The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

APPENDIX: CANDRAK1R1TS COMMENT ON RELATIVITY, 1 107

Therefore it neither has an end,

Nor has it a beginning . 1

(Bhavaviveka). The qualification («from the standpoint of trans- 26. 13. cendental reality») has been introduced (iuto the above syllogism) iu consi¬ deration of the opinion held by the opponent.

(Answer). This is a wrong method, because we do not admit his con¬ struction , 2 eveu from the point of view of phenomenal reality . 3 Non-Buddhists are absolutely lacking the right understanding of (the division 27. 1. between) both realities, (the transcendental and phenomenal one). (It is therefore much better) to repudiate them from both these standpoints.

I would think it a great advantage. The above qualification is thus out of place, even if it is introduced in order (to distinguish the view taken by the author from) the views of the opponent (or from the ideas of simple people).

As to simple people they do not understand what self-origination 27. 3. means. For them also the qualification is useless. Unsophisticated people simply admit that an effect is produced by a cause. They do not enter into such considerations as to whether (the effect) is identical (to the cause), or not.

Our Master (Nagarjuna) has (really) established the same thing, (viz. that we must avail ourselves of the every day idea of causality without any hope to explain it metaphysically). It is therefore clear that the qualification is absolutely senseless.

XX. Bhavaviveka 5 s argument assailed from the standpoint of
FORMAL LOGIC.

However (let us agree and admit that) the qualification might have 27. 7. been introduced in order to intimate that phenomenal causality is not denied. (The syllogism of Bhavaviveka will then nevertheless be formally deficient, since its example, the Spirit, and its reason, the fact of «the existence)) of mental phenomena, will both be ultimately unreal). We will then have either the logical error of a faulty thesis, since it will refer to

1 M. s., XVIII. 10 ,pratitya — Sunya; Sasvata « beginningless®, cp. XXV. 21. Cp. Kant’s solution ef the first antinomy, viz. that the world is neither finite, nor infinite because «a pheno¬ menon does not exist by itself®, op. cit. p. 410 ff.

2 vyavastha.

3 It is not right to maintain that the Sankhya’s view of phenomenal reality is admissible with the qualification that from the transcendental point of view it will be an illusion.

something (sc. the mental phenomena) which (the author of the syllosgim) himself, (from his own monistic point of view), does not accept as real ; 1 or we shall have the logical error of a faulty reason , 2 (viz. the fact of the existence or reality of mental phenomena) which will then refer to something (equally) unreal.

Indeed (Bhavaviveka) himself (being a Madhyamika) does not admit the transcendental reality of (separate) mental phenomena 3 (and at the same time he composes a syllogism about this very non-existing thing).

27. 9 . (Bhavaviveka). This does not matter, since we admit the pheno¬ menal reality of the sense of vision etc.!

(Answer). But then, who is qualified by the words «from the transcen¬ dental standpoint))?

27. 10. (Bhavaviveka). If considered from the transcendental point of view the existence 4 of the phenomenal sense faculties 5 (and of empirical conscious¬ ness ) 6 is not real. The qualification is introduced in order to specify the kind of causality which is denied.

27 . n. (Answer). Then you ought to have expressed yourself (otherwise. You ought to have spoken) exactly thus: «the supposed phenomenal reality of the sense-faculties etc. is no reality in the transcendental sense». But your ex-

28. l. pression is different . 7 However, even supposing you would have expressed yourself (properly), nevertheless (you would not have escaped) the logical error of a faulty thesis since it would then have referred to (empirical sensations, i. e., something quite) unknown to your opponent . 8 (For the

1 This paksa-dosa would be probably classified by Dignaga as anumana-nirakrta, cp. Nyayabindu, p. 59.1. (B. B. VII).

2 About the aSraya-asiddha hetu-dosa cf. Nyayabindu, p. 64.16. The logic of Dignaga forbids deductions from facts which the author of the syllogism, from his own point of view, does not admit as real, cp. ibid. p. 63.13 ff.

3 Lit., «of the basis of the sense of vision ( caksur-dyatana ) and other (subjective bases of cognition, i. e. ddhydtmika-dyatana)».

4 utpatti.

5 eaksuradi.

6 citta (= manas—vijridna ) is included among eaksuradi as dyatana A: 6, cf. my Central Conception, p. 96.

7 The expression that «from the transcendental standpoint the sensations do not arise out of themselves# can be understood as meaning that the transcendental sensations are not identical to their causes. But transcendental sensations do not exist from the Monist’s point of view. Hence for him it will be a syllogism composed about a non-existing thing.