The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

* Lit., p. 28. 1-3. « And even if told, since the opponents admit exclusively a really existing faculty of vision etc., and do not admit nominal realities, it will be a faulty thesis whose sub¬ stratum will be unreal for the opponent. Thus it is not right#.

APPENDIX: CANDRAKlRTl’s COMMENT ON RELATIVITY, 1 1 09

Sankhya) indeed all sensations are absolutely real. He has altogether no nominal (or empirical) realities.

Thus it is that the argument is wrong (either from the standpoint of 28. 3. its author, for whom the separate mental phenomena are not real, or from the standpoint of those to whom it is addressed, because they do not admit any difference between phenomenal and absolute reality ). 1

XXI. Another attempt of Bhavaviveka to vindicate his argument.

But be that as the case may be, we may envisage (the syllogism in 28. 4. question) as referring in general terms just to the relation between a fact,

(the mental phenomena), and one of its characteristics, (viz. existence), without enlarging upon the special (theories which might be entertained by both parties about the nature of mental phenomena or the essence of exis¬ tence). E. g., when it is inferred that words are non-eternal (the general relation of this characteristic to the characterized fact is alone referred to).

Indeed the work of inference would become quite impossible, if the special 29. 1. views entertained in different systems) were to be taken into account. (There are no two systems which agree in the question about the nature of the sound). If we admit (with the Hlnayana Buddhist) that the sound is a secondary element of matter, dependent upon the four universal ele¬ ments , 2 this will not be admitted by his opponent (the Vaisesika), (because he, on the contrary, maintains) that the sound is a quality of the ether, (it is not a substance). This again the Buddhist does not admit on his own behalf. Similarly when the Vaisesika undertakes it to prove that the word is 29. 3. non-eternal, (he can be asked) whether he means the word as a physical product, or the word as a manifestation (of an eternally existing substance).

The first is not admitted by his opponent (the Mimamsaka who postulates the existence of a special eternal substance of whom the spoken words are nothing but separate manifestations). The second is not accepted by (the Vaisesika) himself.

1 According to the logic of Dignaga a discussion must start from facts admitted by both parties, cp. Nyayabindu, p. 62. 3. Sensations real in the absolute sense do not exist for the Monist. The difference of sensations empirically real is unknown to the Sankhya, for him all sen¬ sations are real. Hence, accordingly as we take it, the syllogism of Bhavaviveka will refer either to something non-admitted by the respondent himself,or to something not admitted by his opponent.

2 Cp.. my Central Conception, p. 14.

NIRVANA

29. 4 . The same (applies) mutatis mutandis 1 (to every philosophic issue). (If you admit) that the destruction (of an object) must have a cause, this will not be accepted by the Buddhist on his own behalf, (since he maintains that every existence consists of discrete moments which are evanescent by them¬ selves, without a cause ). 2 But if he alludes to uncaused (invisible) destruc¬ tion (going on at every moment) this will not be admitted by his opponent, (the Vaisesika).

29. 5. Therefore, just as in the case (of the evanescent character of the sound), only the relation of this characteristic to the characterized substratum, in general terms, is taken into account, just so in the present in¬ stance, the mere fact that there is some substratum (called sensations), should be taken (in general), without entering into details, (whether it be a phenomenal or an absolute existence).

29. 7 . (Answer). This is not so, (since in the present case it is just the existence of such a general substratum that is denied). It is denied by no one else than (Bhavaviveka) himself. His avowed aim is here to deny Causality. However, just in denying every causality, he at the same time (eo ipso) denies its substratum, (the caused thing), the substance (of the thing produced), (converting it in a thing which) owes its existence to a mere

30. 2 illusion. Illusion and reality are indeed opposites. (The pluriverse as it ap¬ pears before the unsophisticated eyes of mankind is either logically incon¬ sistent or it is a reality) . 3

30. 3. If it is logically inconsistent , 4 and if (this plurality) which is not the real (condition of the universe) is wrongly apprehended by us as real, if it is a false impression in the mind of the perceiver , 5 then

1 yatha-sambhavam.