The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

22. 6 . It might be maintained that (the Sankhya) is not affected by this denial of origination. He vindicates thq theory (that causality consists in a new) manifestation (of an existing stuff). However the term «origination)) may also have the meaning of «manifestation)).

Indeed (both origination and manifestation) have the common feature of representing something that was formerly unperceived and became perceived after. Therefore a new manifestation can also be called a new origination.

1 Lit., p. 21. 13 — 14. ((Therefore if there is also, an objection ( codana ) of contradiction by a self-argument ( = 8vdnumdnena, i. e., even admitting that Buddhapalita has produced a real argument), since the faults as they have been depicted do not exist, the non-refutation of the faults mentioned by the opponent is quite impossible. Thus this critique is quite incongruous. This should be known*.

2 Lit., p. 22.3 — 5. «Or else the following other way of formulation. Entities which are not

Spirit, (i. e. are physical), for the advocate of self-origination, for that very reason, do not origi¬ nate out of themselves, because they exist in their own self, just as the (individual) Soul. Thus this example can be quoted*.

It then becomes impossible for the Sankhya to maintain that he is not affected by the denial (of an identity between a cause and its effect ). 1

It may be asked, how is it possible to deduce all these considerations 22. 9 . of detail (out of the short statement of Buddhapalita), since he does not mention them? We answer. His words are full of (profound) meaning. In a concise manner they include the above mentioned details. When analysed they reveal their own self in these details. We do not invent something that is not included in them . 2

XVIII. The third stricture of Bhavaviveka answered. The denial
OF one view does not imply the acceptance of the contrary.

(Bhavaviveka maintains that the repudiation of the Sankhya theory 23. 3 . of causation by a mere deduction ad absurdum involves acceptance of the opposite theory, viz. that cause and effect represent two different sub¬ stances. This is wrong), because the converse theory will be again charged to the account of the same opponent, not to our account , 3 since (we have declared that) we have no theory of our own. We therefore (can¬ not be accused) of contradicting our own principles. But if the many objec¬ tions that have been already raised against the opponent are accrued by charging to his account the counterpart of our deduction, we really will only welcome it . 4

The Master Buddhapalita is a faithful adherent of the method of 24. 1. Nagarjuna. How can he possibly pronounce something inadvertently 5 that wmuld give an opportunity (to his opponent)? When a philosopher who

1 Lit., p. 22. 6'—8. ((Although the denial of origination does not repudiate the maintainerof manifestation, nevertheless by using the word origination in the sense of manifestation, since by the similarity of non-perception before and perception after just a manifestation is expressed by the word origination, the denial is not non-repudiatory».

2 Lit., p.22.9—23.2. «How is again this detailed analysis (vyasta-vicara) attained without an expression of the meaning as it is here told? It this is asked, then this is answered.

These sentences, (full) of meaning, are very much meaning, they are turned out ( pravrttani ) in summarizing the meaning as it has been told and, being commented upon, they give birth to their own self, the meaning as is (here) told, thus nothing is imagined which is not (really) as¬ sumed*.

3 Both prasanga and tad-viparyaya are used together to prove the same thesis in, e. g., Sasvadars., p. 21 (Poona, 1924).

4 Lit., p. 23. 4-6. «And the more faults of the opponent are deduced through a deduc¬ tion of the contrary of (his, sc. Buddhapalitas) deduction, the more desirable will it indeed be for us.»

5 sdvakaSam.

NIRVANA

appendix: candeakIrti’s comment on RELATIVITY, I

24. 7.

24. 8.

24. 10.

• 24. 12.
• 26. 1.

denies the reality (of single objects) deduces ad absurdum the conception of their reality , 1 how can he be charged with the counterpart of this deduc¬ tion? Our words are not policemen! They cannot deprive us of our liberty! (Words) possess a power (to express something), but they are controlled by the intention 2 of the speaker. Therefore the only result of our deduction is to repudiate the theory of our opponent. Our acceptance of the converse theory is not at all therewith implied . 3

Our (common) Master Nagarjuna, when combating opposed opinions, has very often had recourse just to a deduction ad absurdum , (without ever admitting its positive counterpart).

E-g.,

We find nothing (called empty) Space,

Before its essence has (here) been determined.

If it would previously to this determination preexist,

It would be Space without an essence . 4
Supposing all the causes of some matter taken off,

And we would call it matter none the less,

It would be matter without causes.

But nowhere without causes any matter does exist . 5