The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)
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1 The school of the Mimamsakas imagined that the word was an eternal transcendental substance, somewhat similar to the Platonic idea. The uttered word was then only its particular manifestation. The logicians and all other schools of philosophy denied the existence of the eternal word on the score that the word which we know from experience is an impermanent pro¬ duction. To illustrate the rules of logic this example is as popular in the whole East, as the de¬ duction of Socrates’s mortality is the current example of the first form of the syllogism in the West.
2 Instead of readiug, p. 21. 3, tathci ca it would be preferable to read na tu , but tathd ca is also possible, since a vaidharmya-drstdnta is also sometimes introduced in this way. After avasthayam a cheda must be inserted.
3 upanayana.
called) application (of the middle term to the minor), and thus it is that 21. 5 . (Buddhapalita) lias really elicited in the argument of the Sankhya a contradiction, (he has done it) just by an independent argument of his own.
How is it then that you accuse him of giving neither a reason, nor an example? 21. 7.
XVI. The answer of the Sankhya virtually repudiated by Buddha¬ palita
(We have thus shown that the accusation of Buddhapalita) for not 21. 8 . having produced (a regular syllogism) with a reason and example is not foun- . ded. But not only this. Equally unfounded is the accusation of not having repudiated the (double) stricture of the opponent, (sc. the Sankhya, who accuses him either of telling nothing new or of contradicting himself ). 1 (Virtually he has repudiated the Sankhya also). How is that? (The San¬ khya maintains that if our denial of identity between cause and effect only means that the effect is a new manifestation of the same stuff, this he has himself always admitted). Yes, but the Sankhya has never admitted that causation consists in a manifested jar, a jar standing before us, being once more manifested, and it is just this manifested jar, in its ready form , 2 that we take as an example (when we prove the absurdity of the idea of an identity between cause and effect).
Regarding the non-manifested jar, the jar in its potential condition 3 21. 10. (as a clump of clay), it is clear a fortiori 4 that (from our point of view) it cannot be produced. How is it then possible to accuse our thesis of falling in (with the Sankhya view ) 5 and how is it possible to accuse our argument of being selfcontradictory ? 6
(To summarize) our opinion. (Buddhapalita) has pointed out the 21. 13. contradictions (in the Sankhya theory of causality not only by a deduction ad absurdum , but) also by an independent argument. Nevertheless the faults imputed to him do not exist. It is therefore impossible to maintain that he
1 Cp. above p. 97.
2 Lit., p. 21.10, «be cause its form (or essence, rupa — svariipa) is established (as an example)#, cp. the Tib. transl.
3 Sakti-rupdpanna.
4 viiista-sddhya, a qualified predicate, a predicate d fortiori ; anabhivyakta-rupa-anutpatti = karana-rupa-karyasya anutpatti—parata anutpatti.
b Lit., p. 21. 11, «the objection of a faulty thesis of proving the proved#.
6 Cp. above, p. 97.
nirvana
APPENDIX: CAN DR A K1RTI 8 COMMENT ON RELATIVITY, I
has not answered the accusations of the Sankhya. The whole onslaught (of Bhavaviveka) is therefore absolute nonsense . 1
XVII. Some minor points explained.
22. l. (It might be objected that the example of a jar is not convincing enough. The rule may apply for the production of a jar out of clay, and not apply to the production of a piece of cloth out of threads? No, because) we say a jar etc. By the etc. the inclusion of every possible object which can originate is indicated. There is not the slightest possibility to doubt (that the rule might not apply) to a cloth etc.
22. 3. The argument (against the Sankhya) may have also been formulated
(by Buddhapalita) in another way, viz.,
(Thesis). All physical entities do not arise out of themselves.
(Reason). Because they always exist in their own essence (i. e., because
Matter is eternal).
(Example). Just as the (eternal) Spirit does.
The (Sankhya who advocates the identity of cause and effect (must accept this argument) for that very reason (that he advocates this identity which is here exemplified by his changeless Spirit). This example (of the Spirit whose eternal identity the Sankhya admits) may have also been quoted (by Buddhapalita in order to combat the Sankhya view ). 3