4 He intuits this (unspeakable thought) as «Tkisness», (the unique Reality of the Universe), he does not suppress it ». 5

«Such is the analysis of thought which he realizes and intuits. This, o noble son, is the Bodhisattva’s exercise of application of mindfulness consis¬ ting in the consideration of what in our consciousness represents its (es¬ sence))).

XXXVIII. The discussion about the point-instant resumed.