The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)
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Therefore if the Buddhist really intends to remain on empirical ground, his ((endeavour is quite useless», he hag nothing better to do than to accept the logic of the Realists. This the Madhya¬ mika has done. He accepts the categories of existence and the modes of cognizing them (the 4 pramdnas ) of the Naiyayikas, as well as the theory that our sense faculties ( sannikarsa) can appre¬ hend the universal as well as the particular things. He accepts all this with the proviso that it is empirical cognition which has nothing to do with the cognition of the Absolute, and which, from the transcendental stand-point, is an illusion (samvrti), since it is relative [Siinya), not abso¬ lute (not paramdrtJia-satya). As to Dignaga’s school, it is true that it investigates that kind of cognition which is not contradicted by experience, which is samvddaka , and defines reality, i. e., ultimate reality, as efficiency. They have the right to maintain that in their logic they partly remain on empirical ground. But they establish a sharp distinction between the «pure» object {hiddha-artha), «pure synthesis, or reasons ( sitddhd Jcalpana), pure sensation (Sucldham pratyakmm — wirvikcdpakam) and empirical definite cognition (niScaya — adhyamsdya). With regard to the latter there is no divergence, hardly any, between the logic of the Naiyayikas and the Buddhists, prapya-visaye (— adhyavasite) nasti vitadah. But with regard to the former, the divergence is decisive, grahya-visaye (— paramdrthasati) tu mahan vivddah. In pure sensation we cognize the pure object, the «thing in itself» ( svalaksana ), the point-instant (ksana), the focus of efficiency. Here we part with the empirical ground, the «thing in itself» cannot be cognized empirically ( jfidnena na prdpyate), but it is reached in pure sensation (api tu vijnanena — pratyaksena = nirrikalpakena). It is a kind of limit, a kind of « Grenzbegriff» ( loka-maryada ), and the logicians who have established it are transcendentalists ( atipatita-loka-maryaddh). It is as much the central conception in Dignaga’s system as Relativity { sunyatd ) is the central concep¬ tion of the Miidhvamikas and Pluralism ( dharmah ) the central conception in Hinayana. All these points will be put in a clearer light in the notes to my translation of the Nyayabindutlka shortly to appear in the B. B. translation series. But it is necessary to keep them in mind in order to understand the next following discussion between Dignaga and Candrakirti about the essence of this «thing in itself#. The attitude of the Madhyamitas towards realism corresponds to the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church towards the plain empiricism of Aristotle. Both the Madhyamikas and the Roman Catholic Church were hostile to critical systems, they preferred realism, with the proviso that it had nothing to do with the cognition of the Absolute which is cognized by revelation or by intuition.
1 The originality of Dignag a’s system of logic consists in the doctrine which admits two distinct sources of knowledge, two only. He calls them perception and inference, but they differ
59. 6
60. 1
60. 2p. 1 ask, the thing possessing this double essentia, does it also exist or does it not?
If it does, we must then have a supplementary object of cognition, (a third kind of it). What happens then to your two sources (established in exact correspondence to the double character of existence)? And if the thing possessing this (double) essence does not exist, the (double) essence (itself will remain in the air), unsupported by something (possessing it). What will then the double knowledge mean? (Nagarjuna) will state in the sequel. 1
Without at all any characteristic
The thing itself becomes impossible.
And if impossible the thing will be.
Characteristics likewise are impossible.
XXXVI. Critique of the notion of an absolute particular pointinstant.
But (says the Logician), we should not interpret the notion of a parti¬ cular essence as an essence possessed by something, but we should avail our¬ selves of the grammatical rule allowing us to interpret this term as meaning the thing istelf which possesses that essence ? 2
(The Madhyamika answers). Even so, (even supposing that you are very widely from what is usually understood by these terms in logic and psychology. They exactly correspond to the double character of everything existing, the particular and the universal. The particular again is not the concrete object usually so designated, but the absolutely particular, the unique, the thing which neither has extension ( desananugata ), nor has it duration { kaldnugato ). it is the thing in itself ( svalaksana ), apart from anything else ( scirvato vydvrtta, tvailokya-vydvrtta j, the point-instant ( ksana). By sense-perception (jpratyaksa) the knowledge corresponding to this point-instant is understood. It is a moment of pure sensation in which no synthesis, no integra¬ tion at all has been produced ( kalpanapodha ). Every synthetic process of thought is contrasted ■with the direct cognition by the senses, as an indirect cognition or inference. Dig naga’s inference thus embraces, besides our inference, all that we would call judgment, intellection, ideation, thought, reason etc., every cognitive process, except pure passive sensation. The point-instant corresponding to pure sensation is the central conception in Dignaga’s system, it represents a differential from which, by a process of integration, all our knowledge is built up. The principle of the Differential Calculus of a planet’s motion ( tatkaliki gatih) was known to Indian astronomers. We still do not know exactly when it was first discovered. Bhaskara in the XH-th century knows it. but Vacaspatimisra,inthe IX-tk century A.D., avers that the point-instant of the Buddhists is the mathematical point known to the astronomers ( jyotir-vidyd-siddhd), cp. Tlitparyatika, p. 386. 1. On the Differential Calculus of Hindu astronomers cp. W. Spottiswoode, J. R. A. S. 1860, p. 221.
1 Y. 4.