The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

2 Lit., p. 60. 1—2. « Further let it he that a characteristic (or essence) is not that by what it is characterized, but, according to Panini, III. 3.13, by making the hyut to stand for the object, a characteristic is the characterized a.

appendix: candrakIrtus comment on relativity, i 143 right, if it really means the tiling possessing that essence), nevertheless a thing cannot be characterized by its own self. That by which it is charactized must be instrumentally related to it, it must be different (from the tiling itself which is) the object (of this instrumental relation). Our criticism (of the notion of an absolute particular) stands. 1

(The criticism is wrong, the Logician will then answer. We assume) that sensation (through which the particular essence reveals itself) is instru¬ mentally related to it, but nevertheless it is immanent in it. We thus escape your criticism. 2

(Madhyamika). Our criticism stands, we will answer. Indeed, we are go. 4—5. here (adhering to the usual conception of what a particular essence is).

The particular 'essence of something, in our opiniou, is that essence which is the exclusive characteristic of the thing, a characteristic which it does not share with anything else. Take, e. g., the following definitions,

1. resistance is the exclusive characteristic of solid bodies,

2. feeling is the reaction (pleasant or unpleasant) produced by an object,

3. consciousness is awareness in every single case (of some object pre¬ sent to our mind or senses)."

This means that by such (exclusive characteristics) something is charac¬ terized. But you brush aside this generally knowm and far spread interpre¬ tation, and admit another one, according to which essence means (not the characteristic),.but the object characterized. 4

However if you imagine that (the absolutely particular, the point-instant) 60 . 7. is characterized by our awareness of it, this can only have the following meaning. (The single point-instant contains a double aspect, the thing caracterized and its characteristic. This, strictly speaking, will be a double parti¬ cular essence), one of them will be the thing characterized, and the other

1 Lit., p. 60. 2—3. «Thus also, since it is not possible that this should be characterized by that, and since by what this is characterized, its instrument, is a different thing from the object, just the same fault».

2 Lit., p. 60. 4—5. « Further it may be that this is not a fault, since cognition is instru¬ mental, and this (instrumentality) is included in the absolute particular#. Jnana is here used in its widest comprehension, it then includes not only pure sensation (vijiiana) but, according to Buddhists and Yedantins, vedema, sukhddi as well.

3 For these definitions of prthivi, vedand and vijiiana cp. my Central Conception, p. 18-19.

4 Lit., p. 60.7. «Having waived off the well known and followed etymology, you assume an object-production#. Before the word jirasiddha, p. 60.7, a cheda must he inserted.

NIRVANA

91. i. will be the characteristic. If our awareness of the point-instant represents its characteristic, the thing characterized, (i. e., the objective side of the relation), will nevertheless represent something different from its characte¬ ristic. Our criticism stands . 1

6 i. 3- Moreover (the Logician may point to the general Buddhist denial of all substance behind the changing sense-data,). The quality of resistance in solid bodies etc. is but a sense datum, revealed in our sensation, it is just the subjective part of that relation, and it does not differ from its particular essence, (it is not something revealed by the sensation, but it is the sensation itself ). 2

6i. 4. TheMadhyamika. But then this moment of sensation 3 itself will never be objective, and then it never will be cognized, because a particular (pointinstant,) can be cognized only under the condition of its being objective (in

61. 5. regard to our consciousness). In that case the following qualification must be added to your statement about the double essence of everything cogni¬ zable, the particular one and the universal one. «One particular essence (of the point-instant) will be cognizable, that one which we (here) have called the characterized (aspect of it). Its other particular essence will not be cognizable, that one which we here have called the characterizing aspect of it».

6 i. 7. But if you (go on to) maintain that this (second aspect is in its turn also) a thing characterized, it will then likewise require some other thing as a charac¬ teristic. And if you in this case imagine a further step in awareness, (an awareness of awareness) as its characteristic, you will incur the danger of an infinite regress in addition (to the fault of disregarding the relation of substance and quality ). 4