The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

(This does not at all imply that Nagarjuna admitted the existence of caused matter).

Another example,

Nirvana is no (separate) entity,

Or else it would be subject to decay and death.

There is no (separate) entity

That never would decay and never die . 6

1 Lit., deduces ad absurdum «the maintainer of reality », the Realist (sa-svabhdva-vadin).

2 We would expect either vivaksaya or vivaksdm anu vidhiyante.

3 Lit., p. 24. 5-6. «There is no accepted deduction ( arthapatti ) being the contrary of the unacceptable deduction (prasanga).»

4 M. s., V. 1. It does not follow that Nagarjuna admits the existence of a real space.

5 M. s., IV. 2.

6 M. s., XXV. 4. If the converse conception be that of a Nirvana immanent in the world and eternal, Nagarjuna admits it, cp. ibid. XXV. 9.

(Bhavaviveka). But these are aphorisms . 1 The sentences of our 25. 3 .
Master contain profound intentions. They can be variously tackled 2 and
give rise to a variety of syllogistic formulation.

(Answer). Why, to be sure, should not the comment of Buddha- 25. 4 . Dalita (which does not contain any syllogistic formulation) be accepted just in this sense, (as the only faithful rendering of Nagajuna’s inten¬ tion).

(Bhavaviveka). It is the business 3 of the writers of detailed com- 25. 4—5. mentaries to make detailed statements about the syllogistic formulations (implied in the aphorisms).

(Answer). This is not (always) the case. Our Master has written a 25. 6 . commentary upon his own manual of dialectics, «The Repudiation of Con¬ tests)), but he did not indulge in it in syllogistic formulations . 4 You are, indeed, merely parading with your cleverness in the science of dialectics.

Although you pretend to be an adherent of the Madhyamika system, you nevertheless compose independent syllogistic arguments. But for such a logician, as you would like to appear, (the Madhyamika method) is only a very great encumbrance. It makes him pile up mistake upon mistake . 5

How is that?

XIX. Examination of Bhaviveka’s formal argument against the Sankhya.

(To combat the Sankhya theory of Causality you have composed the following syllogism).

(Thesis). Mental phenomena , 6 if considered from the transcendental 25.9—26.1. standpoint (of the Monist), are no new productions out of the same (sub¬ stance).

1 artha-vakya

2 parikalpyante.

3 or method, nyaya,

4 This statement can be interpreted as an indirect indication that Gandraklrti knew nothing about a commentary written upon the mula-karikas by Nagarjuna himself. It would follow that the work called Akutobhaya is a forgery as suggested by Wassilieff.

5 Lit.,p.25.7-9.((Merely throughthedesire of displaying the own proficiency in the science of dialectics, the use of independent syllogisms ( prayoga-vdkya ), although having accepted the Madhyamika system, is an indirect indication ( upalaksyate ) of such a logician who is in a very high degree the receptacle of an assemblage of many logical mistakes!»

6 ddhydtmikany ayatanani , cp. above, p. 96 n. 3.

26. 3.

26. 4.

26. 7.

26. 10.

(Reason). Because they exist.

(Example). Just as the Conscious Principle (of the Sankhya which is an eternal unchanging entity).

(Major premise. Whatsoever already exists is not a new self-production).

Now, in this syllogism, by you so formulated, what is the use of the qualification «from the transcendental standpoint (of the Monist )))? 1

(Bhavaviveka). If we take our stand on phenomenal reality we caunot deny origination (of mental phenomena). If this were denied, it would follow that the contrast which we’assume (between the absolute thing in itself and phenomenal reality) does not exist . 2

(Answer). This is not right, because we deny the identity of cause and effect 3 from the phenomenal point of view also. It is corroborated by the following words of the Scripture . 4 «This sprout which springs up from a seed is not produced out of itself, neither is it produced out of non-self, nor out of both, nor without a cause. It is neither created by God , 5 nor by Time, nor from the Atoms, nor from Primitive Matter , 6 nor by Nature ». 7 Here is another text. «The sprout does not belong to the seed, neither is the seed identical with the sprout, nor is it non-identical. It is (a manife¬ station of that unique) Reality 8 which neither (can be determined as) annihilation , 9 nor as (one of the Eternal Principles ))). 10

And in this treatise the author will make the following statement,
Whatever relatively does exist
Is really not what (it appears to be).

But neither is it something else.

1 Lit.,p.25.9—26.2, «Here the syllogism which has been stated thus, as absolute reality the internal bases do not arise out of self, since they exist, just as consciousness, whatfor again in it the qualification «as absolute reality® has been assumed?»

2 Lit, p. 26. 3-4. «And if denied, the admitted repudiation ( badha ) (of the phenomenal by the absolute) would not be entailed (read prasangat)».

3 svata utpatti.

4 From Salistamba-sutra, cf. Sikgasamuc, p. 219. 10 ff.

5 iSvara.

6 prakrti.

7 svabhava.

8 dharmata.

3 uccheda.

10 Such as God, Time, Atom, Matter, Nature etc.